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Abstract  
With the rapid increase in wireless devices, an effective improvement in the 
demand of efficient spectrum utilisation for gaining better connectivity is needed. 
Cognitive Radio (CR) is an emerging technology that exploits the inefficient 
utilisation of the unused spectrum dynamically. Since spectrum sharing is 
responsible for coordinating channels’ access for Cognitive Users (CUs), the 
Common Control Channel (CCC) is one of the existing methods used to exchange 
the control information between CUs. However, the unique characteristics and 
parameters of Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) present several possible threats 
targeting spectrum sensing, spectrum management, spectrum sharing, and 
spectrum mobility leading to the deterioration of the network performance. Thus, 
protection and detection security mechanisms are essential to maintaining the 
CRNs. This thesis presents a novel decentralised CR MAC protocol that 
successfully utilises the unused portion of the licensed band. The protocol 
achieves improved performance; communication time and throughput when 
compared to two benchmark protocols. Less communication time and higher 
throughput are accomplished by the protocol due to performing fast switching to 
the selected available data channel for initiating data transmission. The proposed 
protocol is then extended to two different versions based on two authentication 
approaches applied to it; one using Digital Signature and another is based on 
Shared-Key. The two proposed secure protocols address the security requirements 
in CRNs leading to subsequent secure communication among CUs. The protocols 
function effectively in providing defence against several attacks related to the 
MAC layer such as; Spectrum Sensing Data Manipulation/Falsification, Data 
Tempering and Modification, Jamming attacks, Eavesdropping, Forgery and Fake 
control information attacks, MAC address spoofing, and unauthorised access 
attacks. The associated security algorithms ensure the successful secure 
communication between CUs in a cooperative approach. Moreover, the security 
protocols are investigated and analysed in terms of security flows by launching 
unauthorised access and modification attacks on the transmitted information. The 
testing results demonstrated that two protocols perform successful detection of 
threats and ensure secure communication in CRNs. 
 v 
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Introduction 
1 
 
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
Radio spectrum is a natural resource, spanning a range from 3 KHz to 300GHz, 
with most of it remaining underutilised (Tang & Wu, 2012). In 1999, Joseph Mitola 
(Mitola & Maguire, 1999) introduced a new technology called Cognitive Radio 
Network (CRN). This is based on different techniques namely Software Defined 
Radio (SDR), Opportunistic Spectrum Allocation (OSA), and Dynamic Spectrum 
Allocation (DSA). This technology intelligently adapts its environment to facilitate 
transmission among the cognitive nodes.  
This chapter discusses the background of the CRN technology and its main core 
functions that enable the unique characteristics and operations of the technology. In 
addition, it focuses on the details of the spectrum sharing classifications, security, 
and their related challenges. Since spectrum sharing is enabled through usage of the 
common control channel (CCC), more attention is paid to the security of this 
channel. The chapter also introduces the security requirements in CRNs, and the 
research issue. The main aim and objectives of the research along with its scope and 
limitations are defined. The chapter is concluded with an overview of thesis 
organisation. 
1.1. Cognitive Radio  
Cognitive  Radio  (CR) (Tang & Wu, 2012) technology  promises  to  intelligently  
solve  the  issues  in  conventional wireless technology related to their limited and 
under-utilised spectrum (Shin, et al., 2010). This problem has become an issue of 
greater concern given the continued increase in wireless devices that use unlicensed 
bands to operate, which has resulted in overcrowding, leading to inefficient use of 
these spectrum (Zhao, et al., 2007) (Zheng, et al., 2008) (Wang, et al., 2008). 
Therefore, CR provides a resolution to spectrum inefficiency and the shortage on 
these bands by allowing CR users to opportunistically access the vacant spectrum 
(Chen, et al., 2008). This in turn results in great opportunities for a rising number of 
cognitive users (CUs) to use these bands through an optimised approach for 
utilising radio resources (Lin, et al., 2011) (Baldini, et al., 2012).   
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A cognitive radio network (CRN) has its own intrinsic fundamental approach and 
principle for dynamic operation within the environment, unlike the conventional 
wireless network approach that is based on static radio frequency spectrum with 
fixed licensed users (LUs) and fixed channel (Zhang & Li, 2009). This indicates 
that the cognitive ability and re-configuration capability are the core elements that 
make CR an advanced technology that grants dynamic access to the unused 
spectrum for both licensed and unlicensed users through certain characteristics: 
adoption, awareness, modification, capability of learning, observation, and 
communication in realistic environments (Ucek & Arslan, 2009) (Sanyal, et al., 
2009) (Wang, et al., 2010) (Huayi & Baohua, 2011) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011) 
(Tang & Wu, 2012) (Gao, et al., 2012). These characteristics provide reliable 
communication among CUs at anytime and anywhere as a smart and intelligent 
choice to operate dynamically through Artificial Intelligence algorithms such as 
spectrum sensing, spectrum sharing and spectrum mobility (He, et al., 2010) (Tang 
& Wu, 2012). Moreover, they differentiate this new CR technology from existing 
wireless technologies. Due to these sophisticated features, the CR approach is 
known as Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) or Dynamic Spectrum Management 
(DSM) (Datla, et al., 2009) (Baldini, et al., 2012), in recognition  of  the  potential  
to  realise  dynamically different  paradigms  within  a  network. Therefore, CRN 
can be defined as: 
A wireless system-based network with more intelligent functions that provide 
unique characteristics to adjust to sophisticated network environments, parameters, 
and policies for CUs to improve the spectrum utilisation. 
1.2. Cognitive Radio core functions 
There are four fundamental functions that a CRN device must perform as 
shown in Figure 1-1 and stated below (Baldini, et al., 2012) (Domenico, et al., 
2012): 
1. Spectrum sensing identifies the parts of the accessible spectrum and senses the 
presence of the primary (licensed) user operating in the licensed band. 
2. Spectrum management determines the best channel to establish communication. 
3. Spectrum sharing sets up a coordination access among users on the selected channel. 
4. Spectrum mobility vacates the channel in case the LU is detected. 
Introduction 
3 
 
One failure can easily affect and deteriorate the communication or introduce 
vulnerabilities to the network. Each piece of information gained from a specific 
spectrum element will be supplied to the next component in order to initiate its 
task (Baldini, et al., 2012). 
Spectrum Info &
LUs detection
Coordination to 
access a channel
Decision to select a channel
Decision to 
vacate channel
 
 
Figure ‎1-1: Cognitive Radio Main Functions 
These embedded functions have a strong relationship between them for the 
process of establishing an efficient communication considering the regulations and 
policies that govern CRNs. Each function influences another by providing the 
necessary information required during the process of reaching a final decision. For 
instance, once the spectrum is sensed in order to identify the available point of 
access, there are two possible decisions that can be taken: 1) If the LU is detected, 
then the process will be discontinued; and 2) if they are not detected, then the 
obtained information will move forward to the next stage. The spectrum 
management function then decides upon and selects the proper channel for the 
communication. Once the most appropriate channel is chosen, users are directed to 
access the channel by providing their information. During a successful 
communication, spectrum mobility remains ready for any changes that resulted 
from the appearance of a LU by a regular check of the spectrum sensing 
element, or from other alterations to the environment in terms of the current 
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allocation that is provided by spectrum management and spectrum sharing 
elements (Baldini, et al., 2012) (Umamahesw, et al., 2012). 
As long as CRNs have a set of nodes that interact with each other using 
determined  policies, regulations and sophisticated protocols (Kamruzzaman & 
Alam, 2010), they have different capabilities, relating to the spectrum awareness 
of the network operation and spectrum context, defined regulations and policies, 
quality of service (QoS), and user requirements for requesting traffic load 
capacity, resilience and security (Ji & Liu, 2007) (Zhang, et al., 2008). This 
means that cognitive nodes are able to dynamically reconfigure themselves 
according to the current environment in order to transmit and receive on different 
frequencies, in addition to supporting a variety of transmission access technology 
schemes (Akyildiz, et al., 2009) (Shin, et al., 2010). Another capability is for 
resource management that plays an important role in collaborating to assign the 
vacant network spectrum management resources, whether these are internal to the 
current network or external to conventional wireless networks (Wei, 2011) 
(Baldini, et al., 2012). 
1.3. Spectrum sharing classifications 
Spectrum sharing can be generally classified into three major criteria based on the; 
Network architecture, Access technology, and Allocation behaviour (Figure  1-2). 
These classifications can be described as follows:  
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Figure  1-2: Spectrum sharing Classifications 
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1.3.1. Network architecture 
The first technique is based on the network architecture, whether it is centralised 
or distributed (or ad-hoc). In centralised networks such as IEEE 802.22 cognitive 
radio, a base station governs and senses the free channel information from its 
neighbour’s nodes within range (Huahui, et al., 2010). Unlike distributed CRNs, 
the IEEE 802.22 standard requires the final decision on the availability of a 
channel to be performed at the local observation (Figure  1-3). CR nodes in ad-hoc 
fashion generate and utilise a common spectrum allocation for the exchange of 
information about available channels (José, et al., 2015) (Baldini, et al., 2012) 
(Zhang, et al., 2008). Even though there is a positive perspective of the 
centralised entity in order to address better efficiency, the main drawback is that 
the central entity represents a single point of failure (José, et al., 2015) (Baldini, 
et al., 2012). More classifications can be added into ad-hoc networks, classifying 
them into static and mobile networks. These apply in Wireless Sensor Networks 
as a static form, and in MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) as mobile ad-hoc 
networks in which a set of autonomous mobile terminals are liberated to move to 
other existing hybrid networks (Alhakami, et al., 2014). 
1.3.2. Allocation behaviour 
The second technique is based on allocation behaviour whether it is cooperative or 
uncooperative. In terms of the cooperative method, CUs are responsible for 
coordinating the functionalities of the CRN in order to ensure the optimisation of 
the utilisation of the spectrum and improving network efficiency through the 
exchange of information. However, in the case of uncooperative systems, CUs are 
not responsible for coordinating the functionalities of the cognitive devices with 
other CUs. Instead, they implement these functions on their own (Ejaz, et al., 
2011) (Umamahesw, et al., 2012). The main difference between these two 
methods is relatively clear: the first approach essentially requires the exchange of 
information, hence a control channel is strongly required to facilitate the 
exchange of this information. Whereas in the second approach the cognitive nodes 
do the network functions’ tasks on their own without the need for any 
collaboration from other CUs. This would make the task more challenging and 
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difficult for a CU. In addition, this can affect the performance due to reasons like 
lower efficiency, slower sharing of spectrum resources’ allocation, and less 
reliability than the cooperative technique (Wang, 2009) (Baldini, et al., 2012) 
(Gao, et al., 2012) (Umamahesw, et al., 2012). 
CR User 4
CR User 3
CR User 1 CR User 2
CR Base Station
CR 2
CR 1
CR 4
CR 5
CR 6
CR 3
                           
A: Centralised CRNs                                                  B: Decentralised CRNs 
Figure ‎1-3: CRNs Architecture 
1.3.3. Access technology 
The last classification is access technology whether it is overlay or underlay (Ji & 
Liu, 2007) (Arkoulis, et al., 2008) (Zhang, et al., 2008) (Jinhyung & Wan, 
2010) (Umamahesw, et al., 2012). In the overlay approach a CU utilises the 
spectrum without sharing with a LU. This is in contrast to the underlay approach 
in which both LUs and CUs utilise the licensed spectrum at the same time (Zhao 
& Swami, 2007) (Wyglinski, et al., 2010) with strict power control implemented 
by the CUs not to interfere with the LUs. 
1.4. Research Background 
As discussed in section 1.1 that the CRN is a novel approach of wireless 
communication and is completely different from the traditional wireless network. 
The main objective of deploying CRNs is the ability of offering substantial 
wireless communication that effectively improves the unused spectrum for 
gaining better connectivity through occupying the white spaces dynamically. This 
dynamic operation requires cognitive ability and re-configuration capability that 
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CRNs perform to gain dynamic access with the help of the unique CR functions and 
characteristics that distinguish it from the conventional wireless networks (Chauhan 
& Sanger, 2014). However, this would not be successful and accomplish the 
demand of maintaining the network and CUs’ needs without incorporating 
security factors and validating the communication security requirements namely; 
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, privacy, and 
registration (Rizvi, et al., 2014). These security requirements have been 
emphasised and highlighted in several recent surveys, such as in (Khasawneh & 
Agarwal, 2014) (Li, et al., 2015) (Girraj & Ritu, 2015) (Sharma & Rawat, 2015), 
that have been discussed in the literature review and related to the CR security, for 
the need of addressing the security factors leading to achieving the demand of 
successful communication among CUs in the CRNs. 
Therefore, CRNs should ensure the same security level as that of conventional 
wireless networks. However, due to the sophisticated characteristics and dynamic 
operation of CRNs that were discussed in section 1.1, CRNs present new security 
threats (e.g. primary user emulation attack, primary user interference attack, 
falsifying data, denial of service attack, etc. (Li, et al., 2015) (Girraj & Ritu, 
2015)) that guarantee achieving malicious users’ goals for compromising the 
network communication and its resources. Therefore, this issue becomes more 
critical in a cooperative approach, where CUs require exchanging a set of 
available channels that are not occupied by licensed users. Consequently, 
malicious users can easily exploit this opportunity by targeting the CUs’ activities 
for malicious and selfish purposes such as gaining unauthorised access, making 
the exchanged channels unavailable, creating interference over the selected 
channels, modify or replacing the transmitted channel information. Accordingly, 
malicious users terminate the communication and increase the possible damages 
to the licensed users’ activities over the licensed channels. Thus, CRNs strongly 
need to incorporate the security by all possible means for providing successful 
communications among CUs requiring the meeting of their demands. 
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1.4.1. Security requirements in CRNs 
In order to maintain the network performance, several security aspects must be 
considered and addressed in CRNs. These are explained as follows:  
1.4.1.1. Access control 
As access control provides the guarantee to access the network only if CUs meet 
and follow the defined policy, it coordinates the CUs’ spectrum access to avoid 
collisions that may occur due to utilising the same band. Thus, the security 
property of the physical layer plays a major part to ensure the correct and 
unmodified spectrum sensing information (Xiang, et al., 2010) (Parvin, et al., 
2012). 
1.4.1.2. Confidentiality 
Here the information is accessed only by the intended authorised users and it is 
transmitted in unintelligible form to the unauthorised users. Confidentiality is 
considered as a significant security requirement element in CRNs as the available 
channels are not guaranteed (Mathur & Subbalakshmi, 2007) (Parvin, et al., 2012) 
(Hanen, et al., 2014) (Rizvi, et al., 2014).  
1.4.1.3.  Authentication  
Authentication schemes are widely considered to be the best solution to ensure 
data is transmitted amongst authorised users and that only those legitimate users 
can access the transmitted data (Zhu & Zhou, 2008) (Alhakami, et al., 2012) 
(Hanen, et al., 2014). This requires that data integrity is preserved from any 
modification, as information messages  propagate  through  a  number  of  users  in  
order  to  arrive  at  their  destination. This is particularly important when wireless 
technology permits the injection of adversary packets in multi-hop environments, 
which increases the level of threats (Alhakami, et al., 2012). Therefore, the 
application of an authentication mechanism is intended to protect the network 
from eavesdropping, and the saturation of the CCC making it prone to a DoS 
attack. Usually adversary users have their own targets and interests to affect the 
network and its performance. Encrypting the negotiation/control information 
phases help to maintain the whole network by hiding decisions from the adversary 
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users (Zhu & Zhou, 2008). For instance, once the Free Licensed Channels List 
(FCL) has been determined between two CUs, an encryption mechanism will hide 
the FCL information from any malicious users once they need to switch to a 
different channel. The use of cryptography techniques for exchanging control 
channel information is essential to prevent potential misbehaviour (Zhu & Mao, 
2011) (Baldini, et al., 2012) (Alhakami, et al., 2012). 
During the negotiation phase, the authentication mechanism and encryption 
algorithm function to ensure secure communication between the CUs. As 
discussed in (Zhu & Zhou, 2008), a network vulnerability can be opened for 
attackers if insecure transmission is launched, in which an attacker easily exploits 
this chance to launch DoS attacks. However, due to  the  absence  of  a  
centralised  node  to  act  as  a  base  station  in  multi-hop  environments,  an 
authentication scheme should be relatively simple in order to save energy for CUs. 
This means that complexity can be a drawback in some cases due to the greater 
energy and time required to process the security algorithms. Nevertheless, the 
authentication in a multi-hop environment will avoid the most common threat in 
centralised networks, which is having a single point of failure. This type of threat 
is common among all types of centralised networks such as IEEE 802.11, IEEE 
802.15 and IEEE 802.16. However, this problem is lessened in multi-hop 
networks, where the authentication mechanism takes place locally between CUs 
(Alhakami, et al., 2012). 
1.4.1.4. Availability  
This is the process of ensuring the authorised access to resources at any time. The 
security purpose here is to make the stored information and resources available to, 
or being processed by, the authorised user (Sazia, et al., 2012). In centralised 
networks such as IEEE 802.22 cognitive radio, a base station governs and senses 
the free channel information from the neighbour’s nodes within the range. 
Although the IEEE 802.22 standard (Stevenson, et al., 2009) establishes that the 
final decision on the availability of a channel must be performed at the base 
station for both CUs and LUs, in decentralised networks there is no central 
entity to collect the information for the available channels. Therefore, security 
features are required to be equipped with CUs for maintaining the network, 
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achieving the procedure on how nodes securely update their information with their 
neighbours (Alhakami, et al., 2012) (Hanen, et al., 2014) and preventing DoS 
attacks while making the spectrums available for both LUs and CUs. 
1.4.1.5. Authorisation 
Authorisation is the ability of the system to allow the access to the network. It 
requires authorised parties to be allowed to configure and manage the spectrum 
without the base station. Cognitive nodes must successfully authenticate their 
encrypted configuration and information among the nodes by using an efficient 
algorithm.  
As long as the main focus of this thesis is the MAC layer security which 
considers the core point that deals with data transmission between two different 
CUs, the availability of the CCC is the most essential part to allow for the 
negotiation and transmission of data among CR users. However, the CCC is 
mainly targeted by a malicious user to launch the DoS, and Selfish behaviours 
aiming to maximise their performance interest or saving energy instead of 
cooperating in communication between two nodes through itself (Leon, et al., 
2010). The MAC layer is particularly vulnerable due to existing weaknesses 
within itself in terms of poor authentication in multi-hop networks. Additionally, 
the lack of an encryption mechanism for exchanging frames in the control 
channel creates easy access for any malicious behaviour. Once the control 
channel becomes saturated by an attacker, the service can be compromised by a 
DoS attack. Since CR ad-hoc networks do not have any centralised entity, the 
authorisation becomes more challenging (Alhakami, et al., 2012). 
1.4.1.6. Integrity 
 Integrity refers to the assurance of transmitting data from any modification, 
insertion and/or deletion. It is significantly important as the technology uses 
wireless medium for transmitting data and permits the injection of adversary 
threats. Therefore, using advanced cryptographic techniques assist to achieve data 
integrity in CR technology (Parvin, et al., 2012) (Hanen, et al., 2014). 
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1.4.1.7. Non-repudiation 
 Non-repudiation aims to achieve the transmitted message from being denied by 
either the sender or receiver CUs (Hanen, et al., 2014). Hence, it provides the 
assurance of the transmitted message from the right user and can then be used as a 
proof against themselves if they attempt to misbehave (Zhu & Mao, 2011) (Goyal, 
et al., 2011) (Rizvi, et al., 2014). 
1.4.2. Cryptographic schemes 
As long as cryptographic schemes play significant roles to secure and ensure the 
authenticity and integrity of the transmitted information within a network, they 
are different in their functionalities and operations of managing their keys that 
are employed for the encryption/decryption procedures and message authenticity. 
For example, both symmetric and asymmetric key algorithms function to 
guarantee secure transmission while the Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
algorithm provide the integrity and authenticity assurance of the transmitted 
messages within a network (Toldinas, et al., 2011) (Koopman & Szilagyi, 2013). 
Therefore, these algorithms are discussed in details as follow: 
1.4.2.1. Asymmetric-key algorithm 
This is also referred to as Public Key Cryptography in which two different keys 
known as private and public keys are applied. Each user has a pair of these keys 
for encryption and decryption purposes. The public key is used to encrypt the 
transmitted data and does not require a secure system for the secure key 
distribution while the private key is kept securely by the user to decrypt the 
received information. The Public Key Cryptography algorithm is more secure 
and supports another efficient security technique known as digital signature 
which provides message authenticity. However, the limited energy of the devices 
is affected by the usage of the key size which is required to be considered to 
provide the demand of the security. RSA is an example of public key 
cryptography algorithm (Krishna & Doja, 2011) (Kaur, 2013). 
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1.4.2.2. Symmetric-key algorithm 
It is also known as shared key, where a single, secret key is shared between two 
or more entities for encryption and decryption purposes (Kaur, 2013). Each user 
can encrypt or decrypt the transmitted information using the same key and this 
also can be applied to other users who have the same shared key. This has lower 
complexity than the public/private key pair, thus making it more energy efficient 
(Krishna & Doja, 2011). However, it requires a secure system in order to 
distribute the shared key among the participating users within the network. The 
AES algorithm is an example of a Symmetric-key system. 
1.4.2.3. Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
MAC has been used widely in different networks due to the efficient functionality 
that can be provided within such communication. It is used in a situation that 
requires integrity assurance and message authenticity (Koopman & Szilagyi, 
2013). An attacker can modify the transmitted message through applying bit 
flipping of that original message before it is received by the intended destination. 
Therefore, the receiver is not able to detect any modification occurred on the 
original transmitted message unless a shared secret key is used to key message 
coding in order to generate a Message Authentication Code Key (MAC Key) for 
the assurance of message integrity and authenticity (Capkun, et al., 2008). 
1.5. Motivation  
The CRN MAC layer functions in sharing the physical medium for establishing 
the communication among users wirelessly within the same range. However, 
achieving a successful communication in CRNs is a challenging task and 
considered one of the most critical issues, since the CRN suffers from various 
presented security threats that lead to DoS attacks due to its inherent 
characteristics (Hanen, et al., 2014). These threats target all the CR functions; 
spectrum sensing, spectrum management, spectrum sharing, and spectrum 
mobility for the aim of preventing CUs from using the available white spaces 
(Zhang & Lazos, 2013) (Sharma & Rawat, 2015). Consequently, the overall 
network operation and performance is easily affected in a DoS attack. Therefore, 
performing security at the MAC layer of the cooperative decentralised CRNs is 
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essential for providing defence against the MAC layer security threats related to 
the channels availability and successfully leads to achieving the CUs goal of 
successful and efficient communication over the unused spectrum (Rizvi, et al., 
2014).  
Moreover, marinating secure communication is another crucial aspect to 
guarantee the exchange of control information and data between CUs. However, 
the primary security concerns in decentralised CRNs are authentication and data 
confidentiality (Alhakami, et al., 2014). Compromising on these elements can 
potentially lead to the modification, forgery, or eavesdropping of the MAC frames 
in CRNs, which could, in turn, increase the chance of DoS attacks that would 
adversely affect the performance of the network. However, these security factors 
in distributed CRNs have received relatively little attention in the literature, 
perhaps due to their complex nature and dynamic topology (Goyal, et al., 2011) 
(Alhakami, et al., 2014). These must be investigated properly in order to meet the 
security needs of the CRNs technology. Further research is required in order to 
support the security requirements, especially to provide authentication assurance 
for the authorised access. These requirements assist in maintaining secure 
communication and enable the provision of available resources in distributed 
multi-hop CR environments, while simultaneously avoiding external threats. 
Moreover, an encryption method is required to support secure communication 
between end users, and considering the inherent power limitations of the devices 
(Goyal, et al., 2011). This issue is also important because of the lack of a central 
entity that provides security and key management to end users. Thus, the 
simulation of a secure CR MAC protocol must involve the design and simulation 
of a robust, secure system that can achieve authentication, availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, anonymity, and authorisation to 
achieve the security demands (Attar, et al., 2012) (Alhakami, et al., 2014). 
1.6. Problem statement 
The MAC layer of decentralised CRNs is more exposed to security threats and 
attacks such as eavesdropping, forgery, DoS, and selfish behaviours. These 
vulnerabilities represent the main security concerns in CRNs (Hanen, et al., 2014) 
Introduction 
14 
 
(José, et al., 2015). A compromise on authentication and data confidentiality can 
lead to the modification and forgery of MAC CR frames resulting in potentially 
increasing the chance of DoS attacks (Zhu & Zhou, 2008) (Tang & Wu, 2012) 
(Attar, et al., 2012). For this reason, an authentication and secure communication 
mechanism in decentralised CRNs is strongly needed due to the absence of a trust 
entity among CUs. Unlike in traditional wireless networks, such as Wi-Fi and 
WiMAX, where base stations and access points function as central and core 
entities that provide security key management to end users, CUs need to 
incorporate security by all possible means in order to protect the network 
components. However, the authentication mechanism in decentralised CRNs has 
not received much attention (Yu, et al., 2010) (Tan, et al., 2011), and the related 
vulnerabilities are likely to remain unsolved due to the discrepant unique 
environment (Jhaveri, et al., 2012). Further research is essentially required for the 
demand of achieving strong authentication to maintain a secure communication in 
distributed multi-hop CR environment. 
The control channels selection in decentralised CRNs decreases the probability of 
successful communication among the cognitive nodes due to authenticity and 
validity of the CUs. As discussed in (Sanyal, et al., 2009), CUs are the non-
licensed users and attackers easily exploit the CUs, escalate their privilege, and 
might damage the spectrum and the traffic of the LUs as well. Moreover, without 
security, this issue becomes more critical when cognitive nodes use the 
spectrums in the absence of the LUs or not using their licensed bands. Moreover, 
selecting data channels for exchange of data among the cognitive nodes without 
the authenticity of the CUs is another issue that needs to be addressed in CRNs 
especially for maintaining the links if the LU returns to the licensed data channel. 
A number of research has been conducted in developing security in centralised 
CRNs (Cordeiro, et al., 2005) (Wang, et al., 2008) (Shin, et al., 2010). However, 
the issue is that there is little intention being given for investigating and 
developing a complete secure MAC protocol for providing authentication, 
confidentiality, non-repudiation, and integrity in decentralised CRNs (Zhu & 
Zhou, 2008). For example, the authors in (Zhu & Zhou, 2008) investigated and 
analysed DoS and greedy attacks of the MAC layer in decentralised CRNs, but 
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they do not consider such a mechanism to protect the network from these attacks. 
Moreover, there are some recent publications that theoretically highlight the 
importance of addressing the security challenges and its requirements such as in 
(Attar, et al., 2012) (Hanen, et al., 2014) in decentralised CRNs environment. 
Furthermore, some researchers have introduced individual security techniques 
that assist in the detection of a malicious user based on a timing parameter 
technique and puzzle punishment through the control phase (Rakhshanda, et al., 
2008) (Huayi & Baohua, 2011). These techniques are useful in some 
circumstances for controlling selfish attacks which target to maximise attackers’ 
throughput, or to saturate the channel by sending frequent packets. However, 
these techniques do not identify misbehaving users from being internal or 
external in the CR MAC protocol.  
Therefore, there is a strong need of deploying a complete secure MAC protocol 
to ensure the successful communication among the intended CR users and 
maintain the network operation in decentralised CRNs. According to (Wang, et 
al., 2010) and (Rizvi, et al., 2014), the integration of security precautions should 
be at the MAC layer for ensuring the authenticity and integrity among CUs in 
distributed CRNs environment. Consequently, this research attempts to detect 
malicious behaviour and protect the channel sensing results from adversary users 
who target the spectrum management in the cooperative approach leading to a 
DoS attack. Another aspect considered in this research is related to improving the 
network efficiency and connectivity by utilising effective security algorithms.  In 
addition, the main security requirements that were discussed in section 1.4.1 
especially authentication, is taken into account as the primary element, and 
develops two hybrid secure MAC protocols with a dedicated server being 
involved for authentication purposes and for providing security keys to only the 
registered CUs. These secure protocols should operate with minimum 
handshaking frames between CUs as required to address the main security 
requirements in decentralised CRNs. The research also aims to investigate and 
analyse the malicious behaviours’ impact on the network performance. 
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1.7. Research aim and objectives 
This research aims to develop a novel secure MAC protocol for decentralised 
CRNs. The objectives of this research are: 
 To investigate existing secure MAC protocols in CRNs (both decentralised and 
centralised) and the different types of attacks that are possible in CRNs in order 
to identify the security flaws in the existing MAC protocols  
 To propose, and design a novel hybrid secure MAC protocol for CRNs 
(SMCRN) 
 To perform security analysis of the proposed protocol using the BAN formal 
logic 
 To implement and analyse the performance of the proposed hybrid secure 
MAC protocol through simulations 
 To evaluate the performance of the proposed hybrid secure MAC protocol 
against other secure protocols. 
1.8. Research Contributions 
 Accomplishing an efficient decentralised CRNs MAC protocol that 
performs minimum handshaking frames to increase the network 
performance.  
 Deploying two versions of secure MAC protocols to provide strong defence 
against MAC layer security threats. 
 Reducing the communication time of malicious users’ activities over the 
CCC. Thereby, the detection of transmitted fake control frames, which aim 
to increasing the network and server overload in SSMCRN, leads to 
increasing the CCC availability to other CUs and then resulting in achieving 
higher network throughput.  
 Limiting the transmitted secure control information to only a single pair of 
CUs to protect the SLDCH from being targeted by internal and external 
malicious users to make the SLDCH unavailable or launch a jamming 
attack. 
 Protecting the sensing result information (FCL) and the SLDCHs 
availability from launching DoS attacks that can be resulted by modifying 
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the transmitted control information. Thus, both of the secure protocols 
ensured the integrity and authenticity of this transmitted information to 
enable spectrum management taking the correct decision based on the data 
channel selection criteria. 
 Investigating and analysing the impact of both the unauthorised access and 
modification attacks on the transmitted information in each of the secure 
protocols. 
1.9. Research methods  
Due to their adaptive nature, cognitive nodes are difficult to authenticate without 
any centralised entity like a base station (BS). Although, there is a number of 
published work that attempted to address the security issues in CRNs (Sanyal, et 
al., 2009) (Sazia, et al., 2012) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011) (Zhu & Mao, 2010) (Zhu 
& Mao, 2011) (Minho, et al., 2013), most of these studies focus on the security 
in centralised CRNs where BSs are involved in the communication (Zhu & Mao, 
2010) (Zhu & Mao, 2011) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011) (Sazia, et al., 2012). 
However, few published work on the security in decentralised CRNs have only 
addressed the selfish attack which is one of the existing security issue in CRNs 
(Minho, et al., 2013), while others such as (Sanyal, et al., 2009) simply provided 
a theoretical approach instead of simulating the network to show any results to 
confirm their work. Therefore, authentication, data integrity, and secure 
communication are strongly needed in a cooperative approach within a CR 
environment in order to limit the transmitted data to authorised and legitimated 
users only (José, et al., 2015). This leads the work carried out in this research and 
discussed in this thesis to design and implement a novel secure MAC protocol for 
decentralised CRNs with the minimum handshaking of frames between a pair of 
CUs in order to compare and evaluate against an existing well-known MAC 
protocols on performance terms. 
This study, therefore, proposes to explore the generic security mechanisms of 
authentication, authorisation, and integrity for wireless decentralised networks. 
Based on the desired security requirements in CRNs, a selection of security 
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features will be incorporated within the proposed MAC protocol for decentralised 
CRNs. 
Particular attention will be given to the private/public key pair, and secret (shared) 
key cryptography mechanisms, Message Authentication Code algorithm, and 
digital signature with the aim of investigating the possibility of these algorithms 
being used by two CR nodes and addressing the security issues related to the 
MAC layer in CRNs. This will be achieved by selection, analysis, and testing of 
the proposed MAC protocol in terms of security flaws.  
The above mentioned security features will be incorporated within two 
benchmark protocols for comparison with the proposed secure MAC protocol on 
their overall performance.  
1.10. Scope and limitations of the research work 
Since the CR is completely different from the conventional wireless network 
(section 1.1 details the differences between CR and traditional wireless networks) 
the scope of the current research is to address the authentication, authorisation, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation procedures for ensuring secure data 
transmission amongst authorised CUs in only CRNs. Thus, the security in 
conventional wireless networks is excluded from this research due to the different 
operations and subsequent security approaches for the secure communication in 
the context of these networks. Therefore, the current research maintains the 
security in the CRNs by utilising an authentication server and cryptographic 
symmetric and asymmetric keys to maintain a secure communication among the 
CUs. Moreover, the proposed protocol in its two versions based on the type of 
keys used will address several malicious behaviour attacks such as eavesdropping, 
spoofing MAC address, forgery, DoS, and masquerading, and provide mitigation 
procedures against Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification attacks and Jamming 
attacks. These threats are taken in consideration and prevented from attacking the 
network. Some other attacks such as PUE and selfish attacks are not addressed in 
this work, since the PUE belongs to the physical layer and analyse LUs and other 
users’ signals with a number of work already conducted and published on it, while 
the selfish behaviour where selfish users intend to maximise their throughput has 
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also been addressed in (Huayi & Baohua, 2011) (Minho, et al., 2013). These 
selfish behaviour detection mechanisms can be applied in the proposed Digital 
Signature based Secure MAC Protocol for Cognitive Radio Networks (DSMCRN) 
and Shared Key based Secure MAC Protocol for Cognitive Radio Networks 
(SSMCRN) protocols for selfish users’ detection. Thus, there is no significant 
reason to address the selfish behaviour detection in the proposed protocol while 
the existing schemes effectively work against this type of attack and can be 
incorporated in the DSMCRN and SSMCRN.   
On the other hand, the main reason of deploying two different versions of secure 
MAC protocols is to investigate and analyse the authentication mechanism by 
applying different security approaches, digital signature and shared key, and how 
these different security algorithms can affect the network time performance and 
throughput. It is necessary that the all the security requirements required to be 
addressed to provide strong security against any malicious behaviour.  
1.11. Thesis organization 
The following chapters of the thesis can be summarised as follows:  
Chapter 2: This chapter details work that has been done by other researchers in 
CRNs and is categorised in two main parts belonging to the common features of CR 
MAC protocols for utilising and improving the spectrum efficiently and the security 
threats. These common features include the spectrum sensing techniques, spectrum 
access techniques, and number of associated transceivers that are equipped by a 
CU. However, the security part introduces the details of the common security 
threats in conventional wireless and CRNs, the specific security threats in CRNs 
with more attention given to the protection and detection mechanisms that have 
been done by researchers in spectrum sharing security in CRNs.    
Chapter 3: This chapter discusses the design and simulation of the proposed MAC 
protocol without involving the security features. It introduces the protocol’s 
architecture and features such as the number of radios in each CU, CCC access 
technique, spectrum sensing, and licensed data channel selection criteria. Moreover, 
the protocol’s evaluation in terms of the communication time and message delivery 
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rate along with the LUs activities and its impact on the protocol performance is 
analysed and introduced in this chapter.   
Chapter 4: This chapter introduces a framework of the two versions of the 
proposed secure MAC protocol for CRNs. It also details the protocols’ frames 
exchanges and the associated security algorithms for securing the data 
transmission among the intended CUs. In addition, the chapter introduces the 
analysis of the frames’ transmissions among the contributed entities in the format 
of the formal BAN logic, which mainly considers the security features, to validate 
the proposed secure MAC protocols.  
Chapter 5: This chapter presents the simulation stage of the associated security 
features in the two versions of the proposed secure MAC protocol that were 
discussed in Chapter 4. It highlights the security execution time of each applied 
security algorithms such as RSA, AES and MAC, for encrypting and decrypting the 
transmitted information, verifying and ensuring the integrity of the transmitted 
messages, and generating and verifying of the digital signatures for the 
authentication procedure. 
Chapter 6: This chapter focuses on the simulation of the communication part of 
two versions of the proposed MAC protocol with the associated security features. 
Both versions are analysed and compared to each other in order to investigate their 
operations time, and throughput analysis. Furthermore, the impact of malicious 
users’ behaviours in terms of modification on the transmitted messages, and 
unauthorised access are analysed along with their defence against these malicious 
activities. The chapter also investigates the LUs activities and its impact on the 
network performance of the proposed secure MAC protocols. 
Chapter 7: This chapter presents the comparative analysis of the proposed and 
benchmarks protocols with and without security in terms of the operation time and 
network’s throughput as network performance factors. In addition, the influence of 
the LUs activities on the communication time and throughput of both the proposed 
and benchmark protocols are analysed and compared to investigate their extent on 
each protocol.  
Chapter 8: This chapter introduces the conclusion part of the thesis along with the 
future work suggestions.  
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Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter introduces two different main parts belonging to networking and 
security. It highlights the common features of MAC protocols for CRNs in 
which they lead to successful data exchange among users. Moreover, in addition 
to the well-known security issues in wireless networks, CRNs introduce new 
classes of security threats and challenges, such as LU emulation attacks in 
spectrum sensing and misbehaviours in the common control channel (CCC) 
transactions that degrade the overall network operation and performance. This 
chapter briefly presents both the common security threats in conventional 
wireless and CRNs. It also outlines the security challenges in CRNs. However, 
the chapter will mainly focus on spectrum sharing security and its related 
challenges. Since spectrum sharing is enabled through the use of the CCC, more 
attention is paid to the security of the CCC by looking into its security threats as 
well as protection and detection mechanisms. Finally, the pros and cons as well 
as the comparisons of different CR-specific security mechanisms are presented.  
Figure 2-1 presents the common features of the CR MAC protocols while 
clearly highlighting the features of this research’s proposed Cognitive Radio 
MAC Protocol for CRNs (MCRN). 
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Figure  2-1: Spectrum sharing classification in Ad hoc CRNs and the current research direction 
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2.1. Common features of CR MAC protocols 
MAC protocols are designed and implemented to provide the functionality of 
coordinating the spectrum access among a set of CUs. Several aspects and 
mechanisms are involved to achieve the aim of a successful data exchange 
between a sender and receiver. These include the criteria of spectrum sensing to 
find the spectrum hole, the types of mechanism used being either underlay or 
overlay for coordinating channel access by multiple CUs, data channel selection, 
and the number of available radio equipment for each CU.  
2.1.1. Control channel 
The most significant part of the CRNs MAC protocols is the exchanges of the 
control information among CUs in order to determine the criteria of switching to 
the appropriate Selected Licensed Data Channel (SLDCH) before initiating the 
data transmission. This part has received remarkable research that proposed 
different mechanisms for exchanging control information (Ma, et al., 2005) 
(Kondareddy, et al., 2008) (Haythem, et al., 2009) (Lin, et al., 2011) (Romero, et 
al., 2012) in the CRNs. Thus, the control channels can either be static or dynamic. 
The use of the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) or underlay ultra-wideband 
band for exchanging control information is considered as a static approach where 
CUs are assigned a control channel of unlicensed band such as IEEE 802.11b/g 
spectrum (2.4-GHz) spectrum (Salameh, et al., 2008) (Haythem, et al., 2009) 
(Song & Xie, 2012). However, the dynamic channel approach can be classified 
into two types known as dedicated and non-dedicated CCC. Only the dedicated 
approach is considered in this work for several reasons that will be discussed later 
in section 3.2.1.  
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2.1.1.1. Non-dedicated CCC 
In this approach, a non-dedicated CCC is assumed among a set of CUs. Hence, a 
number of CRNs MAC protocols are designed for the exchange control 
information without a dedicated CCC. Instead, CUs necessitate finding the 
spectrum hole based on the spectrum sensing of the licensed channels, then they 
are required to agree about the reliable channel for exchanging their control 
information. This process necessitates successful completion before initiating 
their data transmission process over the selected data channel. However, this 
approach requires stringent time for selecting the control channel and channel 
synchronisation between CUs.  
The work stated in (Joshi, et al., 2009) proposed a MAC protocol for decentralised 
CRNs with an improved network throughput. Their protocol does not consider a 
dedicated CCC and instead it deploys a stable control channel for control 
information exchange among CUs. This is achieved when every CU maintains a 
status table of channels and indexes these channels frequently. Therefore, the 
channel that has the highest stability is determined to be the control channel for 
exchanging control information between a pair of CUs. The work of (Carlos & 
Kiran, 2007) proposed a Cognitive MAC (C-MAC) protocol for decentralised 
multi-channel CRNs. The communication process among CUs is based on 
Rendezvous Channel for selecting the available slot of time to coordinate CUs in 
discrepant channels. Also, the Communication Rendezvous technique is used in 
(Theis, et al., 2011) (Zhang, et al., 2014)  for the negotiation procedure between 
two CUs. Thus, a pair of CUs is required to agree and find an available channel to 
exchange certain control information that belongs to the selected channel for data 
transmission and its data rate before they initiate data transmission. However, the 
Rendezvous approach requires additional time for CUs synchronisation and leads 
to delay occurrence that effect the throughput performance as the network 
resources are not used efficiently.  
Another approach of MAC protocols such as in (Lee & Kim, 2012) requires a 
predefined channel hopping sequence that is determined among CUs in order to 
achieve the hopping process over the existing licensed channels (Song & Xie, 
2012). Both the cognitive sender and receiver necessitate time and channel 
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synchronisation (Zhao, et al., 2007). During this process, a proper channel is 
determined to be utilised to transmit data through exchange of control information 
between both the sender and receiver cognitive nodes. Once successful control 
information is exchanged between the sender and receiver, they end the hopping 
process and start with the second phase of transmitting data. After the completion 
of the data transmission phase, the synchronisation requests are recurred with the 
hopping sequence (Haythem, et al., 2009) (Domenico, et al., 2012). Since this 
approach is achieved over the existing licensed channels (Song & Xie, 2012) both 
the sender and receiver necessitate time and channel synchronisation (Zhao, et 
al., 2007).   
2.1.1.2. Dedicated Common Control Channel 
In traditional distributed wireless networks, the CCC is one of the existing 
licensed channels (Ren, et al., 2012) while in centralised CRNs, a dedicated 
channel can be assigned as a CCC by the central entities whether base stations 
(BSs) or access points (APs) for exchanging the control information (e.g. channel 
availability resulting from spectrum sensing) among the central entities’ 
controllers and CUs (Ren, et al., 2012). However, it also can be employed for 
facilitating the spectrum sharing process between two CUs in distributed 
cooperative CRNs thus a CCC is established between both the sender and receiver 
for handshaking control information frames. Due to these effective functionalities, 
a number of researchers (Kondareddy, et al., 2008) (Safdar & O'Neill, 2009) 
(Haythem, et al., 2009) (Kahraman & Buzluca, 2010) (Huayi & Baohua, 2011) 
(Attar, et al., 2012)  believe that CCC designed procedures can play a major role in 
promoting the initiation of the exchange of information processes among 
cognitive nodes. However, this approach of allocating a CCC for CUs in a 
distributed CR environment is a major challenge due to the absence of the central 
entity that provides the management part for determining the CCC channel, and 
the time difference of the spectrum resources. Therefore, there are two categories 
of MAC protocols which consider the assumption of the existence of a single 
dedicated control channel that is available and reliable all the time for CUs to 
exchange their control information. The first type used is the licensed dedicated 
CCC to exchange the control information among cognitive CUs (Su & Zhang, 
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2008) (Yoo, et al., 2009) (Chen, et al., 2011) (Yin, et al., 2011), while the second 
assumes unlicensed dedicated CCC to be utilised by CUs to exchange their 
control information. Generally, the dedicated CCC assumption is commonly 
known for deployment since it is a convenient place where all the CUs can launch 
and observe the ongoing packets of control information and efficiently simplify 
the architectures of the MAC protocols (Ren, et al., 2012).  
In the work reported in (Zhang & Su, 2011), a MAC protocol called Cognitive 
Radio Enabled Multi-Channel MAC (CREAM) for decentralised CRNs is 
proposed. Two types of channels were considered among CUs to achieve 
successful data exchange. The first was known as the control channel, which is 
assumed to be dedicated, reliable, and permanently available for the contributing 
CUs to exchange their available channel lists. Whereas, the second type 
recognises the data channels for data exchange between CUs. 
The protocol operates based on four handshaking control frames over a dedicated 
control channel. The first two frames are called Ready-to-Send (RTS) and Clear-
to-Send (CTS), and are designed to reserve the CCC and solve the hidden node 
problem, while the other two control frames are known as Channel-State-
Transmitter (CST) and Channel-State-Receiver (CSR), and are responsible for 
exchanging the list of available channels and agreed licensed channels between 
the sender and receiver. Moreover, two different frames, known as Data and 
Acknowledgment (ACK) are exchanged between both the sender and the receiver 
over the selected data channel.  
CREAM is based on contention-based mechanism technique for controlled 
channel access and IEEE 802.11 standard for Distributed Coordination Function 
(DCF) algorithm backoff time. Moreover, each CU is equipped with a single 
transceiver for both control and data channels. However, the licenced data channel 
selection criteria is based on random selection for transmitting data. When the LU 
appears (ON) to utilise the licensed channel, the CUs necessitate restarting the 
process of exchanging control information to switch to different available licensed 
channels for transmitting data. Therefore, due to the use of both dedicated CCC 
among CUs to exchange control information, and multiple Licensed Data 
Channels (LDCHs) for data transmission the protocol is considered as the first 
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benchmark for its comparative analysis with the proposed MAC protocol for 
decentralised CRNs (MCRN).   
The work reported in (Qian, et al., 2013) introduced a cognitive-radio-based 
carrier sense medium access with collision avoidance (CR-CSMA/CA) MAC 
protocol for CRNs. The protocol uses the CSMA/CA technique to access the 
channels utilised by CUs, and can be applied in three different scenarios, where a 
single channel, multiple channels, and a realistic CCC are used to exchange data 
among CUs. However, only the realistic CCC scenario is considered and 
applicable to this thesis, since it has the same feature as the proposed MCRN 
protocol, wherein a CCC is adopted for the exchanging control information. 
Therefore, the CR-CSMA/CA operates based on three handshaking frames over 
the CCC named as PTS, RTS and CTS. The Prepare-To-Sense (PTS) frame aims 
to ask neighbouring nodes to keep quiet for the next duration. Then spectrum 
sensing takes place to detect the channels states and determine the available 
channels. However, Request-To-Send (RTS) and Clear-To-Send (CTS) aims to 
exchange control information and update the NAV of the CUs. Due to the 
operational characteristics that are integrated with the CR-CSMA/CA in terms of 
using a realistic CCC to exchange control information among CUs and multiple 
LDCHs for data transmission, the protocol is considered as the second benchmark 
for its comparison with the proposed MCRN, as they have common features for 
their operations.  
In the work reported in (Joe & Son, 2008), a Dynamic Spectrum Allocation MAC 
Protocol (DSA-MAC) based on Cognitive Radio for QoS Support is designed. 
The protocol is based on ZigBee channels with multiple transceivers assigned to 
each CU for accessing multiple channels simultaneously. Although the ZigBee 
channels have a range from 0 – 26, the proposed protocol specifies channel 0 as a 
dedicated CCC for adapting four handshaking frames whereas the rest of the 
channels (1 to 26) are used for transmitting the data. If a LU appears to use the 
licenced channels, CUs are required to restart the process for selecting both CCC 
and data channel for transmitting procedures. 
The work reported in (Hussein, et al., 2013) proposed a MAC protocol for 
centralised and decentralised CRNs. The protocol required a control channel to 
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exchange the control frames for determining the selected available channel for 
data transmission. Each CU is equipped with a single transceiver and performs 
802.11 DCF technique for the control channel access. 
The authors in (Jia, et al., 2008) designed a MAC protocol called Hardware-
Constrained Cognitive MAC (HC-MAC) for decentralised CRNs in which the 
assumption of common control channel is available any time for CUs to exchange 
three different pairs of control frames. The first group includes C-RTS and C-CTS 
frames which are designed for reserving the control channel while the second 
group involves S-RTS and S-CTS which aim to exchange the available channels 
for data transmission between the sender and receiver. Thus, as soon as the data 
channel is determined both CUs switch to that channel and initiate the data 
exchange process after that another two frames known as T-RTS and T-CTS are 
launched over the control channel after the successful data exchange to notify 
other CUs about the end of the communication process by the current pair of CUs. 
This would enable contentions among other CUs for the control channel access to 
exchange C-RTS and C-CTS frames.  
The work reported in (Iyer & Limt, 2011) proposed a Multi-channel MAC 
Protocol for CRNs. The assumption of an existing centralised controller 
recognised as Spectrum broker is made for obtaining the CUs’ information and 
then determining channel allocation for those CUs. The protocol uses a dedicated 
control channel for transmitting spectrum sensing information and communication 
with the spectrum broker, this requires a single transceiver that is tuned for the 
control channel. Nevertheless, a number of periodic time-slots is used to divide 
the control channel and assumed to be synchronised with the licensed channels. 
Thus, each CU is equipped with two transceivers recognised as a control 
transceiver tuned for the control channel and a software defined radio transceiver 
tuned to any licensed channels. However, the main issue is that the protocol 
requires and relies on a Spectrum broker as a central controller for channel 
management and provides the necessary information for determining efficient 
channel allocation for those CUs, this method is not considered performing the 
cooperative approach in which channel sensing results necessitate to be shared 
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among CUs to perform the agreement of selecting a licensed channel for data 
transmission. 
The authors in (Kamruzzaman, et al., 2015) introduced an Energy efficient 
Cognitive Radio multichannel Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol 
recognised as ECRMAC. The assumption of a dedicated CCC is made in order to 
reserve segments for exchanging data and this is done through exchanging three 
handshaking frames over the control channel. These control frames recognised as 
ad hoc traffic indication message (ATIM) which includes both the number of the 
packets that needs to be transmitted and a list of use segment (LUS). The received 
LUS is compared with the receiver’s LUS to link between both CUs. Thus, the 
receiver requires updating the LUS by selecting a random number of segments 
and making the state of this list as Tentatively Assigned that is launched with 
ATIM-ACK frame. Once the ATIM-ACK is received, the sender requires to 
update its LUS based on the received selected segments and change their status to 
‘occupied’ which then need to be transmitted with ATIM-RES frame. Thus 
neighbouring CUs necessitate updating their LUS information. By doing this 
handshaking frames, the multichannel hidden node problem can be solved. 
Therefore, both sender and receiver initiate data transmission which is time slotted 
and two types of frames are exchanges in the reserved specific timeslot on a 
licensed channel.   
2.1.2. Spectrum Access Techniques 
Spectrum access techniques play a significant role in channel utilisation in CRNs. 
They can be classified into two different methods to utilise a channel: Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) which is based on time slots and CSMA/CA 
technique which is based on random access. 
2.1.2.1. TDMA technique 
The first approach is based on time slots in which a particular slot is assigned to a 
single user to be enable them to transmit the data. Every time slot has two 
different periods belonging to the listening period for CUs synchronisations and a 
communication period for control and data frames exchange. TDMA is a 
technique that is used by CUs to access the CCC for control information exchange 
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or over the selected data channel for data transmission. The authors of (Carlos & 
Kiran, 2007) (Iyer & Limt, 2011) applied the same technique in which bacon 
intervals have been designed for adjusting both listening period and 
communication period. The control frames and selected data channel and 
synchronisation take place during the sensing interval while the data exchange is 
initiated during the communication period.  
2.1.2.2. CSMA/CA technique 
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) is 
considered as a random access mechanism for channel utilisation in WLANs and 
also in CR technology, where a set of CUs attempt to perform the wireless 
medium channel access based on a contention process (Chong, et al., 2009) (Liu, 
et al., 2010). However, this brings an issue related to the collision occurrence 
which is resulted from multiple CUs who attempt to use the same CCC for their 
control frames exchange that enable them to determine the most reliable licensed 
channel for data transmission. However, this issue can be solved by applying a 
random backoff time to seize the channel without possible collision occurrence. 
This technique is employed by different researchers in CR MAC protocols 
(Chong, et al., 2009) (Zhang & Su, 2011) for coordinating CUs when to access the 
control channel and transmit to avoid any collision that may occur. Thus, a CU 
requires checking the availability of this control channel before launching the 
RTS frame, this process requires listening to the control channel for a period of 
time. If the control channel is busy, then CUs apply a random backoff time. 
2.1.3. Sensing channels 
Sensing channels is a crucial aspect in CRNs to provide significant information 
belonging to the channels’ availability and the LUs’ signals over the licensed 
channels. Based on the sensing technique, the decision of the most reliable 
channel selection can be determined. Three different techniques belong to the LUs 
detection over the licensed channels are used by different researchers (Lee & 
Akyildiz, 2008) (José, et al., 2015) (Li, et al., 2015). The first approach concerns 
energy detection, in which the CUs are required to sense the licensed channels for 
a short time, to detect LUs activity using energy detection techniques. This 
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approach is used widely, due to its low complexity and the lack of necessity for 
prior information about the LU’s transmission characteristics and particular 
designs to detect spread spectrum signals (José, et al., 2015). For these reasons, 
this technique is selected for detecting signals in the proposed protocol explained 
in this thesis. However, the second approach is based on the matched filter 
detection technique, which is considered an optimal approach for detecting LUs’ 
signals and for delivering computations at a low cost. However, the technique 
demands prior knowledge of LU for the CUs. The third technique is based on 
features detection, which has both high computational costs and provides only 
partial knowledge of LUs compared to others, in order to determine the LUs 
occupancy by investigating the associated specific features of LUs modulated 
signals. 
2.1.4. Licensed channel selection 
However, in terms of licensed channel selection, there are two different 
approaches described in the literature. The first is recognised as random selection 
of a channel in which all the licensed channels are assumed to be equally in good 
condition to CUs such as in (Jia, et al., 2008) (Zhang & Su, 2011). In this manner 
the licensed data channels are different in terms of their availability as soon as the 
LUs have their right and priority to utilise these channels at any time compared to 
CUs. However, the other approach is based on the availability of the channel 
predictions based on the future of the channel status. This significantly assists the 
CUs to make the decision of the appropriate selected licensed channel for data 
transmission. Therefore, the network performance would be improved especially 
when the throughput factor is considered to measure the successful message 
delivery among CUs (Wang, et al., 2011). Thus, the proposed protocol considers 
the best licensed channel that has the highest available time as licensed channel 
selection criteria between CUs.  
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2.1.5. Number of associated transceivers 
The existing MAC protocols can be classified into two categories based on the 
number of transceivers that are assigned to each CU. For example, the authors of 
(Ma, et al., 2007) (Carlos & Kiran, 2007) (Su & Zhang, 2008) (Kim & Kang G. 
Shin, 2008) (Kamruzzaman, 2010) (Zhang & Su, 2011) (Hussein, et al., 2013) 
(Kamruzzaman, et al., 2015) use a single transceiver for each CU. In this case, a 
big challenge has risen when a CU attempts to sense and observe the activities of 
both the transmitted control frames over the control channel and data frame over 
the data channel simultaneously. This results in causing the hidden node problem 
since the CU is able to listen a single channel whether control or data channel at a 
time.  
However, another category of MAC protocols (Joe & Son, 2008) (Kondareddy & 
Agrawal, 2008) (Salameh, et al., 2009) (Salameh, et al., 2010) (Iyer & Limt, 
2011) (Qian, et al., 2013) is based on using at least two transceivers for each CU. 
This approach functions in improving the network throughput and performance 
from different sides. For example, a CU who has multiple transceivers is able to 
sense different channels at the same time, this leads to an increase in the network 
throughput by fast switching to the desired channel, and also in case if there is a 
necessary switching to different licensed channel due to the appearance of LU. 
Moreover, CUs equipped with multiple transceivers can observe and listen to the 
on-going packets over multiple channels including the control channel at the same 
time. This leads to the reduction of potential packets’ collisions that resulted from 
the hidden node problem. 
Therefore, the multiple transceivers approach is significantly important for multi-
channel MAC protocol since CR is a smart and intelligent technology for 
improving the spectrum utilisation. It is impossible to deny the fact that less 
energy is consumed with a single transceiver compared to the multiple 
transceivers approach. However, the energy consumption is not addressed in this 
thesis since it is out of the scope of this research. Thus, the nature of CRNs 
requires effective and efficient functionalities of the spectrum utilisation and 
applying multiple transceivers significantly contribute in observing the on-going 
packets transmission in both CCC and data channels. Therefore, each CU is 
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equipped with a pair of transceivers in the proposed protocol for different reasons 
(see section 3.2.2.1 for further discussion). By considering multiple transceivers, 
not only the hidden node terminal issue (Kondareddy & Agrawal, 2008) in a 
single channel would be solved but also being an effective approach for solving 
the hidden node in a multi-channel environment, and increasing the spectrum 
efficiency. In addition, it enables the dynamic fast switching to different data 
channel called a backup data channel as soon as the LU appears to utilise the 
licensed channel. However, the backup data channel is left for the future work 
since it is out of the scope of this research. 
Table  2-1 summarises and compares different characteristics of the discussed 
existing MAC protocols in literature review for decentralised CRNs. 
Table  2-1: Characteristics of some existing MAC protocols 
Protocols 
Control 
Channel 
Number 
of 
control 
frames 
Spectrum 
Access 
technique 
Number of 
Transceivers 
LDCHs 
selection 
Criteria 
Sensing 
Technique 
CREAM 
(Zhang & 
Su, 2011) 
Dedicated 4 
802.11 
(DCF) 
Single Random 
Energy 
detection 
CR-
CSMA/CA 
(Qian, et al., 
2013) 
realistic 
CCC 
3 
802.11 
(DCF) 
Multiple 
Not 
discussed 
Energy 
detection 
DSA-MAC 
(Joe & Son, 
2008) 
Dedicated 4 
802.11 
(DCF) 
Multiple 
Based on 
SINR 
Energy 
detection 
P-MAC 
(Hussein, et 
al., 2013) 
None 
dedicated 
2 
802.11 
(DCF) 
Single 
Not 
discussed 
Energy 
detection 
ECRMAC 
(Kamruzzam
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Since the aim of this work focuses on the deployment of a secure MAC protocol 
for CRNs, the network overhead can be affected by the associated security 
information and frames for providing defense against the related malicious 
activities to the MAC layer. Therefore, there is a need of a MAC protocol that 
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efficiently provides a successful communication with respect to minimum 
handshaking frames that would results in fast switching to the SLDCH for data 
transmission. Moreover, the existence of a dedicated CCC to only CUs considers 
the best medium channel for providing security and significantly leads to 
increasing the chance of reliable, efficient, and successful secure communication 
among CUs (More discussion about the reason for considering a dedicated CCC is 
provided in section 3.2.1). Thus, despite the existing MAC protocols discussed 
beforehand accomplish successful utilisation of the unused white spaces by CUs, 
they are not considered as the best choice for deploying the security on top of 
them. The performance of CRN’s time and throughput can be improved if the 
number of handshaking frames are minimised since most of these protocols such 
as CREAM, and CR-CSMA/CA, which are used as benchmark for different 
reasons discussed in section 6.2, exchange more than two control frames over the 
dedicated CCC. However, although two control frames are exchanged in 
Performance Evaluation of Cognitive Radio Network Predictive MAC (P-MAC) 
protocol (Hussein, et al., 2013), it uses non-dedicated CCC, which is not 
considered as the best channel for ensuring the reliable and successful 
communication among CUs since the chance of the disturbing the CUs 
communication can occur by LUs, who have the priority to utilise the channel. 
Consequently, CUs require allocating a different control channel to avoid the 
interference due to the LUs’ activities. 
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2.2. Security Threats 
Although a CRN is similar to the traditional wireless network, it faces similar 
and some additional vulnerabilities that has resulted in the discarding of the 
communication process among end users (Leon, et al., 2010) (Fragkiadakis, et 
al., 2013). These vulnerabilities can lead to varied threats, which can be 
classified into two categories: the first relates to common security threats in 
both conventional wireless and CR networks, and the second category is 
specific to CRNs. 
Figure  2-2 presents the challenges and security in CRNs while clearly 
highlighting the main area of this research. 
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Figure  2-2: Challenges & Security in CRNs 
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2.2.1. Common security threats in conventional wireless 
and CR Networks 
In traditional wireless technology, a radio channel is used to establish 
communication and transmit information between communicating nodes and AP 
or BS. It is also being used in cognitive networks to address several similar 
functionalities. The transmitted information can be sensitive such as user identity, 
allocation, signalling, and key information. However, an attacker using a range of 
techniques such as eavesdropping, forgery, and masquerading attacks can easily 
intercept the communication during the transmission process (Zhang & Li, 2009) 
(Tang & Wu, 2012). An effective security mechanism must be applied to 
protect data transmission from malicious behaviour like eavesdropping, and 
information tampering (Soleimani & Ghasemi, 2011). Therefore, as far as data 
protection is concerned, different security measures can be used for the protection, 
detection and countermeasures based on wireless security protocols such as WEP, 
WPA and WPA2 in conventional wireless networks and EAP, AES and 3DES in 
WiMAX. These security protocols are designed with various levels of encryption 
of different strength being used according to the importance level of the 
information being secured. Figure  2-3 shows the most common threats in both 
traditional wireless and CRNs. 
Greedy 
Behaviour
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Conventional Wireless
Malicious & 
Selfish attacks
Fake Authentication 
Attacks
Black and Grey 
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DoS & Information 
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Service 
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Figure ‎2-3: Common Security threats in conventional wireless and CRNs 
2.2.1.1. Fake Authentication Attacks 
In the infrastructure-based wireless networks, the communication between terminals 
and BSs is accomplished through the wireless medium. Thus, a malicious user may 
exploit this opportunity to obtain the identity information belonging to the network 
control information, network services, and network access through tapping on the 
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wireless channel to pose as a legitimate user. Therefore, this grants a malicious user 
access to the network and to obtain a network service free of charge, or to launch an 
attack against the network (Sampath, et al., 2007) (Tang & Wu, 2012)  (Song, et al., 
2012). Therefore, cryptographic encryption schemes are generally used to protect the 
transmitted messages (Guo, et al., 2010). 
2.2.1.2. Information Tampering 
This is a serious attack that causes change, modification, replacement, or 
deletion of the information before it is received at its intended destination 
(Sampath, et al., 2007), and that result in misleading the receiver, who can thus 
make a wrong decision. Alteration significantly affects message integrity, which 
is unacceptable for legitimate users and network policies. However, this type of 
attack generally occurs in a situation where a cooperative terminal is needed to 
forward the information (Robles, et al., 2010) (Terence, 2011) (Tang & Wu, 
2012). 
2.2.1.3. Service Repudiation 
In this attack, when the connection is achieved between two nodes, one user denies 
transmitting their information for two reasons: repudiation for the communication 
service to deny usage of the network, which requires payment for the network usage, 
and repudiation for the communication content to refuse the transmission of their 
content. For example, when transactions are made in a commercial process, the user 
refuses to pay. To overcome these issues, proof-of-origin evidence can be used 
against a particular individual for sending or receiving messages. Identity, 
authentication, and cryptography encryption schemas are presently used to prevent 
unpredictable or hidden issues arising (Rai, et al., 2010) (Tang & Wu, 2012). 
2.2.1.4. Replay Attack 
The key purpose of this attack at the MAC layer is to obtain effective 
information by intercepting and retransmitting the same signed information sent 
to a particular node over a period of time in order to build trust with the receiver. 
This gives an advantage to the attackers, granting them access to new useful 
information like user passwords, which then enables unauthorised access to 
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resources and control network licenses, etc (Goyal, et al., 2010) (Li, et al., 2011) 
(Enneya, et al., 2011) (Goyal, et al., 2011) (Tang & Wu, 2012) (Baayer, et al., 
2012). Therefore, in order to overcome this attack, the timestamp procedure is 
recommended because of the message validation involved (Baayer, et al., 2012). 
2.2.1.5. Denial of Service and Information Interference 
While electromagnetic waves are essential in order to gain wireless information 
from users, recent advanced hardware technologies can involve a higher 
transmitted power in the communication process at the physical layer. It is, 
therefore, possible for an attacker to use this transmitter power to block the 
ordinary transmission and create interference and noise in the communication 
procedure, thereby decreasing the capacity of the wireless BS resources and 
equipment. This can also lessen user access through a BS terminal. Therefore, the 
interference of information procedures is likely to have a critical social impact 
(Jakimoski & Subbalakshmi, 2008). An example of this occurred in 2001, when 
the satellite communication service was interrupted due to the high power caused 
by locating a VSAT terminal (Jakimoski & Subbalakshmi, 2008) (Tang & Wu, 
2012). 
Another approach of DoS can be launched by greedy behaviour attack. For instance, 
during the channel negotiation process in both centralised and decentralised multi-hop 
networks, an attacker intends to maximise their throughput of using a spectrum 
through manipulating and changing the parameters of the MAC layer protocol (Zhu & 
Zhou, 2008) (Djahel, et al., 2009) (Attar, et al., 2012) (Zou & Yoo, 2015). This is 
achieved by reporting false information regarding the available channel, which causes 
throughput collapse for other users. For instance, in decentralised networks, if a 
greedy user attempts to misbehave by starving the neighbouring node, the 
intermediate user will be affected and banned from transmitting its messages (Tang & 
Wu, 2012). 
2.2.1.6. Malicious and Selfish behaviour attacks 
In malicious behaviour, the attacker makes other CUs to make handoff from the 
current channel. This generally causes degrading of the network performance 
(Leon, et al., 2010) (Chaczko, et al., 2010) (Soleimani & Ghasemi, 2011) (Zou 
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& Yoo, 2015). However, in selfish behaviour, the attacker intends to maximise 
their throughput and disturbing the normal process (Akkarajitsakul, et al., 2011). This 
happens when the selfish user collaborates in the process of the routing discovery 
with other users, and then avoids forwarding other users’ packets and drops them. 
This brings an advantage to the selfish node to maximise their throughput by 
preserving their resources and uses the received resources belonging to other users 
(Soleimani & Ghasemi, 2011). 
2.2.1.7. Black and Grey Hole Attacks 
Both black and grey holes’ attacks exist in decentralised networks and the rate of 
dropping the transmitted packets is used to distinguish between these two attacks. 
In a black hole, the malicious user intends transmitting forged routing packets and 
pretending to be the destination node to deceive users for starting their packets 
transmissions. This provides the misbehaving chance to the malicious user to 
launch DoS by dropping all the received packets (Abusalah, et al., 2008) 
(Soleimani & Ghasemi, 2011) (YI, et al., 2012). However, in the grey behaviour 
attack, a malicious user drops part of these transmitted packets in order to interrupt 
the routing discovery procedure that results in deteriorating the overall network 
performance (Xiaopeng & Wei, 2007) (Jiwen, et al., 2010) (Joshi, et al., 2011) 
(Kariya, et al., 2012) (Anon., 2012) (Jhaveri, et al., 2012) (Jhaveri, et al., 2012). 
2.2.2. Specific security threats in CRNs 
Generally the DSA is considered as a big challenge to implement because of: 
1- The dynamic behaviour and nature such as different frequency, geographical 
location and time of operation (Datla, et al., 2009) (Li, et al., 2009).  
2- In comparison to known security issues that exist in wireless networks, CRNs 
are more exposed to threats from targeted intelligent malicious strategies (Jack, 
2008) (Zhang, et al., 2008) (José, et al., 2015). This poses security challenges in 
preventing any definite or predictable risks from occurring.  
Due to the key differences in their specifications when compared to conventional 
wireless networks, CRNs face certain unique challenges and security issues in 
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terms of their continued effective use and their vulnerability to outside attacks. 
These particular characteristics of CRNs involve the need for additional 
implementation of specific functions, such as proper sensing protocols, correct 
decision making, appropriate switching, and the provision of sufficient access for 
the sharing of the resources required to operate each particular function. Several 
potentially serious threats to network performance have been highlighted by 
researchers investigating CRN technology (Zhang & Li, 2009) (Mao & Zhu, 2011) 
(Tang & Wu, 2012), which increase spectrum availability to malicious users. As 
long as the CRN is similar to a conventional wireless network in utilising a 
spectrum as a medium for the transmission and receiving of information, it is more 
exposed to security threats which are usually not faced by conventional wireless 
technology. Therefore, security mechanisms play an important role in maintaining 
the network that is potentially affected by different kinds of threats (Tang & Wu, 
2012). Malicious attacks are well-known threats that target all layers in the CRNs 
(Zhang & Li, 2009) (Tang & Wu, 2012), with their own behaviour, which can 
affect network performance by attacking a particular layer. Thus the main 
security threats and challenges related to CRNs can be identified in Figure  2-4 
below and described in more detail in the following sections: 
Spectrum Management 
Security
Specific CRNs Threats
Spectrum 
Sensing Security
Spectrum 
Sharing Security
Spectrum Mobility Security
 
Figure ‎2-4: CRNs specific security threats 
2.2.2.1. Security in spectrum sensing 
Spectrum sensing is a major aspect of CRNs, providing the spectrum information 
about the appearance of the licensed incumbent user and the available channels 
(Ucek & Arslan, 2009)  (Wang, 2009) (Chen, et al., 2010) (Ejaz, et al., 2011). 
The challenge broadly pertains to the ways in which a CU detects and 
differentiates between LUs and CUs. This is of great importance as attackers may 
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be able to emulate the signals of the LUs, thereby increasing the likelihood of false 
alarms being triggered. In addition, the hidden node problem may be another issue 
that can lead to a failure to detect the LUs, which would result in unacceptable 
shadow fading (Chen, et al., 2008) (Akyildiz, et al., 2008). Therefore, it is 
subjected to the most prevalent attack that brings the network performance down 
by reporting the false results of the LU detection. As long as the security in 
spectrum sensing is concerned with controlling the network operation, attackers 
have their own malicious behaviours strategies, focusing instead on degrading the 
network spectrum performance by causing collisions or occupying the spectrum. 
This can result in potential security vulnerabilities that enable DoS attacks to be 
launched easily (Mao & Zhu, 2011). Thus serious attacks can occur in this level of 
the spectrum, which are called Primary Users Interference (PUI) and Primary User 
Emulation (PUE).  
In PUE, an attacker has a chance to focus on the physical layer to simulate a signal 
that resembles the signal of the LU, thereby misleading and deceiving other CUs 
(Chen, et al., 2008) (Anand, et al., 2008) (Ucek & Arslan, 2009) (Shin, et al., 2010) 
(Chaczko, et al., 2010) (Huang, et al., 2010) (Zhou, et al., 2011) (Jin, et al., 2012) 
(Yuan, et al., 2012) (Alahmadi, et al., 2014). This would result in increasing the 
availability of the spectrum to the malicious user. The authors of (Chen, et al., 
2008) (Wan, et al., 2009) proposed a simulation technique used by a malicious 
user, which involves a multiple stage attack that demonstrates the general 
influence on the network performance and other special effects on the CUs. 
Additionally, the simulation experiment results showed how the relationship 
between the performance improvements can be associated with the bands’ 
availability and vice versa.  
However, in PUI, the attacker breaks the rules of the CRN mechanism by affecting 
network performance through interfering with LUs within the network. This forces 
the LU to use the spectrum with noise and unavailable frequency band (Tang & 
Wu, 2012). This is also called a Jamming Message attack or Lion attack where the 
attacker transmits high signal power to disturb the LU through TCP connection 
(Sampath, et al., 2007) (Zhang & Li, 2009) (Leon, et al., 2010) (Wu, et al., 2012). 
Several researchers have investigated and proposed algorithms to detect malicious 
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behaviours in cooperative sensing of the spectrum in order to improve security in 
this stage. A detection scheme based on a past test report obtained through 
calculating the suspected point of CUs, and computing the value of trust behaviour 
mechanism, is proposed in (Wan, et al., 2009). The algorithm is able to 
distinguish malicious from honest users within a network. However, (Li & Han, 
2010) presented a data mining technique without needing priori information about 
a CU to detect misbehaviours. In addition, (Mao & Zhu, 2011) explained that 
changing the spectrum modulation system strategy and protecting the location 
information of the LU, and using proactive techniques in transmission, can help to 
prevent DoS attacks at this stage.  
2.2.2.2. Security in spectrum management 
Spectrum management is considered to be the second task after obtaining the 
result from spectrum sensing the decision of the appropriate available spectrum is 
crucial aspect to maintain the link between a pair of CUs for data transmission. 
This decision is mainly based on the desired characteristic of the current channel 
in terms of the local observation by CUs and the activity of the LU over that 
channel (Zhang, et al., 2008). However, the appropriate channel decision is a 
challenge task as soon as CRNs should be capable for supporting two different 
types of bands, licensed and unlicensed (Parvin, et al., 2012). 
However, this stage cannot be safe from attacks. It is possible for an attacker to 
easily forge or tamper the transmitted information that belongs to the channels’ 
availability, which will affect the correctness of any decisions made by the 
spectrum management. This is a significant issue that could arise relatively easily 
(Hanen, et al., 2014) (Parvin, et al., 2012) and has influence on the networks’ 
resources in terms of identifying the channels availability to CUs and can result in 
launching a DoS. CUs can be deceived and will not be able to utilise the channel 
with its adaptive purpose (Mao & Zhu, 2011) (Tang & Wu, 2012). In this case 
malicious users (e.g. selfish) can maximise their throughput through the use of 
these channels for their data transmissions. Therefore, the inherent complexity of 
the protection techniques is a key requirement to provide reliable and secure 
transmission of information among CUs. 
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2.2.2.3. Security in spectrum mobility   
This stage refers to the mandatory process of seamlessly switching (handoff) from 
the current channel to another available one due to channel occupancy by the LU. 
With the appearance of the LU to utilise their assigned channel, a CU must 
vacate and select another available channel to initiate a new connection, 
resulting in greater energy consumption (Feng, et al., 2009) (Mao & Zhu, 2011) 
(Tang & Wu, 2012) (Song & Xie, 2012). This process also constitutes a significant 
challenge for CUs when an attacker launches a threat to hinder or prevent this 
integral and flawless switching by occupying the available channels. When there is 
a large number of malicious users the channels availability is reduced, and 
affect the entire network resources including other legitimate CUs, who are 
required to find available channels (Jakimoski & Subbalakshmi, 2008) (Song & 
Xie, 2012). Moreover, this kind of attack could also potentially increase the 
waiting time involved over a licensed channel in achieving a proper handoff and 
this increase is certainly unacceptable to the LUs, who have priority need to utilise 
their assigned channels (Parvin, et al., 2012).  Also, a failed handoff to a proper 
channel may occur when an attacker forces CUs to vacate the channel by 
pretending to be the LU. As a consequence, it results in slower communication 
and requires additional time to resume the process of the communication (Zhang, 
et al., 2008) (Chen, et al., 2008) (Jin, et al., 2012).  
2.2.2.4. Security in spectrum sharing 
The dynamic environment in a MANET network architecture leads to show more 
challenges and security  issues  due  to  the  lack  of  the  central  entity  which  
usually  provides  security  and  key management  among  users (Yu, et al., 2010). 
Since CRNs are self-organised and self-configured and CUs have the capability of 
reconfiguring the transmission specification, a great opportunity is presented to 
malicious users who have this flexibility to get any advantageous for launching 
their attacks (Attar, et al., 2012).  
From a security point of view, no spectrum sharing classifications, which are 
discussed in section 1.3, are secure against any malicious behaviour while they are 
not supported with security mechanisms for protection and detection (see 
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Table  2-2). Generally the attackers’ intention is to determinate an effective 
strategy that exposes a predictable risk. For instance, when CCC is used in the 
cooperative method of decentralised CRNs for exchanging information about the 
available channels and the selected channel for data transmission between SUs, 
the CCC is more prone to various attacks based on selfish and malicious 
behaviours (Leon, et al., 2010) (Fragkiadakis, et al., 2013). Because the CCC is 
regarded as a valuable structure for the attacker to access the channel and gain the 
most sensitive information, a key approach for some attackers involves applying a 
PUE attack. Moreover, it is more exposed to other attack types such as 
eavesdropping and DoS, which can be launched easily due to existing weaknesses 
within the MAC layer, where poor authentication and an existing lack of 
encryption mechanisms enable an attacker to detect available channels that they 
can occupy to forge or drop MAC frames (Zhu & Zhou, 2008) (Safdar & O'Neill, 
2009) (Leon, et al., 2010) (Hanen, et al., 2014), as shown in Figure 2.5. 
Another vulnerability in a CCC is where an attacker forges the transmitted packets 
to another path and causes collisions. As a consequence, this impedes the network 
performance and launches a DoS attack. Once a CCC is saturated by attackers, a 
large number of forged packets are generated to block the exchange of the control 
information, enabling DoS attacks to be easily launched against the network, 
hence affecting its performance (Hanen, et al., 2014). Moreover, the author of 
(Zhu & Zhou, 2008) suggests that encryption must be applied between legitimate 
SUs for the exchange of control information; otherwise, it can be readable by 
attackers of other CUs. Also, it can protect the exchanged control information over 
the channel from predictable control channel hopping sequences, thereby 
preventing itself from being saturated (Bian & Park, 2006) (Tang & Wu, 2012). 
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Figure  2-5: Malicious activities in decentralised CRNs 
Therefore, Table  2-2 summaries the potential attacks that can be launched by 
adversary users in CRNs.  
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Table ‎2-2: Overview of the attacks occurring at different CR functions 
Attack Name CR function Description 
Forgery & 
Data tamper 
Spectrum 
Sensing 
Spectrum Management system makes wrong decision by 
receiving the attackers' sensing information 
Overlapping 
An attacker impacts other networks by transmission to a 
specific network 
Denial of 
Service 
 
An adversary user decreases the availability of the spectrum 
bandwidth by blocking the communication, through creating 
noise spectrum signals which cause interference with PUs 
Lion or 
Jamming 
Message 
An attacker transmits high signalling power to disturb the PU 
or the CU which results forcing the CU to hop to different 
channel to utilise 
Spectrum 
Sensing 
Data 
Falsification 
 
In collaborative spectrum sensing, a collaboration technique 
used among CR nodes to generate and utilise a common 
spectrum allocation for the exchange of information about 
available channels. However, an adversary node gives false 
observations information to other users. 
Eavesdropping 
Spectrum 
Sharing 
Weaknesses within the layer due to the poor authentication 
and no existing encryption mechanisms 
Denial of 
Service & 
masquerade 
Repetition of the frequent packets that result in overcrowding 
the channel which is being busy to be utilised by legitimated 
users 
Selfish 
behaviour 
or selfish 
masquerade 
attack 
An attacker does not follow the normal communication 
process for maximising their throughput, saving energy or 
gaining unfair beneficial access of using spectrums through 
injecting frequent anomalous behaviour 
Key depletion 
An attacker attempts to break the cipher by repetition of the 
session key 
Forgery attack 
Lack of authentication mechanism leads to the occurrence of 
modification and forgery on MAC CR Frames which result in 
the launch of DoS attacks 
Biased utility 
Spectrum 
Management 
An attacker tries to reduce the bandwidth of other SUs in 
order to obtain more bandwidth by changing the spectrum 
parameters 
False feedback 
An attacker secretes the incidence of the PU in order to disturb 
the information sensing of other SUs 
 
2.3. Secure Communication Scheme in CRNs 
Since each layer within CRNs has its own characteristics and parameters (Ci & 
Sonnenberg, 2007) (Wan, et al., 2009), they are vulnerable and allow an 
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attacker to make a decision to launch a specific attack for the purpose of 
deteriorating the whole network performance. In MAC layer frames, an 
adversary has a variety of aims to misbehave and launch such an attack. For 
instance, a denial of the channel service is one of the serious threats that lead to 
the network degradation between both sender and receiver. This attack happens 
when the attacker saturates the control channel until it becomes weak for 
attacking (Baldini, et al., 2012). In addition, selfish behaviour is another 
example of attack that can also exist in MAC layer in which an attacker does 
not follow the normal process of communication. Therefore, in order to provide 
defence against these threats, security mechanisms are required in MAC layer 
to provide authentication, authorisation and availability (AAA) in CRNs. Thus, 
incorporating these security features can lead to the exchange of complete and 
reliable secure MAC frames among CUs (Prasad, 2008) (Zhang & Li, 2009) 
(Tang & Wu, 2012). Several studies have been conducted for secure 
communication in CRNs (Mathur & Subbalakshm, 2007) (Prasad, 2008) 
(Sanyal, et al., 2009) (Parvin, et al., 2010) (Zhu & Mao, 2010) (Sorrells, et al., 
2011) (Zhu & Mao, 2011) (Huayi & Baohua, 2011) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011) 
(Zhu & Mao, 2011) (Parvin & Hussain, 2012). They are classified into two 
categories based on protection and detection techniques for addressing the 
security requirements and to define the existing security issues in MAC 
protocols in CRNs.   
2.3.1. Protection mechanisms in CRNs 
In general, the authors of (Mathur & Subbalakshm, 2007) (Prasad, 2008) 
(Sanyal, et al., 2009) (Zhu & Mao, 2010) (Parvin, et al., 2010) (Parvin & Hussain, 
2011) (Zhu & Mao, 2011) (Parvin & Hussain, 2012) aim to provide a secure 
communications among CUs by applying different security mechanisms, such 
as authentication and authorisation access by different techniques within a CRN. 
Their proposed procedures include digital signatures, certification authority, 
trust based and third party entities like BSs. Although, these solutions attempt to 
be effective in some ways, they fail in demonstrating any results and focus only 
on providing a theoretical approach with poor clarity in their work for the full 
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entire operation. Their discussions have significant limitations in terms of 
lacking of security aspects belonging to the security requirements and their 
failure to evaluate the approaches. While in (Mathur & Subbalakshm, 2007) 
(Sanyal, et al., 2009) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011) efforts have been done in order to 
perform the authentication within CRNs. However, their operation approaches 
were all limited to infrastructure CRNs. 
2.3.1.1. Digital signature and certificate authority 
A technique based on applying digital signatures in order to obtain a secure 
communication and protect the network from DoS attacks is proposed in  
(Sanyal, et al., 2009) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011). Their approaches involve the 
activities of a CA, PUs, and both PUs’ and LUs’ BSs. However, the main 
differences of these mechanisms are that the BSs are connected to the CA using 
wire links in (Mathur & Subbalakshm, 2007), while in (Sanyal, et al., 2009) the 
approach used was to have an asymmetric key scheme applied instead of BSs.  
2.3.1.2. EAP-SIM 
Another approach of authentication mechanism is presented in (Zhu & Mao, 
2011). However, the presented scheme requires a BS which is connected to a 
CA and uses both EAP-TLS for establishing a secure connection and EAP-SIM 
for authenticating the user.  
2.3.1.3. Trust values procedures 
Other techniques based on trust values are proposed in (Parvin, et al., 2010) 
(Parvin & Hussain, 2012) to address and analyse the issues within CRNs. The 
trust value calculated to lead to the decision that will either allow the current 
user to utilise the available licensed channel or not. 
2.3.1.4. Other framework architectures  
Security for authentication and authorisation architecture frameworks have been 
proposed in (Prasad, 2008) (Zhu & Mao, 2011). Both techniques require third-
party entities for appropriate access policies to the spectrum. The authors of 
(Prasad, 2008) use a technique based on processing user identification in the 
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system and providing the user preferences to third parties according to privacy 
rules. Based on this, the user is authenticated and then determined whether or not a 
data port would be used. However, the subsequent architecture in (Zhu & Mao, 
2011) consists of two layers, which are up-layers for authentication purposes and 
encryption techniques, while the physical layer is for securing and protecting the 
spectrum. 
Overall, while these proposed mechanisms are effective in some ways in 
protecting the networks from forgery and DoS attacks, they are not applicable in a 
decentralised environment because a BS is needed and incorporated for verifying 
the identity and providing secure communication. Moreover, the work focusses 
theoretically on discussing the security challenges and needs in CRNs and failed to 
produce results and poor clarity in their proposed framework operation.  
Another security framework is proposed in (Safdar & O'Neill, 2009) for providing 
security in the MAC layer of decentralised CRNs. However, the framework has 
significant limitations related to security mechanisms and simulation parts and 
discussed as follows: 
 The work is introduced theoretically and lacked both necessary information 
such as the frames sizes and sensing techniques which require different 
time over the CCC and lead to subsequent effect on the throughput rate, 
and demonstrated results for validating their approaches.  
 There is lack of clarity in achieving the authentication mechanism without 
identifying and highlighting the authentication process, and for the reasons 
for having a trusted terminal to provide the secret information to validate 
CUs. The authors do not consider the process of how the authentication 
takes place and registering CUs for receiving the secret information that 
belongs to validation of those CUs. Instead they only stated that the 
authentication must take place between both senders and receivers over the 
CCC. This is a most critical point that needs to be evidently addressed in 
decentralised CRNs, since there are different verification schemes that can 
be used such as digital signatures, IDs, and shared keys. These schemes 
have different operation requirements for the need of registering CUs and 
the relevant number of the security frames that are required to be 
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exchanged for the demand of completing the registration process and the 
secret information exchange. This subsequently affects the entire network’s 
operation and performance.  
 Each pair of CUs necessitates exchanging three control frames over the 
CCC and they recognise as Free Channel List (FCL) frame, Channel 
Selection (CH-SEL) frame, and Channel Reservation (CH-RES) frame. 
However, the number of control frames can be reduced for the aim of 
improving the network’s efficiency and performance related to the 
communication time and throughput. This reduction is also essential for 
reserving the CCC for less time and subsequently allowing CUs to perform 
fast switching to the selected data channel and making the current CCC 
available for the next pair of CUs. 
 After selecting a licensed data channel, the sender sends CH-RES frame to 
its neighbouring for channel reservation. However, this will lead to 
increasing the potential threat targeting the announced data channel by the 
internal malicious users for launching a DoS attack through creating 
interference to disturb the communication. Therefore, making the selected 
data channel hidden from other CUs is essential for increasing the chance 
of exchanging data successfully between CUs, without occurring 
interference made by internal and external adversary users. 
 Moreover, CUs are required to exchange their public keys to secure all the 
communications including the exchanging of the available channel list, 
selected data channel, and the actual data. However, this is not considered 
as an efficient approach since it leads to increasing the communication 
time and reserving the CCC for a longer time by two ways; the number of 
the transmitted frames for the purpose of public key exchange, and the 
execution security time of asymmetric key to encrypt and decrypt the 
secure control information and the transmitted data. Consequently, the 
network performance will be affected and especially in the situation where 
a large number of CUs need to access the control channel for establishing 
their communication. Moreover, the licensed data channel’s availability 
can also be affected by slowing the switching time from the CCC to the 
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data channels. Therefore, this approach causes the decrease in the network 
throughput due to the long communication time over the CCC and 
subsequent lowering of the throughput. Thus, the proposed security 
protocols intended to avoid the use of asymmetric key by replacing it with 
a symmetric key algorithm to secure the control and data communication 
between CUs over the CCC and data channels for the purpose of 
improving the network performance. This point has been proved in the 
proposed protocols in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, in which the RSA and AES 
algorithms are used to encrypt a single frame, is transmitted to the 
dedicated server for authenticating CUs in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
respectively. Thus, it has been found that the execution time of the 
asymmetric key algorithm necessitates significant time leading to reserving 
the control channel for longer time. Therefore, the avoidance of 
asymmetric key algorithm is highly recommended and considered in the 
proposed protocols for securing both sensing results and data exchange 
among CUs over both CCC and selected licensed data channels. 
Therefore, the security and challenges in decentralised CRNs still arise and require 
defensive techniques for securing communication among CUs. Table  2-3 
demonstrates the pros and cons of the proposed protection mechanisms. 
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Table ‎2-3: Protection mechanisms in CRNs 
Proposed 
Mechanism 
pros/cons Description 
User 
identification  
Pros 
Low complexity by generating two virtual ports for secure 
transmission: the first is for control traffic information and 
another is for data transmission which is blocked by default 
unless the user has been authenticated. 
Cons 
It requires a third party to provide information like user 
preferences 
Digital 
signature & 
certificate 
authority 
Pros 
Low complexity and using the basic architectures of 
symmetric and asymmetric key infrastructures. 
Cons 
It has not been simulated and tested to proof the security. It 
also does not work in Ad-hoc environment due to being 
based on centralised entities. 
Certificate 
authority 
 
Pros 
Effective security mechanism due to identifying and 
verifying the user and the server respectively. 
Cons 
Requires a third-party to verify the user identity. Also the 
mechanism has not been simulated and tested to ensure 
security against malicious behaviours. 
Trust values  
Pros 
It is an additional procedure that can be built on the top of 
other security techniques to increase the level of the 
protection and detection in term of secure communication. 
Cons 
Requires a third party procedure is to provide previous 
information of a node. Moreover, when a new node joins 
the network, the CA will not be able to provide reference 
for that particular user. Hence the mechanism does not 
operate in strong fixed level of the authentication for all 
CUs equally. 
 
2.3.2. Detection schemes in CRNs 
The authors of (Rakhshanda, et al., 2008) (Huayi & Baohua, 2011) (Zou & 
Yoo, 2015) have focused on the detection mechanisms in CRNs. Their 
proposed techniques address a variety of attacks caused by malicious and 
selfish behaviours, and the pros and cons of these mechanisms are illustrated 
in Table  2-4. 
2.3.2.1. Selfish behaviours 
Selfish behaviour detection techniques for the CCC are proposed in (Huayi & 
Baohua, 2011) (Minho, et al., 2013), where a puzzle punishment model 
(Huayi & Baohua, 2011) is applied for bad behaviour activities in a situation 
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where a receiver is asked for a new hidden channel that has not been included 
previously. Thus, the sender would be a suspicious case. Therefore, the 
receiver applies the puzzle punishment to detect whether the sender is a 
selfish node or not. If the sender node solves the puzzle, they will be 
considered as a legitimate user and communication will be resumed normally; 
otherwise, the communication will be disconnected. Another technique called 
Cooperative neighbouring cognitive radio Nodes (COOPON) (Minho, et al., 
2013) is applied among a group of neighbouring users to detect selfish nodes 
who broadcast fake channel lists. Consequently, neighbouring users can 
detect the selfish users by comparing the transmitted channel list of the target 
user with their lists. In addition, a similar mechanism called cooperative attack 
detection scheme (CADC) is proposed in (Zou & Yoo, 2015) in which CUs 
transmit their FCLs over the CCC to determine the final status of the availability 
of these channels. Thus, the scheme detects both greedy attackers, who transmit 
a part of authentic available channels and hide the other part for occupying them 
selfishly and malicious attackers, who transmit lists of occupied channels by 
LUs to deteriorate the network’s performance.     
2.3.2.2. Timing parameter 
Another detection mechanism was proposed in (Rakhshanda, et al., 2008). 
They presented a mechanism that relies on timing parameters at MAC layer. 
When the negotiation phase is taking place, the node, which receives a 
request, sets up timing parameters for controlling the time interval. This 
forces the sender to transmit data without getting a higher rate. If the sender 
does not obey and sends packets more frequently, the receiver node takes 
action against the sender. Then the receiver node analyses the sender’s 
misbehaviour and broadcasts the information over the current network.  
2.3.2.3. Anomalous Spectrum Usage Attacks (ASUAs) 
The authors of (Sorrells, et al., 2011) presented a cross-layer technique for 
CRNs for detecting ASUAs. Collecting the information on both the physical 
and network layers provides an awareness of the current spectrum. It operates 
against the PUE and jamming attacks to provide successful access to the 
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spectrum. Table  2-4 shows the advantages and drawbacks of the existing 
detection mechanisms in CRNs. 
Table ‎2-4: Detection mechanisms in CRNs 
Proposed 
Mechanism 
pros/
cons 
Description 
Selfish 
activity 
Pros 
Applied in both CCC and data channel which decreases the potential 
of misbehaviour in different stages of the network 
Cons 
Focuses only on detecting selfish behaviour and does not provide the 
complete secure communication between sender and receiver 
timing 
parameter  
 
Pros 
Detecting misbehaving nodes during the negotiation phase. It helps to 
maintain the channel from getting saturated. 
Cons 
 Theoretical and has not been simulated and tested to provide the 
detection scheme results.  
 Weak against eavesdropping and forgery attacks especially once the 
FCL is not hidden which is exploited to launch Jamming attacks. 
Anomalous 
Spectrum 
Usage 
Attacks  
Pros 
Combining both physical and network layers for detecting malicious 
users give a better achievement instead of selecting only a layer 
Cons 
Focuses only on the detection approach and does not consider a 
significant protection scheme against both jamming and PUE attacks 
mobility. 
 
2.3.3. Comparisons of the presented schemes against 
MAC layer attacks  
Incorporating the security requirements; authentication, confidentiality, non-
repudiation, and data integrity in CRNs can lead to the exchange of complete 
and reliable secure MAC frames among CUs (Bian & Park, 2006) (Zhang & Li, 
2009) (Tang & Wu, 2012). The proposed digital signature, trust value and, CA 
procedures are different in terms of their operations (see the protection schemes 
in section 2.3.1), the security requirements are considered to provide the 
necessary defence against most of the MAC threats such as DoS, Forgery, 
eavesdropping and replay attack in centralised CRNs. However, the presented 
schemes require licenced and CU’s BSs that are connected through a wired link to 
the CA. 
In contrast, both puzzle punishment and COOPON approaches consider only the 
selfish behaviour among the other MAC attacks such as DoS, forgery, 
eavesdropping, and spoofing in decentralised CRNs. However, they are 
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effective in selfish behaviour detection due to the cooperation between a group 
of CUs which involve identifying selfish users in the COOPON technique and 
demand of solving the puzzle to resume the communication in puzzle 
punishment system. Moreover, the timing parameter procedure easily addresses 
DoS attack due to the presence of the centralised entity that controls the CUs’ 
communication. In addition, the cooperative attack detection scheme (CADC) 
focusses on detecting only greedy attackers who hide a part of authenticated 
licensed channels for occupying them selfishly, and malicious attackers who 
intend to deteriorate the network performance by sending a list of occupied 
channels by LUs.     
Despite these published research, which have been discussed in details in 
sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 attempt to provide solution for either protection or 
detection schemes in CRNs, none of them specifically introduced a clear vision 
of providing a complete secure MAC protocol for the cooperative approach of 
decentralised CRNs and incorporating most of the security requirements 
namely; authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and data integrity in 
CRNs with full simulation and validation of the work such as in (Rakhshanda, et 
al., 2008) (Sanyal, et al., 2009) (Parvin & Hussain, 2011). Instead they just 
introduce theoretical approaches that are not possible to be validated without 
simulation and testing or using formal logic method techniques such as BAN, 
GNY, etc.  
2.4. Summary 
Security is a crucial aspect needed in CRNs in order to achieve successful 
communication between sender and receiver CUs. Due to some unique 
characteristics in CRNs, different new threats exist to attack CR functions such as 
PUE and PUI in spectrum sensing, Tampering attack in spectrum management, 
failed handoff in spectrum mobility and MAC threats like eavesdropping, forgery 
and selfish behaviour attacks in spectrum sharing. A major portion of the chapter 
has been dedicated to this part for being the main motivation behind this overview 
work. It introduced details of challenges and security mechanisms in spectrum 
sharing that is based upon two criteria; a Dedicated Local Control Channel also 
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known as Common Control Channel (CCC), and a Non-Dedicated CCC. 
However, only the CCC is chosen to investigate and highlight the potential 
existing threats and vulnerabilities. It is found that several sorts of attacks such 
as eavesdropping, selfish behaviour, forgery, DoS and masquerade is exposed to 
multi-hop CR environment. In addition, this chapter included several prevention 
techniques and countermeasures that are proposed by other researchers to solve 
the existing issues with secure communication mechanism in CRNs. They focus 
on protection and detection procedures in CRNs layers. Therefore, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed methods have pointed and 
summarised. 
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Chapter 3 DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED MAC 
PROTOCOLS WITH AND WITHOUT SECURITY 
This chapter focuses on two main sections that introduce the design of MAC 
protocols for CRNs with and without security. The first part presents the design of 
a novel MAC protocol for decentralised CRNs abbreviated as MCRN. It clearly 
identifies the method of exchange of the control information among CUs over a 
dedicated control channel. Moreover, it provides the details of the main features 
of the MCRN protocol such as the number of the transceivers that are associated 
with each CU to observe the ongoing activities over both the CCC and data 
channel which is selected and agreed upon on the basis of the channel selection 
technique. The Second part considers exclusively the design of two different 
security protocols based on, Digital-Signature, and Shared-Key. These two are 
extended protocols based on MCRN for achieving the security requirements 
within the network. Thus, both the Digital-Signature based Secure MAC protocol 
for CRN (DSMCRN), and the Shared-Key based Secure MAC protocol for CRN 
(SSMCRN) are discussed in details through applying appropriate and robust 
framework architectures and the frames’ transmission for achieving the security 
and communication in ad hoc CR environments. Moreover, the analysis of the 
frames’ transmissions among the contributed entities are described in the format 
of the formal BAN logic, which mainly leads to achieve the contribution of 
deploying and implementing the protocols through considering the security 
features defined and analysed within messages’ exchange in the DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN protocols. 
3.1. Assumptions  
The following assumptions are adopted in the proposed protocols. Therefore, the 
assumptions from (1-4) are applicable for all proposed protocols with and without 
security while the rest (5-8) are applicable only to the security protocols 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN since they are related to security aspects. 
1) CUs obey the MAC layer protocol and do not interfere with the licensed 
users activities over the licensed data channels. 
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2) CUs require sensing the licensed data channel before exchanging their 
control information to detect LUs activities using an energy detection 
technique. 
3) The common control channel is assumed to be dedicated, reliable, and 
permanently available for the contributing CUs. 
4) Each CU is equipped with a pair of transceivers in the proposed protocols. 
5) A dedicated server is engaged for the authentication purpose and providing 
the security key management to end users through registering CUs for 
controlling the entire network. 
6) In the unauthorised access scenario, it has been assumed that a malicious 
user usually communicates with a valid CU, and this research do not 
consider the situation of two malicious users communicating with one 
another. 
7) The dedicated server controls the network access information which 
namely the shared-keys and CUs’ IDs for only the registered CUs. 
8) CUs initiate exchanging the sensing results that belong to the licensed 
channels availability, selected data channel, and the transmitted data only 
after the server has validated both sender and receiver and provided the 
shared-key for control and data frames exchange after the successful 
authentication. 
3.2. A MAC protocol for CRNs (MCRN) 
This section highlights the details of the proposed MCRN protocols in terms of its 
design and operation. The MCRN protocol permits the efficient utilisation of 
unused part of the licensed channels through considering the sequences of the 
different processes: 
 Channel sensing to record the channels status; available or occupied by the 
licensed users, who have the priority to utilise these licensed channels.  
 Determine and share only the available channels to select the highest 
available data channel for data exchange between a pair of CUs. 
 Switching to the selected data channel and initiating data transmission.  
 Vacating these channels in the case if the LUs activities are detected. 
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Therefore, the details of proposed MCRN are provided in the following sections. 
3.2.1. Dedicated CCC for MCRN 
The need for a dedicated common control channel is essential in a cooperative 
approach of CRNs. Since it plays a major role and provides several advantages to 
CUs to guarantee the success of exchanging the control frames related to the 
spectrum sensing, sharing, management, and mobility. It also facilitates to provide 
coordination and cooperation among CUs to proceed the process of sharing the 
spectrum sensing results and making the decision of selecting a licensed channel 
for data exchange between both senders and receivers (Jia, et al., 2008) 
(Domenico, et al., 2012). Moreover, although, the CCC is simple in its design 
(Zhang, et al., 2014), it easily overcomes the issues related to the allocation, 
establish the link between CUs and monitoring of a secure communication 
(Gavrilovska, et al., 2014). 
Since CUs initiate their communication process in the negotiation phase and 
require time over the control channel to exchange a number of control frames 
before initiating the data exchange. This time does not affect the LUs by occurring 
any interference while the control channel is dedicated to only CUs. As a result, 
there is no restriction in terms of the channel reserving time for those CUs and 
this will ensure the reliable communication between CUs. However, this time is 
not easy to be managed between CUs and LUs if the control channel is not 
dedicated and selected from the available licensed channels, because it is not 
possible to guarantee the successful communication between CUs due to the 
possible appearance of LUs, who has the priority of utilise the channel, at any 
time. Consequently, CUs necessitate vacating the channel which then leads to the 
failure of negotiation phase, which will be repeated and would result in affecting 
the network performance and throughput. This issue becomes more critical when 
security aspects are considered and require additional time that would lead to 
increase the chance of the interference with LUs. This issue is significantly taken 
into consideration, since the main aim of this research is to develop a secure MAC 
protocol rather than focusing on a network protocol, the security execution time 
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considerably affects the CUs’ communication time and this has been proven and 
detailed in chapters 5 and 6.  
Therefore, the dedicated control channel will contribute to overcome this issue by 
providing additional advantages and is considered as an efficient approach for 
addressing the security requirements (e.g. Authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, secure communication and etc.) in decentralised CRNs. Since additional 
security frames and more time needed for the execution of different security 
algorithms are required, this leads to an increase of the time taken over the control 
channel. Thus, considering a dedicated control channel and avoiding a non-
dedicated control channel will ensure the reliable and secure communication 
among CUs especially when the security execution time is not fixed among 
discrepant devices have different capability. 
Therefore, the assumption of the dedicated CCC is made in the proposed protocol 
as according to the US Federal Communication Commission (FCC), most 
licensed bands are not utilised efficiently (Sood & Singh, 2011) (Bhattacharjee, et 
al., 2011) (Kanth, et al., 2013). It is calculated that 70% to 94% of these bands are 
unused, thus indicating that the greater part of the database of the whole spectrum 
is available to utilise. This fact has encouraged researchers such as (Joe & Son, 
2008), (Zhang & Su, 2011) and also the author of this thesis to validate the 
assumption that dedicated CCC can be used for the proposed protocol. Therefore, 
the proposed protocol will be using a dedicated CCC to exchange control 
information. The characteristics of the CCC motivates all users to utilise the band 
as it provides a guarantee of reliable control information exchange for wireless 
communications systems and permits broadcasting and network synchronisation 
(Jha, et al., 2011) (Domenico, et al., 2012).  
3.2.2. MCRN features  
The proposed MCRN protocol employs different features that lead to efficient 
utilisation of the unused spectrum. These include the number of radios in each 
CU, CCC access technique, spectrum sensing, and licensed data channel selection 
criteria. These features were highlighted in Figure ‎2-1 and are explained below:  
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3.2.2.1. Multiple transceivers in MCRN 
As discussed in section 2.1.5, there is a number of MAC protocols (Joe & Son, 
2008) (Kondareddy & Agrawal, 2008) (Salameh, et al., 2009) (Salameh, et al., 
2010) (Iyer & Limt, 2011) (Qian, et al., 2013) (Timalsina, et al., 2013) that 
considered multiple transceivers due to the effective functionalities related to 
improving the efficiency of spectrum utilisation and the network performance by 
tuning and accessing discrepant channels simultaneously. Therefore, it is assumed 
that each CU is equipped with a pair of transceivers in the proposed MCRN since 
it uses two different channels (control and data). A single transceiver is used over 
the CCC to transmit and receive the control frames while the second transceiver is 
used to sense the licensed data channel during the exchange of the control 
information and to enable the receiving and transmission of data and ACK frames 
over the selected data channel. This approach is being considered in this work 
because of the hidden node problem, which is a challenge that needs solving in 
distributed CRNs, since multiple channels can be available for utilisation by CUs. 
The multi-channel hidden node problem increases with the availability of these 
channels. These issues have been investigated by different researchers (Carlos & 
Kiran, 2007) (Liang Shan, 2009) (Zhang & Su, 2011) (Reddy, 2012) 
(Venkateswaran, et al., 2012) who found that they tend to come up when a CU 
needs to send a packet while the receiver is receiving different packets from a 
different sender. This causes collisions among the transmitted packets and results 
in a deterioration of the network performance.  
It cannot be denied that single transceiver offers an effective and less energy 
intensive solution than multiple transceivers. However, the nature of CRNs 
requires effective functionalities to observe the on-going packet transmission in 
both control and data channels. Multiple transceivers not only solve the hidden 
node terminal issue in a single environment but also provide an effective approach 
to solving the hidden node issue in a multi-channel environment thus increasing 
the spectrum efficiency. This approach is expected to be considered in future 
studies because it enables dynamic and fast switching, that is, CUs can 
dynamically switch to different data channels (backup data channels) as soon as 
the LU appears to be utilising the licensed channel. This approach is also 
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considered in the design of the CTS frame in the MCRN protocol.  However, it 
will not be implemented as part of this study, since it does not fall within the 
scope of this research. 
3.2.2.2. Sensing channels and licensed channel selection in 
MCRN 
The assumption of energy detection technique for spectrum sensing that was 
discussed in section 2.1.3 is used in the proposed MCRN protocol. It is selected 
among the others, since it is used widely to detect signals and has low 
computational and implementation complexities, because of the lack of a need for 
the prior LUs’ information over licensed channels and particular designs to detect 
spread spectrum signals (Li, et al., 2015). Thus, the adopted sensing technique is 
an energy detection technique that meets the demands and is the most appropriate 
for the proposed protocol, since it enables CUs to sense LU’s activities over the 
licensed data channels before exchanging their control information within a short 
time. This is necessary to determine the channels’ availability before adding it to 
the FCLs.  
In terms of the Selected Licensed Data Channel (SLDCH) criteria, the proposed 
protocol considers the most appropriate and reliable licensed data channel for a 
pair of CUs to launch their data frames. It is entirely based on the channel that has 
the highest available time. This is important in CRNs to avoid any potential 
interference with the LUs over the SLDCHs and to increase the network 
throughput. 
3.2.3. MCRN architecture 
The proposed MCRN is designed to accommodate decentralised CRNs where a 
set of CUs attempts to exchange their control information and data. This is a 
challenge in ad hoc networks because of the lack of an existing centralised entity 
that acts as a Base Station or Access Point to provide the control information to 
the CUs.  
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Figure  3-1 depicts the network scenario, in which a dedicated CCC is allocated 
only to CUs and used to exchange control information belonging to the available 
data channels (FCL) and the most reliable selected data channel (SLDCH), to 
exchange data between a pair of CUs within the same range. This process is 
shown in Step 1 of the same figure, in which a contention based technique is 
performed by CUs for accessing and reserving the CCC to exchange the FCL and 
SLDCH. Thus, two CUs exchange the control information while the third CU 
requires that the waiting CCC be vacated by the first group of CUs and switched 
to the selected data channel. Based on the data channels scan results, CUs can 
identify available channels not occupied by LUs. This stage must be completed 
before the exchange of the control information, which is shown Step 1. Although, 
both CUs can switch to any of the data channels included in FCL, and shared 
between the sender and receiver, such as data channels 2 and 3 in same figure, 
they only select a single data channel, which meets the applied data selection 
criteria requirement based on the highest channel availability. Once the SLDCH is 
determined and exchanged between both the sender and receiver, both CUs switch 
to the chosen channel and initiate the data transmission. However, data channel 1 
is not included in the FCL, since the LU occupies it. 
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Figure  3-1: MCRN network scenario 
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3.2.4. Header fields in MCRN frames  
Usually a frame’s format in data communication and networking comprises 
constant management parameters (fields) such as; Header, Destination MAC 
address, Source MAC address, FCS, and other fields according to the frame’s 
usage as shown in Figure  3-2. However, the frames sizes are different in this 
protocol and chosen according to their needs since there is no published standard 
for CRN frames’ sizes but some fields like Destination MAC address, Source 
MAC address, and FCS remain similar to the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
4
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
FCS
1 1 6 6
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Figure  3-2: Frame structure 
Therefore, the Header’s 8 bits are allocated to determine several aspects belonging 
to the management procedure to indicate the following functions: 
 Protocol type consists of 2 binary bits. It gives the details of the sender's 
protocol version e.g. IPv4 or IPv6.  
 Frame type consists of 2 bits, the first specifies whether control or data frames 
while the second identifies the sub type of the frames. They are set as follows: 
 0 0 in RTS frame of the control phase  
 0 1 in CTS frame of the control phase 
 1 0 in a data frame of the data phase 
 1 1 in ACK frame of the data phase 
 Power management bit specifies the status of sender power management after 
completing the exchange of the current frame. 
 Protected bit specifies the encryption state of the information included within 
a frame. It is always set to 0 in the MCRN protocol since it does not consider 
the security and encryption techniques. 
 Retry bit indicates the retransmission control or data frames. 
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 Fragmentation bit is usually associated with the frame type where it is set to 0 
if the transmitted frame is a control frame, and 0 or 1 if it is a data frame. If the 
message needs to be fragmented it is set to 1, otherwise it remains 0.  
 Duration: this field is based on 8 bits used to set the NAV value. When both 
the sender and receiver CUs are exchanging their frames, neighbouring CUs 
require suspending their communication for a period of time called NAV. 
 Destination MAC Address: 6 bytes are allocated for the destination MAC 
address of the receiver.  
 Source MAC Address: 6 bytes are allocated for the source MAC address of 
the sender.  
 Frame Check Sequence: this field is based upon 4 bytes for the Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) process to identify the validity of the transmitted 
frame by checking their integrity. 
3.2.5. MCRN Phases  
The proposed protocol consists of two different stages using different channels; 
the first stage is called the Control phase which is designed for the exchange of a 
pair of control frames between two different CUs. These frames are known as 
RTS and CTS and facilitate the exchange of control information to determine the 
criteria of selecting an appropriate data channel for initiating the data 
transmission. The second stage is called the Data transmission phase, which is 
based upon multiple licensed channels that are sensed and determined in the 
previous control phase and are then used by CUs to launch their data and ACK 
frames. The frames’ sequence in the MCRN protocol is shown in Figure  3-3. 
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Figure ‎3-3: Control and data frames sequences in MCRN 
3.2.5.1. Control Phase 
Both the Request-To-Send (RTS) and Clear-To-Send (CTS), in the context of CR, 
are control frames which are used in the MCRN protocol based on Distributed 
Co-ordination Function (DCF). The format of the control frames, RTS and CTS, 
are shown in Figure  3-4 and Figure  3-5. 
The RTS is a broadcast frame, in which an additional field of 2 bytes, called Free 
Channel Lists (FCL), is allocated to include a list of a maximum of four available 
licensed channels that are determined by the sender to enable data transmission. 
Each channel can be represented in 4 bits. However, in the CTS unicast frame, 
based on these attached channels, the receiver determines the best available 
channel according to channel selection criteria which are explained in section 
3.2.2.2. Only the most reliable selected licensed channel based on the highest 
available time from the FCL is used by the receiver CU. This channel, called the 
Selected Licensed Data Channel (SLDCH), can be represented in 4 bits while the 
remaining bits are set to 0 in this thesis.  
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Figure ‎3-4: RTS frame format 
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2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
0 0
12
 
Figure ‎3-5: CTS frame format 
3.2.5.2. Data transmission Phase  
The data transmission phase takes place only if both the sender and receiver CUs 
successfully exchanged both the RTS and CTS frames and agreed on the licensed 
data channel for data transmission. Thus, both CUs switch to the selected licensed 
data channel as soon as the CTS frame is successfully delivered to the intended 
destination. Then the sender initiates the data transmission over the SLDCH 
without waiting time (DIFS) as the channel is available and has already been 
selected by both CUs. In contrast, the intended destination CU requires SIFS 
waiting time. The receiver therefore initiates the transmission of the ACK frame 
to notify the sender that the data has been delivered successfully. Based on the 
successful receipt of the ACK frame, the communication process between a pair 
of CUs is successfully completed and the entire process of frames exchange is 
terminated. The frame format of the Data and ACK frames are shown in 
Figure  3-6 and Figure  3-7 respectively. However, once the LU appears to be ON 
and able to utilise the selected licensed data channel during the data transmission, 
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then both CUs are required to immediately vacate the channel and restart the 
entire process to determine another SLDCH. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Data FCS
1 1 6 6 41-3000
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 1 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
0 0
12
Figure  3-6: Data frame format 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
ACK FCS
1 1 6 6 41
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 1 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
0 0
12
 
Figure  3-7: ACK frame format 
3.2.6. Medium Access Control (MAC) for MCRN 
The MAC layer which exists in the IEEE 802.11 wireless protocols to establish 
the communication process of the shared wireless medium among users provides 
the same functionality in CRNs to deliver reliable data among CUs. Therefore, 
two different types of channels are considered in the MCRN protocol, namely a 
CCC, which is a dedicated channel and is assumed to be available all the time for 
CUs to exchange their control information and licensed data channels that are 
determined by the CUs to exchange their data.  
Figure  3-8 demonstrates the process of frame exchanges between CUs and 
highlights both DIFS and SIFS time as well as the Network Allocation Vector 
(NAV) during the frames’ exchange. 
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Figure  3-8: Timing and process of Medium Access Control (MAC) in MCRN 
3.2.6.1. MAC access modes and timing 
The DCF technique is applied in the MCRN protocol to provide the same 
functionalities in terms of accessing the CCC and exchanging the control frames 
between a pair of CUs before initiating the data transmission. Although only one 
CCC is located for multiple CUs to exchange their control frames, the DCF 
method offers the essential access and coordinates multiple CUs to utilise the 
same wireless channel to launch frame transmissions without the possibility of a 
collision. The DCF technique is based on the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) (Taejoon & Jong-Tae, 2009) (Jie, et al., 2013) 
(Dappuri & Venkatesh, 2014) in which users are required to ensure that the CCC 
is clear for transmission before launching their control frames. This aims to avoid 
collisions and is achieved by applying channel access based on a contention 
technique and random backoff time. If the channel is marked busy, then a CU 
needs to set random back-off time to avoid collision. 
Thus, in Figure 3-8 above, there are two pairs of CUs that need to launch their 
RTSs over the CCC for the purpose of data exchange. CU C needs to 
communicate with CU A. Therefore, the process of the prior CCC access is based 
on the contention technique and CU C requires checking of the availability of the 
CCC for a time equal to DIFS before launching the RTS frames. If the CCC is 
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busy then both CUs apply random backoff time to seize the channel without any 
collisions occurring. If the CCC is found to be available and assuming CU C wins 
access to the CCC, then CU C can launch the RTS frame because the channel is 
available for a period of time exceeding DIFS time.  
Each intended destination CU requires waiting time measured in microseconds 
known as SIFS after receiving each control frame (RTS and CTS). Then, once the 
SIFS time has elapsed, a CU can reply over the CCC with CTS if the RTS has 
been received or switch to the selected data channel for data transmission if the 
CTS has been received. By exchanging these two control frames successfully, 
both CU C and CU A agree to select the SLDCH (Channel 1) to exchange data, 
therefore they switch to the SLDCH immediately as soon as the SIFS time to 
initiate data transmission has elapsed.  
In terms of the data channels, two types of frames exist, namely, Data and ACK. 
CU C (sender) can launch the data frame without waiting time as the channel is 
sensed and determined to be available during the exchange of the CTS frame over 
the CCC. However, the receiver, CU B, requires SIFS time before replying with 
the ACK frame.  
As soon as the first group vacates the CCC after the successful switching to the 
selected data channel, the CCC will be available for other CUs to exchange their 
control information. Thus, it can be utilised by different pairs of CUs after the 
contention technique of accessing the CCC. The second group of CUs exchange 
their RTS and CTS frames and then switch to different SLDCH (Channel 2) for 
data transmission. This process of using the CCC will continue as long as there 
are CUs willing to exchange data.  
3.2.6.2. NAV period 
According to 802.11 wireless frames (Sushma & Dijiang, 2010), a duration field 
is included within the transmitted frames to reserve of the channel for a specific 
time, which is measured in microseconds, required to complete the transmission 
process (Sushma & Dijiang, 2010). Therefore, the duration field in the RTS in 
MCRN has the same functionality for representing the Network Allocation Vector 
(NAV) time which aims to inform the other CUs within the same range that the 
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CCC is reserved (busy) for a fixed time. This resulted in barring of the utilisation 
of the current channel during that period by other CUs, otherwise the transmission 
process would be interrupted. This benefits wireless devices in terms of saving 
power as it enters into power saving mode until the NAV value reaches zero. 
Thus, the neighbouring CUs, who are within the same range, can recognise the 
transmitted control frames. They set their NAV according to what is provided in 
the duration field of the transmitted frame and then they count down the NAV 
timer to reach zero before attempting to transmit a frame. As soon as the timer of 
the NAV reaches zero, CUs are alerted that the CCC becomes available for 
utilisation.  
3.3. Secure MAC Protocols for Cognitive Radio 
Networks (SMCRN) 
The MCRN protocol proposed and discussed in the previous section does not 
consider the required security features against the potential threats in CRNs. 
Therefore, this section focusses on the design of two different security protocols 
identified as, Digital-Signature based Secure MAC protocol for CRN 
(DSMCRN), and the Shared-Key based Secure MAC protocol for CRN 
(SSMCRN). These two security protocols are built independently on the proposed 
MCRN protocol to address the security requirements within CRNs. Therefore, the 
security protocols’ frameworks which demonstrate the full operation and frames 
sequences related to security keys exchanges and communication are provided. In 
addition, the associated security features, aim in addressing the security 
requirements in CRNs, of each protocol are highlighted and explained in details.  
3.3.1. Symmetric and Asymmetric keys cryptography in 
SSMCRN and DSMCRN 
Two different types of cryptographic keys are identified in the security field as 
asymmetric (Public and private), and symmetric (Shared or Secret) keys. They not 
only aim to perform the secure communication in the DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols respectively, but also other relevant security features such as 
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authentication, integrity, and confidentiality among incorporated users with the 
assistance of using different security algorithms. 
Although, the proposed protocols can adopt any types of both asymmetric and 
symmetric key algorithms, both RSA and AES are considered among the other 
security algorithms. Since RSA is widely utilised for secure information exchange 
while AES is considered to be the strongest security approach in cryptography 
compared to the other related techniques. Despite, DES was the strongest security 
algorithm up to 1992, it failed to become so due to its vulnerability to threats 
resulted from its small key size. This failure led the National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to replace the DES algorithm with the AES 
that provides more security and has not been broken so far (Naidu & Joshi, 2015). 
Consequently, the U.S. government announced that the AES algorithm can be 
used for protecting information and became the default security algorithm to 
encrypt information. Thus, the associated features of AES like, gaining high 
throughput, flexibility, simplicity, and easiness of implementation has led AES 
adaptation by numerous organisations across the world (Kumar & Rajalakshmi, 
2014). 
3.3.1.1. Associated cryptographic keys in SSMCRN 
In SSMCRN, three different symmetric (Shared) keys and an asymmetric 
(public/private) key are applied to provide different security features, these keys 
are classified into four groups: 
 Group 1: Network’s Shared Key shares between all registered CUs and server 
for gaining authorised access to the network. 
 Group 2: X-S-Shared Key is shared between the user X and the Server only. It 
is generated by user X before transmitting IOR frame to encrypt/decrypt and 
ensure the integrity of the transmitted information between the server and user 
X. 
 Group 3: X-Y-Shared Key is generated by the server after the successful 
authentication process for both users X and Y only. This ensures the 
confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted information between this 
pair of CUs. 
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 Group 4: Server’s public/private key: the server public key is distributed to all 
users whom willing to register and gain authorised access to information to 
utilise the network resources. Its function is to exchange secret information 
belonging to the user at the initial stage of the registration process.  
The primary reasons of using three different shared keys in SSMCRN are: 
1- Different pairs of CUs are required to communicate securely with the demand 
of achieving the confidentiality. 
2- Since CUs have the ability of misbehaving during the transmission, therefore if 
a group of CUs shares the same shared key, it will increase the chance of 
misbehaviour activities such as decrypting any encrypted transmitted 
messages. As a result the detection process will be difficult to achieve.  
3- Through applying three different shared keys the following security 
requirements can be achieved. 
 Authentication through the use of Network’s Shared Key 
 Secure frames’ exchanges between the intended recipients through the use 
of X-S-Shared Key and X-Y-Shared Key at different security levels 
 Confidentiality with the help of applying the X-S-Shared Key 
 Integrity assurance through applying the X-S-Shared Key and X-Y-Shared 
Key 
Table  3-1 below outlines the aims of using these keys and their relation to the 
required security features in SSMCRN. 
Table  3-1:  Security Keys in SSMCRN  
Cryptographic 
Keys 
Authentication Integrity Confidentiality 
Secure 
Transmission 
Server’s 
Public/ 
Private Key 
  
Only the server can 
decrypt the IOR 
Encrypt IOR 
Network’s 
Shared Key  
To 
authenticate 
CUs  
To ensure the 
integrity of ITA 
and RTA 
Confidential 
communication 
Encrypt ITA 
and RTA  
X-S-Shared 
Key 
 
To ensure the 
integrity of COR, 
CUA1 or CUA2 
Only user X 
decrypt the COR 
and CUA1 or 
CUA2 
Encrypt COR, 
CUA1 and 
CUA2 
X-Y-Shared 
Key 
 
To ensure the 
integrity of RTS 
and CTS and Data 
Only users X and Y 
decrypt the RTS, 
CTS and Data 
Encrypt RTS, 
CTS and Data  
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3.3.1.2. Associated cryptographic keys in DSMCRN 
In DSMCRN, as part of the Server’s public/private key, only two different shared 
keys are identified as X-S-Shared Key and X-Y-Shared Key along with the User’s 
Public/Private Key are applied. These associated keys are classified into four 
groups as follows: 
 Group 1: User’s Public/Private Key is generated by the CUs during the 
registration process. Therefore, the public key is provided to the server to 
generate a unique ID that is associated with the user public key. This ID aims 
to have the registered CU gain the authorised access to the network resources 
and used for authenticating the CU through the associated public key for 
verifying digital signature procedure. 
 Group 2: X-S-Shared Key is shared between user X and the Server only. It is 
generated by user X before transmitting IOR frame to encrypt/decrypt and 
ensures the integrity of the transmitted information between the server and user 
X. 
 Group 3: X-Y-Shared Key is generated by the server after the successful 
authentication process for both users X and Y only. This ensures the 
confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information between this pair of 
CUs. 
 Group 4: Server’s public/private key: the server public key is distributed to all 
users who are willing to register and gain authorised access information to 
utilise the network resources. Its function is to exchange secret information 
belong to the user at the initial stage of the registration process. 
Table  3-2 highlights the associated cryptographic keys to incorporate in providing 
the required security features in DSMCRN protocols. 
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Table  3-2: Security Keys in DSMCRN 
Cryptographic 
Keys 
Authentication Integrity Confidentiality 
Secure 
Transmission 
 Server’s 
Public 
/Private Key 
  
Only the server can 
decrypt the IOR, 
ITA and RTA 
Encrypt IOR, 
ITA and RTA 
X Public/ 
Private Key 
Generate/verify 
digital signature 
To ensure the 
integrity of ITA and 
RTA through DS 
The private key is 
kept secret to sign 
messages 
 
X-S-Shared 
Key 
 
To ensure the 
integrity of 
COR, CUA1 and 
CUA2 
Only user X 
decrypt the message 
Encrypt COR, 
CUA1 and 
CUA2 
X-Y-Shared 
Key 
 
To ensure the 
integrity of FCL 
and SLDCH and 
Data 
Only user X and Y 
decrypt the 
messages 
Encrypt RTS, 
CTS and Data 
3.3.2. Secure keys exchanges in DSMCRN and SSMCRN  
Each authorised registered CU has a unique ID which is associated with the user’s 
public-key in DSMCRN while network’s Shared Key and ID in SSMCRN. This is 
the authorised access information is generated by the server and obtained in the 
registration phase of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols. However, the main 
security concern is that this information must be delivered to each intended 
registered CU in protected and unreadable format from other users. Because the 
received information is essentially used to identify the CU, whom this information 
belongs, to the server in DSMCRN and the CUs who are part of the network in 
SSMCRN. Also, the authentication procedure is mainly based on the public key of 
the registered CU in DSMCRN and the network’s Shared Key and ID in 
SSMCRN. Without the encryption technique, this information is easily 
manipulated or obtained and used by different users or attackers. Therefore, the 
generated X-S-Shared Key (Group2) is considered to produce the ideal solution to 
encrypt and protect this transmitted information from other users before its 
transmission. However, the X-S-Shared Key (Group2) necessitates to be shared 
between both CU X and the server previously. Thus, in order to distribute it to the 
server in a secure manner, the use of the server’s public key (Group4) provides a 
perfect consideration for encrypting the X-S-Shared Key. As the encrypted X-S-
Shared Key can only be decrypted by the server which has the private key. 
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Furthermore, the X-S-Shared Key (Group2) is also used for encrypting the X-Y-
Shared Key (Group3) in the CUA1 or CUA2 frames in both DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN. Thus, the overall secure exchanged keys are encrypted and decrypted 
by the right entities in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN. Figure  3-9 summarises the 
encrypted keys exchanges by involving different keys in DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN. 
Users’ IDs in DSMCRN’ I  i  X-Y-Shared Key (Group3)- -   ( )
  encrypts 
  encrypts  encrypts
X-S-Shared Key (Group2)
OR
Network’s Shared Key (Group1) in SSMCRN
Servers’ Public-Key 
 
Figure ‎3-9: Secure keys exchanges in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
3.3.3.   DSMCRN and SSMCRN architecture  
Although the proposed MCRN protocol for decentralised CRNs was discussed in 
depth in chapter 3, it is entirely revisited in this chapter with some additional 
factors belonging to the security procedures. The additional aspects can be 
highlighted into two sides. The first is a cooperative dedicated server that is 
engaged for the authentication purpose and providing the security key management 
to end users through registering CUs for controlling the entire network. The second 
belongs to the additional security frames required to provide the necessary security 
demands, including the authentication and users’ validation, as well as secure 
communications among incorporating entities. These additional aspects are applied 
to both DSMCRN and SSMCRN equally with the same added frames and server 
involvement. However, the main difference between them is that some of the 
frames have different sizes compared to each other in both protocols. This is 
because of the required security information exchanged between CUs and the 
server.  
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Thus in Figure  3-10, a dedicated server is incorporated within the communication 
over only the dedicated CCC, which is allocated to the server and CUs only for 
exchanging the security frames and control information belongs to the sensing 
channels results (Free channels List, FCL, or white spaces) and the most reliable 
selected licensed data channel (SLDCH) for the aim of exchange data between a 
pair of CUs within the same range. 
Therefore, case 1 refers to two different situations in which the CUs perform the 
contention method to access the CCC in order to communicate with the server for 
the registration process to gain authorised access to network information, or 
authentication procedure to send a request for validating CUs. This case is only 
used for security purposes, and is considered an initial stage in which a CU 
exchanges registration and security frames before initiating the process of control 
information exchange. This aims to control the network, so that it can only be 
utilised by authorised CUs. Once the CUs are successfully authenticated and 
permitted to continue communicating with each other, then case 2 is begun to 
exchange the FCL and SLDCH information over the CCC, and to perform the 
switching procedure to the SLDCH. Therefore, the same discussion about the 
network scenario as raised in section 3.2.3 is applied in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols, to exchange control information and initiate data transmission. Thus, the 
complete framework of both DSMCRN and SSMCRN is demonstrated in 
Figure  3-11. 
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LU
A dedicated Common Control Channel (CCC)
Data Channel 1
Data Channel 2
Data Channel 3
X
A dedicated Common Control Channel (CCC)
√ 
CU
X
Case 1. A CU  communicates with the dedicated 
server over the CCC
Case 2. A CU communicates with another 
CU over the CCC
Case 3. A CU select an available data 
channels
CU CU CU
CU CU
A dedicated server
X
CH 2
CH 2
FCL
CH 3
SLDCH
Figure  3-10: DSMCRN and SSMCRN Network scenario 
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CU-A CU-B
Server
ITA
CTS
RTA
CUA2
CU
A1
RTS
Server
CU-A
CU-B
RTR
CTR
IOR
COR
CU-A CU-B
Data
ACK
A) Phase 1: Registration Frames 
B) Phase 2: Authentication and 
Control information Frames 
C) Phase 3: Data transmission 
Frames 
 
Figure ‎3-11: DSMCRN and SSMCRN architecture 
The assumed authentication server involved in the network and shown in 
Figure  3-11 is a layer 2 device which can be an AP or a mobile device. It is 
assumed that the device is capable for providing the required associated 
transparent security functions related to the encryption and decryption. This 
differentiates the operation of the assumed authentication device in the proposed 
protocols from the other existing authentication servers that operate in the 
application and transport layers such as RADIUS and TACACS+ respectively. 
Therefore, the proposed protocols integrate all the required security features in a 
single layer instead of relying on multiple layers this avoiding complexity and 
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possible additional overhead that might occur that lead to the decrease in network 
efficiency. Accordingly, the proposed security protocols are simple in their 
structure and operation, since the assumed layer 2 authentication server has less 
complexity in terms of performing authentication processes without the need of 
access credentials which are required for RADIUS. Moreover, since the CRNs are 
self-organised, self-configured and can be deployed anywhere and anytime free of 
cost, the use of existing authentication server will have additional costs that can 
affect the deployment of CR technology. Therefore, the proposed security 
protocols use the authentication server for both registering CUs and authentication 
purposes. In addition, the use of the associated security at the MAC layer ensures 
the protection and confidentiality for the information presented in the MAC 
frames related to the message transmission between two CUs in decentralised 
CRNs. Thus, the security issues related to the PHY and MAC layers in 
decentralised CRNs, such as jamming attacks, Spectrum Sensing Data 
Manpulation/Falsefication, MAC address Spoofing, and Primary User Emulation 
(PUE) and Primary User Interference (PUI) attacks, are handled by offering the 
security at these layers. 
3.3.4. Digital-Signature based secure MAC protocol for 
Cognitive Radio Networks (DSMCRN) 
DSMCRN is a Digital Signature based secure MAC protocol for CRNs 
(Alhakami, et al., 2013) designed to achieve the security requirements, such as 
authentication, authorisation and data confidentiality addressing most of the 
existing issues in decentralised CRNs. A cooperative dedicated server is engaged 
for the authentication purpose based on a digital signature procedure with the 
assistance of asymmetric-key cryptography for detection mechanisms against 
unauthorised access. The server also provides the security key management to 
valid CUs for maintaining a secure communication process. Therefore, the 
protocol accommodates two different cryptographic encryption mechanisms 
known as symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques that are used to secure 
messages’ transmissions (Alhakami, et al., 2013). It also consists of three 
different essential embedded phases that operate in sequence. Each phase has a 
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different task and relies on the completion of the previous phase. Table  3-3 
demonstrate where the symmetric and asymmetric key algorithms are used in the 
DSMCRN. 
Table  3-3: Encryption methods used in DSMCRN 
Encryption 
Method 
Type of 
encryption 
Keys 
size 
DSMCRN Phases 
Registration Control Data 
Server to 
Node 
Node to 
Server 
Node to 
Node 
Node to 
Server 
Server 
to Node 
Node to 
Node 
RSA 
Asymmetric 
Cryptography 
1024  √  √   
AES 
Symmetric 
Cryptography 
128 √  √  √ √ 
 
In order to obtain the required security for achieving a successful data 
transmission among valid CUs, each user necessitates going through two different 
stages before transmitting data. These two phases are designed and applied for the 
security purpose. More details of the functions of each phase are discussed next: 
3.3.4.1. Registration phase of DSMCRN 
The registration process is considerably important to CUs for obtaining the 
security IDs to provide authorised network access. This security information is 
essential because it enables only the registered CUs in joining the network, and 
continuously communicate with the other valid users. Therefore, CUs who intend 
to use the network resources, are required to register their information with a 
dedicated server to obtain a user’s ID. This is achieved through launching four 
frames; Request-To-Register (RTR), Clear-To-Register (CTR), Information-Of-
Registration (IOR), and Confirmation-Of-Registration (COR) over the CCC. 
Figure ‎3-12 shows the messages’ sequence of the registration phase of both 
protocols.  
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ServerCTR
IOR
COR
RTR
New User
 
Figure ‎3-12: Messages’ sequence of the registration phase 
1) Request-To-Register (RTR) frame 
The process of initiating the registration phase is established when a new CU 
transmits an RTR broadcast frame over the CCC. The frame’s destination is the 
dedicated server which is the main controller of the network in terms of the 
security key management to end users, and the authentication procedure. 
Figure ‎3-13 shows the RTR frame contents. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
FCS
2 2 6 6 4
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
0 0
12
Sub type 
0 0 0 0
4
  
Figure ‎3-13: RTR frame format 
2) Clear-To-Register (CTR) Frame 
A CTR is a unicast frame that is sent as a reply by the server. It includes the 
public-key in order to encrypt any transmitted information between those two 
entities in the next frame. Therefore, the frame format is shown in Figure  3-14.  
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Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Server Public 
Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
0 0
12
Sub type 
0 0 0 1
4
 
Figure  3-14: CTR frame format 
3) Information-of-Registration (IOR) Frame: 
After receiving the server’s Public-Key, the CU requires generating security keys 
from both symmetric and asymmetric keys cryptography independently. A shared 
key is generated from AES-128 and a pair of public/private keys is generated 
from RSA-1024 algorithms. Only the public and shared keys will be distributed to 
the server in a unicast secure manner. Therefore, the CU requires generating a 
Message Authentication Code Key (MAC-key) to ensure the integrity of the 
transmitted keys to the dedicated server. Therefore, the CU encrypts MAC-Key, 
ID, Shared-key and Public-key using the server’s public-key, which is received in 
the CTR frame. This encrypted information then is included in the IOR frame 
before its transmission to the server as shown in Figure  3-15.  
As soon as the server received the IOR, it will decrypt the information through 
applying its Private-key. Then the server needs to verify the received information 
from any modification that has occurred during the transmission. Therefore, it 
generates a new MAC-Key through applying the MAC-Key algorithm with the 
use of the received Shared-Key, ID and Public-Key. If both the generated and 
received MAC-Keys are identical, then the IOR frame is accepted. 
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Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Public key + Shared-
key + MAC-Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 0 1 0
4
 
Figure  3-15: IOR frame format in DSMCRN 
4) Confirmation-Of-Registration (COR) frame 
Once the server has accepted the IOR information, it stores both the user’s Public-
Key, ID and Shared-key and generates a specific ID for the CU. Therefore, the 
server sends a COR unicast frame that includes the generated ID and a new MAC-
Key in an encrypted format using the same Shared-Key that received in the IOR 
frame from the user. Consequently the user obtains the required ID after 
decrypting and then verifying the received information using the same Shared-
Key and MAC-Key algorithm respectively. This information indicates the 
complete successful registration process and offers the ability to the CU for 
joining the network. However, in case of MAC-Key verification indicates false 
which means the transmitted information has been modified during the 
transmission, the CU requires to launch the RES frame in order to let the server 
retransmit the COR frame. The content of the COR frame is demonstrated in  
Figure  3-16. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
User ID + MAC-Key FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 0 1 1
4
 
Figure  3-16: COR frame format 
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The flowchart of the entire registration process of both the DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN protocols is shown in Figure  3-17. 
Start
Server includes 
Pub-key 
CTR for 
him/her self?
1. generates Shared-key,Public-
key, ID and MAC-Key
2. encrypts all
Server:
1. decrypts IOR
2. generates MAC-key 
MAC-keys 
identical ?
Server encrypts all
Server sends  COR
 Yes 
COR for 
him/her self?
User: 
1. decrypts COR
2. generates MAC-key  
Yes
MAC-keys 
identical ?
 No 
 No 
 User sends  
IOR
Yes  No 
Server sends CTR
Yes
 No 
Server sends 
RES
Server sends 
RES
User stores ID
Generates ID and 
MAC-key 
Wait for 
Random time
Wait for NAV 
Time
Authentication and 
control phase
CCC 
available?
 Yes
User sends RTR 
 No 
 
Figure ‎3-17: Flow chart of the registration process in DSMCRN 
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3.3.4.2.  Authentication and control phase of DSMCRN 
The current phase considers as the initial stage of applying the security techniques 
in the communication between the sender and receiver CUs. It is designed for 
exchanging six frames; Information-To-Authenticate (ITA), Request-To-
Authenticate (RTA), Confirmation-Of-Authentication1 (CUA1), Confirmation-Of-
Authentication2 (CUA2), Request-To-Send (RTS) and Clear-To-Send (CTS). 
These frames are divided into two groups based on their functionalities. The first 
group is the security frames, which are ITA, RTA, CUA1 and CUA2, for 
achieving the task of authenticating both the sender and receiver CUs through 
applying a digital signature procedure and providing a shared-key for those users 
after they are authenticated in order to encrypt and decrypt the next frames. The 
second group is the control information frames, which are RTS and CTS, for 
control information exchange between the sender and receiver. Figure ‎3-18 below 
illustrates the sequence of the Authentication and Control phase frames’ 
transmission among the sender, receiver and the server: 
 
Figure ‎3-18: Authentication and control phase framework in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
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1) Information-To-Authenticate (ITA) frame: 
The process of the communication between a pair of CUs is initiated formerly 
when the sender CU signs its ID. This would result in generating a digital 
signature, which then is attached to the ID. The sender therefore encrypts both the 
generated signature and ID uses the server’s public key (Group 4) that was 
received in a CTR unicast frame. This encrypted information is attached to the 
ITA frame which then is transmitted to the receiver CU. Figure  3-19 shows the 
ITA frame format after the encryption. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Sender’s Signature FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 1 0 0
4
Figure  3-19: ITA frame format in DSMCRN 
2) Request To Authenticate (RTA) frame: 
As soon as the receiver CU received the ITA frame, it does the same process of 
signing its ID and then attaching to the generated signature that belongs to himself 
for authentication purpose. Then the receiver CU attaches both the received 
encrypted information from the sender CU and its information to the RTA frame 
which then is transmitted in a unicast form to the server. The frame format of the 
RTA, which includes two separate signatures belong to the sender and receiver 
CUs, after the encryption is shown in Figure  3-20. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Sender’s 
Signature
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 1 0 1
4
Receiver’s 
Signature
...
Figure  3-20: RTA frame format in DSMCRN 
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As soon as the server receives the RTA frame, it requires verifying both 
signatures individually after decrypting them using its private-key. Therefore, 
with the help of the received IDs, the server uses its database to retrieve the 
public-keys of the sender and receiver CUs and then verifies each signature 
through applying these public-keys separately. Based on the verification results, 
two possible actions will be taken by the server; if the result of the each signature 
verification is positive (True), it indicates that both users are authorised and 
allowed to continue the communication with each other. Thus, the server will 
generate a shared-key for both sender and receiver for encryption and decryption, 
this key is represented as X-Y-Shared Key (Group 3).  
However, if the status of one of the digital signature verification refers to negative 
(False), this means that the user is failed to authenticate and treated as malicious 
or invalid users because of non-registration within the server to gain authorised 
access to the network. In this case, the server will eliminate the user who is failed 
to authenticate from gaining access and uses the resources of the network. In other 
words, suppose the sender is a malicious user or has not registered for obtaining 
an ID and contributed with the communication by sending ITA, if their signature 
is failed to be verified, then the server will update the receiver CU with this by 
sending a Fail-To-Authenticate frame indicates that sender is malicious. Thus, the 
receiver CU requires stopping the communication with the sender CU 
immediately. The failure of authentication process framework is shown in 
Figure  3-21 while the format of the FTA frame is shown in Figure  3-22. Therefore 
the entire process of the authentication flowchart of DSMCRN is shown in 
Figure  3-23. 
  
Design of the proposed MAC protocols with and without security 
91 
 
Sender Receiver
  ITA    
ITA:  Information To Authenticate 
RTA: Request To Authenticate
FTA: Fail To  Authenticate 
Malicious 
Authenticator
RTA
FTA
Sender is 
a malicious ?
I want to 
deceive the 
recipient
Figure  3-21: Failure of authentication process of the sender 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
FTA FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
1 1 1 1
4
Figure  3-22: FTA frame format 
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Figure  3-23: The authentication process flow chart in DSMCRN 
3) Confirmation-Of-Authentication CUA1 & CUA2 frames: 
Only after the successful verification of both CUs and generating a shared-key 
(group 3) for encryption and decryption procedure, the server launches two 
different unicast frames known as CUA1 and CUA2 for the sender and receiver 
CUs respectively. Each frame includes three pieces of encrypted information; 
MAC-Keys, IDs and X-Y-Shared Key belongs to Group 3 keys. The included 
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information of the CUA1 which is intended to sender CU is encrypted using the 
sender’s shared key, X-S-Shared Key (Group 2), that was generated previously by 
the sender in the IOR frame during the registration. Also for encrypting the 
content of the CUA2, the server encrypts the information using the receiver’s 
shared key, X-S-Shared Key (Group 2), that was generated by the receiver during 
their registration. The format of the CUA1 and CUA2 are given in Figure  3-24 
and Figure  3-25 respectively. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
ID + Shared-Key + 
MAC-Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 1 1 0
4
Figure  3-24: CUA1 frame format 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
ID + Shared-Key + 
MAC-Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 1 1 1
4
Figure  3-25: CUA2 frame format 
When the sender received and then decrypted the CUA1 frame by the use of the 
same shared key (Group 2) they can verify the authenticity of the received 
message through using the MAC-Key algorithm. Thus, the comparison of the 
received and the new generated MAC-Key will confirm whether the received 
shared has been modified during the frame transmission or not. The same process 
applies to the receiver as soon as they received the CUA2 frame. 
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4) Request-To-Send (RTS) frame: 
During the authentication process and before receiving both the CUA1 and 
CUA2, both the sender and receiver CUs sense the licensed channels to list the 
available channels that can be utilised for data transmission in the next phase. 
Therefore, after receiving the CUA1, the sender requires to launch an RTS unicast 
frame which includes both the authentic sensing results (Available/Free Channel 
List (FCL)) and a MAC-Key which is generated from applying both the received 
Shared-key (Group 3) and the FCL in the MAC algorithm. Therefore, both MAC-
Key and the FCL are encrypted by applying the same shared key, X-Y-Shared Key 
(Group 3), and this is considered as a clear contribution point of this research 
since the encryption is essential to hide the FCL and SLDCH from both adversary 
users (external attackers) and other CUs (internal attackers), who aim to 
misbehave by switching to these channels and make them unavailable for both 
senders and receivers in CRNs and resulting in deteriorating the network 
performance through decreasing its throughput. Moreover, if the FCL is not 
encrypted then the malicious users can inject or modify the FCL which results in 
wrong decision is made by spectrum management to select the best channel for 
data transmission and this attack is recognised as Spectrum Sensing data 
manipulation/falsification attack that resulted from unauthentic sensing results. 
Thus, the attacker’s aim is to give false observation information to the CUs in 
order to affect the communication process by launching DoS attack in terms of the 
available channel level or may to maximise his/her communication performance 
(selfish attack). Furthermore, not only the encryption mechanism is essentially 
considered in the RTS frame for securing the FCL but also MAC-Key for the 
attached FCL is generated in the sender side and then attached to the FCL for the 
encryption procedure. This significantly helps to authenticate the received 
information in the receiver side for the integrity assurance of the transmitted 
information. Thus, the format of the RTS frame is shown in Figure  3-26. 
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Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
FCL FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 1 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
1 0 0 0
4
Figure  3-26: RTS frame format 
As soon as the receiver received the RTS frame, he/she is able to decrypt it using 
the same shared-key (Group 3) which received from the CUA2 frame. Therefore, 
the CU requires ensuring the integrity of the received information through 
generating a new MAC-Key of the received FCL and the Group 3 shared-key. 
Once the integrity of the received information ensured then the receiver replies 
with the CTS frame as follow, otherwise the CU needs to reply with RES frame to 
leads to retransmitting the CTS frame again. 
5) Clear-To-Send (CTS) frame: 
As mentioned before in the RTS frame, both the sender and receiver perform the 
sensing mechanism to allocate the available licensed channel to transmit their data 
over. Based on the received FCL, the receiver needs to select the most reliable 
data channel based on the high availability from the FCL. Thus, the receiver 
launches a CTS unicast frame which is shown in Figure  3-27. The CTS frame 
includes both the Selected Data Channel (SLDCH) and a MAC-Key which is 
generated by running both SLDCH and the shared-key (Group 3) in the MAC 
algorithm. These two pieces of information are encrypted using the shared-key of 
group 3 (X-Y-Shared Key). Both the encryption and generated MAC-Key for the 
SLDCH are crucial in this stage to defend against a DoS attack, which can be 
resulted by launching a Spectrum Sensing Data manipulation/Falsification attack 
which was discussed in the RTS frame described earlier in this chapter.  
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Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
SLDCH FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 1 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
1 0 0 1
4
Figure  3-27: CTS frame format 
On the sender side, the encrypted content of the received CTS frame can be 
decrypted through applying the same shared-key, X-Y-Shared Key (Group 3). 
Then the CU requires ensuring the integrity of the received encrypted SLDCH 
through generating a new MAC-Key and then compares it with the received 
MAC-Key. If these MAC-Keys are matched, then both CUs necessitate switching 
to the SLDCH for data transmission, otherwise, the sender sends RES frame to 
notify the receiver that the received information has been modified during the 
transmission and this leads to retransmitting the CTS frame again. Thus, the flow 
chart of the secure control frames transmissions is shown in Figure  3-28. 
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Figure  3-28: Secure control phase transmission in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
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3.3.4.3. Data transmission phase of DSMCRN 
Data and Acknowledgement frames are two main different frames, which are used 
in the current phase. Figure  3-29 demonstrates the data frames sequence between 
the sender and receiver CUs. 
 
Figure ‎3-29: Data transmission phase 
1) Data frame 
When both CUs are agreed and exchanged SLDCH over CTS frame successfully 
and then switched to the SLDCH, they can exchange both Data and 
Acknowledgement frames in unicast form over the SLDCH. Usually the data is 
transmitted in encrypted format uses the group 3 shared-key (X-Y-Shared Key) 
after the MAC-Key is generated and associated with the data for the integrity 
assurance. Thus, the receiver is able to decrypt the received information by using 
the same shared-key and then verify the data integrity through applying the same 
group 3 shared-key and the received data. This process indicates the secure data 
transmission and data confidentiality, which are considered as a clear contribution 
point of this research, since only the right legitimate intended receiver among 
other users, who either can be internal CUs (CUs attempt to misbehave) or 
external attackers, can decrypt and verify the integrity of the received data. The 
format of the data frame is shown in Figure  3-30.  
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Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Data + 
MAC-Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 1 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
1 0 1 0
4
Figure  3-30: Data frame format 
2) Acknowledgment frame  
Once the integrity of the received data is ensured the ACK unicast frame is 
transmitted over the same channel. Only 1 byte is encrypted and known as ACK 
field in Figure  3-31 to confirm that only the intended receiver has transmitted the 
ACK frame. This encryption is important since the man in the middle attack can 
intercept the data transmission frame by causing modification or eavesdropping of 
the transmitted data and resulting in DoS attack. Therefore, only the encryption of 
the transmitted ACK frame is considered since it ensures and notifies the sender 
that the data has transmitted successfully to the intended CU and there is no need 
of ensuring the integrity of the encrypted information by the sender while the 
notification is done by the encryption procedure using the shared key is known to 
only a pair of CUs (sender and receiver). Therefore, once the ACK frame is 
received and then decrypted successfully by sender the entire process of the 
communication is ended and both CUs vacate the current licensed data channel.  
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
ACK FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 1 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
1 0 1 1
4
Figure  3-31: ACK frame format 
Design of the proposed MAC protocols with and without security 
100 
 
Note: Generally, the format of the RES frame remains same in all the protocols 
phases and is shown in Figure  3-32. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
FCS
2 2 6 6 4
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 * *
Retry
1
1
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
0 0
12
Sub type 
* * * *
4
Figure  3-32: RES frame format 
The flow chart of the data transmission process in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols is shown in Figure  3-33. 
Sender: generates Data 
and MAC-Key 
Sender: sends Data
Receiver :decrypts 
Data frame 
MAC-keys 
identical ?
Receiver: sends 
RES
 No 
Receiver:
Encrypt 1 byte and then 
sends ACK
End
 Yes 
Sender: encrypts Data and 
MAC-Key
Receiver: generates  
MAC-Key 
After Successful 
Switching
LU is ON  Yes 
Wait for 
expiring time
No 
 
Figure ‎3-33: Data transmission phase flow chart in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
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3.3.5. Shared-key based Secure MAC protocol for CRNs 
(SSMCRN) 
The proposed DSMCRN protocol (Alhakami, et al., 2013) is analysed and 
addressed the security requirements to provide an authentication procedure among 
CUs using digital signature procedure with the assistance of asymmetric-key 
cryptography for detection mechanisms against malicious behaviour activities. 
However, it can also operate based upon symmetric-key cryptography for 
maintaining the same functionalities in terms of providing the necessary security 
features. The SSMCRN protocol (Alhakami, et al., 2014) maintains the same 
phases of the DSMCRN protocol in terms of registering the CUs’ information to 
the dedicated authenticator server as a first stage, authenticating and exchanging 
the control information as the second stage and secure data transmission as last 
phase. However, its operation in addressing the authentication and CUs validation 
is different comparing to DSMCRN because of a shared key is used among the 
registered CUs instead of having an asymmetric key to generate a digital signature 
for authentication purpose. Table  3-4 demonstrates where the symmetric and 
asymmetric key algorithms are used in the SSMCRN. 
Table  3-4: Encryption methods used in SSMCRN 
Encryption 
Method 
Type of 
encryption 
Keys 
size 
SSMCRN Phases 
Registration Control Data 
Server to 
Node 
Node to 
Server 
Node to 
Node 
Node to 
Server 
Server to 
Node 
Node to 
Node 
RSA 
Asymmetric 
Cryptography 
1024  √     
AES 
Symmetric 
Cryptography 
128 √  √ √ √ √ 
 
The SSMCRN protocol consists of three sequential phases; registration, control 
and data phases that each performs a specific task to fulfil the secure data 
transmission among only the authorised CU recipients (Alhakami, et al., 2014). 
Thus, the phases of the SSMCRN operation are explained as follows: 
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3.3.5.1.  Registration phase of SSMCRN 
The registration phase of the SSMCRN protocol follows the same process of the 
registration process in DSMCRN in terms of obtaining the authorised security 
information access to join the network. Also, this is achieved through transmitting 
four frames; RTR, CTR, IOR and COR frames between both the CU and the 
dedicated server. Therefore, RTR and CTR frames are discussed in details in 
section 3.3.4.1 while the IOR and COR frames are explained as follow: 
1) Information-of-Registration (IOR) frame: 
This frame is similar to the IOR frame in DSMCRN in terms of its unicast 
transmission to the server in encrypted format with the use of the server’s public-
key and decryption procedure by the server which applies its private key. 
However, the main difference is in the content of the encrypted and transmitted 
information which only includes the user Shared Key, ID and MAC-Key. The 
format of the IOR frame of the SSMCRN protocol is shown in Figure  3-34 below. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Shared-Key + ID + 
MAC-Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 0 1 0
4
Figure  3-34: IOR frame format in SSMCRN  
2) Confirmation-Of-Registration (COR) frame: 
This frame is similar to the COR frame in terms of its unicast transmission to the 
CU and both the encryption and decryption procedures in DSMCRN. However, it 
is different in the content of the encrypted information, which includes the 
network’s shared key and an ID generated for the registered CUs as well as the 
MAC Key for the integrity of this information. The format of the COR frame is 
shown in Figure  3-35. 
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Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
Shared-Key + ID + 
MAC-Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 0
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 0 1 1
4
Figure  3-35: COR frame format in SSMCRN 
The flowchart of the entire registration process of the SSMCRN protocol is shown 
in Figure  3-36. 
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Figure ‎3-36: Flow chart of the registration process in SSMCRN 
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3.3.5.2.  Authentication and control phase of SSMCRN 
This phase focuses on achieving the same security and control information 
objectives of the authentication and control phase in DSMCRN. However, the 
main difference is the authentication process, which is based upon two different 
sequence steps; pre-authentication on the CU level and primary-authentication on 
the server in SSMCRN instead of authenticating CUs through verifying digital 
signatures in the server in DSMCRN. The frames sequence for the authentication 
and control phase remain same in both protocols and was shown in Figure  3-18 in 
section 3.3.4.2. 
1) Information-To-Authenticate (ITA) frame 
Before a sender tries to communicate with the destination CU, it firstly generates 
MAC-key through running its ID on the MAC algorithm. The sender encrypts both 
the ID and MAC-Key using the Network shared key (group 1) that received in 
COR frame. This encrypted information is transmitted to the intended destination 
within an ITA unicast frame over the CCC. The recipient needs to pre-authenticate 
the sender through decrypts the received information. If the receiver CU is able to 
decrypt it, then this indicates that the sender is a valid user from the receiver point 
of view. By doing this the recipient involves in protecting the server from any 
invalid transmitted frame that indirectly would increase the chance of launching a 
DoS attack by the attacker. The frame format of the ITA in SSMCRN is shown in 
Figure  3-37. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
 ID + MAC-Key FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 1 0 0
4
Figure ‎3-37: ITA frame format in SSMCRN 
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2) Request-To-Authenticate (RTA) frame 
When the ITA frame received and decrypted successfully, the receiver does the 
same process of generating MAC-Key through running its ID on the MAC 
algorithm. Then the receiver encrypts its ID, the generated MAC-Key and the 
sender information (sender’s ID and MAC-Key). This encrypted information is 
transmitted to the server within an RTA unicast frame as shown in Figure  3-38. 
Therefore, the authentication procedure is mainly based on having the network 
shared-key (group 1) and the user ID for ensuring the information belongs to a 
certain registered user. 
Header Duration
Destination
 MAC Address
 ID + MAC-
Key
FCS
2 2 6 6 4...
Sender  MAC 
Address
Bytes
Protocol Type 
2 1Bits
0 1 0 1
Retry
1
0
Frag
1
Pwr
0
Protected
1 0
12
Sub type 
0 1 0 0
4
 ID + MAC-
Key
...
Figure  3-38: RTA frame format in SSMCRN 
3) Confirmation‎of‎User’s‎authentication‎1&2‎(CUA1&2) 
These frames are explained in details in CUA1 and CUA2 frames of the 
Authentication and Control information phase of the DSMCRN in section 3.3.4.2. 
4) Request to send (RTS) 
RTS frame is explained in details in the Authentication and Control information 
phase of DSMCRN in section 3.3.4.2. 
5) Clear to send (CTS) 
CTS frame is explained in details in the Authentication and Control information 
phase of DSMCRN in section 3.3.4.2. 
The authentication phase of the SSMCRN flow chart is shown in Figure  3-39. 
3.3.5.3.  Data transmission phase of SSMCRN 
This phase includes both Data and ACK frames, which are explained in details in 
Data transmission phase in section 3.3.4.3. 
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Figure ‎3-39: Authentication process flowchart in SSMCRN 
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3.3.6. Analysis of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols 
using BAN logic 
This section focuses on analysing and describing the proposed DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN protocols using a formal logic method called BAN logic. Therefore, the 
details of how messages sequence of the three phases of the proposed protocols 
accomplishes with BAN logic and given in the next sections. 
3.3.6.1. What is the BAN logic? 
In order to analysis any protocol for communication usually there are two 
different approaches which are simulation technique using tools such as NS2, 
OPNET Modular, testbed or any programming language like Java or C++ while 
the second approach using a formal logic method such as BAN (Burrows, et al., 
1990), GNY  and Belief (David, 1999). Therefore, the BAN logic method is used 
for analysis and validating the proposed DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols. The 
significant motivation of using this method among the others is because it is less 
complexity comparing to GNY and Belief logics in terms of the understanding. 
Moreover, it is used as an initial stage to validate the protocol in terms of meeting 
the communication and the security requirements before the simulation task takes 
place. Figure  3-40 shows different approaches of protocol analysis. 
 
Figure ‎3-40: Protocol analysis methods 
Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic (Burrows, et al., 1990) provides a variety 
of symbols that are used for cryptographic schemes for both symmetric and 
asymmetric key exchange. Thus, the use of this logic is applicable to analyses the 
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proposed DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols since they are designed and involve 
symmetric and asymmetric techniques. Therefore, Table  3-5 below gives the BAN 
logic symbols that are used in the current protocols. 
Table  3-5: The BAN logic symbols  
 Symbol Usage 
X | Y X Controls Y 
X | Y X Believes Y 
X |~ Y X Sends Y 
  K 
| X 
Public Key of X 
K
-1
 Private Key (Secret) 
      K 
X         Y      
X and Y shared a secret key  
    X     M X  Believes (Sees) M 
3.3.6.2.  BAN logic messages meaning rules 
The BAN logic rules are represented in formulas based on the given symbols in 
Table  3-5 and each has been described in details.  
1) Rule 1 
| , { }
| |
K
KP Q P P X
P Q X


 
When node P sees the message that is encrypted with the secret key of both P and 
Q, then node P believes the node Q has transmitted the message since the shared-
key is only recognized for those users who can produce this message. Thus, the 
proposed protocols meet the current rule since the server authenticate and grant a 
shared key for both the sender and receivers.  
2)  Rule 2          
1| , { }
| |
K
K
P Q P X
P Q X
 

 
This rule is similar to the previous rule, but as soon as the asymmetric key has two 
main parts which are the public and private keys, with node P sees the message 
that is encrypted with the private Key of node Q. Then node P believes Q has sent 
the message which can only be produced by Q. This rule is met in the DSMCRN 
protocol analysis since the implication of digital signature is applied.  
3) Rule 3    
| | , | |
|
P Q X P Q X
P X
   

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If P believes Q controls X then P believes Q believes X. This resulted in P 
believes X. This rule achieved in all the messages of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols since the MAC-Key is provided with the transmitted messages for 
achieving the integrity. 
3.3.6.3. Established initial assumptions for the proposed 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
According to the assumptions that were highlighted in section 3.1, five of these 
assumptions related to the security are described in Table  3-6 to initiate and build 
sequence processes for analysing the proposed protocols whereas Table  3-7 lists 
the variables that are used. 
Table  3-6: The assumptions that are used in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Assumptions Explanation 
| , ,ID IDS N N P Q

  
Server controls the network access information which is 
shared-key and CUs’ IDs for registered CUs 
| | KP S Q    
Node P Believes the server controls the public-key of Q once 
it is registered  
| | KQ S P    
Node Q believes the server controls the public-key of P once 
it is registered 
| | ,|
K
P S P Q   
Node P believes the server controls the communication and  
provides a shared-key for control and data frames exchange 
after the successful authentication 
 | | ,|
K
Q S P Q   
Node Q believes the server controls the communication and  
provides a shared-key for data exchange after the successful 
authentication 
Table  3-7: The variables that are used in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Variables Description 
,P QX X  Node’s P or Q Message  
MACMX  
Message X MAC Key, which is generated the attached information of 
message X 
3.3.6.4. DSMCRN‎and‎SSMCRN‎protocols‎phases’‎analysis 
Based on the previous assumptions in Table  3-6 the protocols phases are analysed 
as follows: 
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1) Registration phase analysis 
The analysis and descriptions below are for the sequence messages’ transmission 
between a sender (P) that requests the server (S) to register and obtain the required 
information to join the network in DSMCRN and SSMCRN. 
In DSMCRN: 
Message (1) P Server  ~|P X   (Step 1.1) 
Message (2) Server P ~| { }|
K
S S  (Step 1.2)                                                                
Message (3) P Server  
|
~ , ,{ ,   } 3| | K
K
MAC
K
SID
P P SP P M

  
         (Step 1.3.1) 
However, in SSMCRN (Step 1.1) and (Step 1.2) remain same while (Step 1.3.1) 
and (Step 1.4.1) are different and provided in (Step 1.3.2) and (Step 1.4.2) 
respectively. 
Message (3) PServer 
|
3  | { }~ ,  ,  KID MAC S
K
P SP P M

    (Step 1.3.2) 
The required information about the registration is provided in (Step 1.3.1) and 
(Step 1.3.2) which they transmitted to the server in encrypted format using the 
|Server. Here only the server can decrypt and see the content of receiving message 3 
after applying its private key SK as shown in the following (Step 1.4.1) and (Step 
1.4.2). Since these keys are two parts as a pair which is generated from asymmetric 
key algorithms and the private key, which is used to decrypt the message 3, is only 
known to the server. 
 
| , , ,  3{{| } }K
K SK
ID MA S
K
CP P S P M      (Step 1.4.1) 
  
|
3 ,  ,{{  } }ID MAC
K SK
K S
P S MP

   (Step 1.4.2) 
The message 4 in DSMCRN is analysed as follows:                                           
Message (4) SP ,|~ 3{ } KID MAC P S
S P M   (Step 1.5.1) 
    ,  3{ } KID MAC P S
P P M   (Step 1.6.1) 
   3 }{{ },  
K
K
P S
ID MAC P S
P M  (Step 1.7.1) 
However, the message 4 in SSMCRN is shown as follows: 
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   3~ , ,  | { } K
K
ID MAC P S
S N P MN  (Step 1.5.2) 
    , 3  ,{ } 
K
KID M P SAC
NP PN M       (Step 1.6.2) 
   , , 3{{ }  } 
K
K
K P S
PD C SI MA
N N P M  (Step 1.7.2) 
Now node P has been successfully registered its information on the server and 
granted an ID which is the authorised access to join the network in DSMCRN and 
network shared-key and NID in SSMCRN. These are encrypted and transmitted 
securely with the 
K
P S  as it is only shared between P and S.   
2) Authentication/Control information phase analysis 
This part introduces three nodes are involved within the communication and 
identified as P, Q and S for the authentication and the secure transmission of the 
control information. Both P and Q are assumed completed the registration phase. 
Message (5) PQ             
PK
sigIDP P   (Step 5.1.1) 
The P applies its private key PK to encrypt the PID and this resulting in generating 
a hash value recognised as Psig. 
 
|
 |~ , 
Ksig ID S
P P P

          (Step 5.2.1) 
Both Psig and PID are appended and then encrypted with |S to ensure the 
confidentiality of the transmitted message.                      
          
|
,    
Ksig ID S
Q P P

      (Step 5.3.1) 
Here Q has nothing to do with message 5 since it can only be decrypted with the 
server’s private key. However, this message is used to establish the link of the 
communication with Q. Thus, Q has been notified to be involved within the 
communication, therefore it necessitate to send message 6.  
However, in SSMCRN, P sends PID as shown in (Step 5.1.2) which is encrypted 
with the network shared key that was obtained in (Step 1.7.2 in message 4). Only 
the registered and authorised recipient users can decrypt the current message. 
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   ~ 5 | { , } KID MAC N N
P P M      (Step 5.1.2) 
   
 
{{ } ,  5 } 
K
K
N N
N NID MAC
Q P M         (Step 5.2.2)        
Message (6) QS:     In DSMCRN, node Q (destination) generates a digital 
signature as shown in the following step: 
       
QK
Q Q
ID sig
   (Step 6.1.1) 
Both Qsig and QID are appended and then encrypted with |S for achieving the 
confidentiality of the transmitted message.    
                     
| |
|~ ,,
K Ksig sigID IDS S
Q P P Q Q
 
 
 
 
              (Step 6.2.1)  
                    ,
| |
,| ~ K Ksig sigID IDS S
S Q P P Q Q
 
 
 
 
         (Step 6.3.1) 
                    
| |
, ,
K K
SK
sig sigID IDS S
SK
anP dP Q Q
 
   
   
   
    (Step 6.4.1) 
The two parts of message 6 have been decrypted by the server SK
-1 
as shown in 
(Step 6.4), then based on the attached IDs for P and Q the server retrieves both |P 
and |Q from the database.  
   
| |K Ksig sigS S
and QP
 
 
(Step 6.5.1) 
Thus, based on rule 2 the authentication process of both users are completed after 
applying the (Step 6.5.1) since the each pair of asymmetric key is applied correctly 
to validate each signature.  
However, the message 6 of SSMCRN is different and analysed as follows: 
    ~ 5| ,  ,  KID ID MAC N NQ P Q M  (Step 6.1.2) 
     5 ,  ,  KID ID MAC N NS Q MP  (Step 6.2.2) 
     5,  ,  K
K
ID ID M
N
AC
N
N NQP M  (Step 6.3.2) 
The authentication of the P and Q in SSMCRN is based on the decryption of the 
message 6 also based on the attached IDs within the message to retrieve the 
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K
P S  for user P and 
K
Q S  for user Q and these shared keys will be used for 
securing messages 7 and 8 in the next steps.           
Message (7) S P:  
K
,|~ 7P  ,{ } ID MAC KP S
S PQ MQ   (Step 7.1) 
             ,  ,  7{ }ID MAC K
K
P S
PP Q PQ M   (Step 7.2) 
                            ,  ,  7 KID MAC
K
K
P S
P S
PQ MP Q
 
(Step 7.3) 
Message (8) S Q:    ,|~  8,{  }ID MAC
K
KQ S
P QS PQ M    (Step 8.1) 
        , 8|~ ,  { }ID MAC
K
KQ S
Q S Q PP Q M    (Step 8.2) 
                         ,  ,  8{{ } }
K
KID MAC
K Q S
Q S
PQP MQ  (Step 8.3) 
After a successful authentication of both P and Q the server sends two different 
frames include Q and S shared-key and PQID as shown in (Step 7.1) and (Step 8.1). 
This information is encrypted with different shared-keys that are shared between 
users and server while the decryptions are represented in (Step 7.3) and (Step 8.1).  
Message (9) P Q:       |~ , 9MAC KP QP FCL M   (Step 9.1) 
       ,  9|~ MAC KP QQ P FCL M   (Step 9.2) 
         , 9  KMAC
K
P Q
P Q
FCL M   (Step 9.3)  
Message (10) Q P:     0|~ ,  1  KMAC P QSLDCHQ M    (Step 10.1) 
        10,   |~ KMAC P QP Q SLDCH M  (Step 10.2) 
            ,  10  K
K
PC QMA
P Q
SLDCH M       (Step 10.3) 
Based on the successful secure exchange of FCL and SLDCH in (Step 9.1) and 
(Step 10.1), both P and Q agreed about the SLDCH to transmit X over. Thus the 
next step analysis the secure X between those users.  
3) Secure data transmission analysis 
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This stage demonstrates the secure data transmission between the nodes P and Q. 
Based on (Step 7.1) and (Step 8.1) both users received 
K
P Q  that is 
significantly used in (Step 11.1) to secure the data (X) during its transmission 
between only P and Q. Since 
K
P Q  is only known to this pair of users, the 
transmitted X can not be decrypted by other users as the required key is not 
recognised.                       
Message (11) PQ:  1|~ , 1  MAC KP QP X M                   (Step 11.1)        
 , 11|~  MAC KP QQ P X M    (Step 11.2)       
 , 11  MAC KP Q
KP Q
X M
 
 
 
  
(Step 11.3)        
Message (12) QP:  ~| KP QQ ACK             (Step 12.1)          
 |~  KP QP Q ACK          (Step 12.2) 
          
K
K
P Q
P Q
ACK        (Step 12.3) 
3.3.6.5.  Security Analysis 
As long as the BAN logic method is employed to determine whether or not the 
security protocols achieve the authentication requirement (Burrows, et al., 1990), 
it is used to determine both the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols’ function of 
authentication and verifying the secure transmission between the sender and 
receiver. The evaluation capability of these protocols can therefore be obtained 
from an examination of the following areas: 
1) Mutual Authentication 
The authentication task is significantly considered in both protocols through 
achieving the authorised access information belong to each CU. Thus, it is based 
on the digital signature technique in the DSMCRN and both CUs’ shared-keys 
and network key to verify the sender and receiver on the server side before the 
control information transmission between those CUs is initiated. The server 
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therefore does the authentication process and then informs both the sender and 
receiver about the status of the authentication through grant them with a unique 
shared-key allocated for this pair of CUs. The obtained key indicates the success 
of the authentication process and leads both CUs continue with their 
communication.  
2) Secure Communication 
Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography techniques are considered and 
involved for secure message transmissions in both protocols. Thus, all the 
transmitted messages of the three phases are encrypted with the use of whether 
symmetric or asymmetric keys based on their demands. However, only the RTR 
and CTR frames which do not require encryption since it initiates the process of 
communication for mainly requesting the server to send its public-key. For more 
detail, see sections 3.3.4.1 and 3.3.5.1 in DSMCRN and SSMCRN respectively. 
3.3.6.6.  Vulnerability Analysis 
The current protocols have been investigated from different sides of the security 
perspective in order to ensure that they are able to operate against a range of 
different potential attacks that can be launched against CRNs. The following 
attacks will therefore be explained in terms of their security relationship with the 
current protocols. 
1) Replay and Masquerading Attacks 
In the messages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols, an 
attacker cannot escalate and impersonate the legitimate CUs information and 
privileges for gaining authorised access since the encryption mechanisms were 
involved and performed against the replay and masquerading attacks. For example 
in message 5 and 6 of DSMCRN, the senders and receivers necessitate producing 
and attaching their digital signatures within the transmitted encrypted messages. 
Any node requires signing their ID for producing a unique hash value based on 
both the private-key and the associated ID for authentication purposes. This 
results in generating digital signatures being attached to the transmitted encrypted 
messages as shown in (Step 5.1.1) and (Step 6.1.1). Thus, the attacker’s goals of 
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obtaining the CUs identities cannot be achieved since the asymmetric key 
encryption algorithm is applied to secure the sender’s information transmission. 
Moreover, the digital signature implication in these two steps also provides non-
repudiation security factor in which they can be used as a proof against the CUs 
themselves if they attempt to misbehave by denying the message transmission. 
However, in the same messages of SSMCRN, since the sender necessitates 
encrypting their IDs and MAC-key using the network’s shared-key that is only 
shared between the legitimate CUs and the server as shown in (Step 5.1.2) and 
(Step 6.1.2), this significantly protect the CUs information from being used by 
malicious users, who need to escalate the CUs privileges to gain authorised 
access. 
In the remaining messages of both protocols, the possibility of masquerading and 
reply attacks is extremely low and difficult to occur since the shared-keys that are 
used are not recognised by malicious users and are only known by the senders and 
receivers. It is difficult for adversary users to gain the required information and 
use the network’ resources.  
2) DoS Attacks 
A DoS attack can be launched in CRNs since all CUs are involved in the channel 
sensing and provide the details of the DCHs’ availabilities in collaborative mode. 
Based on the channel sensing results that take place at the CUs level, both the 
sender and receiver determine and select the appropriate licensed data channel for 
data exchange. This introduces a DoS attack for the selected channels since the 
malicious users can make these channels unavailable and causes DoS attack. By 
doing this, both the sender and receiver lose the time of the data exchange over 
the selected DCH and then leads to restarting the entire process of the control and 
authentication phase, causing saturation over the CCC.  
In order to overcome this issue, both FCL and SLDCH are protected from being 
busy and used by an attacker, who intends to launch a DoS attack, by encrypting 
them between the sender and receiver during their exchanging over the control 
channel. Also this serves to prevent the saturation of the SLDCH, thereby 
avoiding the generation of a large number of forged packets that would effectively 
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block the channel and enable DoS attacks. Therefore, this encryption effectively 
reduces the possibility of the chosen channel being selected for communication to 
be recognised by other users and therefore increases the chance of the successful 
data transmission over the SLDCH. 
3) Forgery Attack 
Since the transmitted messages are protected by the encryption scheme from the 
man in the middle attacks in which an attacker resides between the sender and 
receiver for intercepting and modifying the transmitted message. This causes 
modified messages will be delivered to the intended recipient. Therefore, the 
proposed protocol incorporates the MAC algorithm in all the required the 
transmitted messages to detect any modifications have been occurring during the 
transmissions. However, in the messages 5 and 6 of the DSMCRN do not apply 
the MAC algorithm, as they have already been incorporated with the digital 
signature, which also function to detect the forgery attack since the hash value is 
recalculated and compared in the server side for the integrity assurance.  
3.4. Summary 
This chapter introduced the design of the proposed MCRN protocol for distributed 
CRNs. It has clearly identified the method of exchange the sensing results which 
include a list of available channels that are not occupied by the licensed users and 
the determined best channel for data exchange among CUs. Moreover, it provided 
the details of the main features of the MCRN protocol such as the number of the 
transceivers that are associated with each CU to observe the ongoing activities 
over both the CCC and data channel which is selected and agreed upon on the 
basis of the channel selection technique. The hidden node terminal is considered 
and solved with multiple transceivers since it has a direct influence on the 
network performance.  
The chapter also introduced the designing part of two different versions of a 
secure MAC protocol known as DSMCRN and SSMCRN and details the 
proposed protocols’ messages sequence between senders, receivers and server to 
exchange the associated security information for providing authorised access. 
Moreover, a reliable communication between end users as well as between end 
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terminal devices and the server is provided to ensure the security against any 
attacks that might occur. Therefore, both DSMCRN and SSMCRN proposed 
protocols consist of two parts apart of the registration process to obtain the 
authorised access information from the dedicated server. The first is for both 
authenticating senders and receivers and exchanging the control information 
respectively. The validity of any user is proved by the server through verifying the 
digital signatures of both users in DSMCRN and the applied network’s shared key 
for encryption and decryption and the associated IDs of both users in SSMCRN. 
Thus, any frame that is sent or received has the sender’s information for the 
authentication procedure, is needed to be checked by the server to ensure the 
user’s legitimacy. However, the second part relies on the result of the 
authentication. Once the user has been verified successfully, then the second part 
takes place in securing the data transmission, otherwise the communication will 
be rejected.  
In addition, the chapter presented the proposed protocols’ analysis using the BAN 
formal logic which is used as an initial stage that leads to the contribution of 
implementing, evaluating and validating both DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols 
in terms of meeting the communication and the security requirements.  
The chapter provided a list of contributions of this research and they can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Design a framework for accomplishing successful communication among 
CUs in decentralised CRNs. 
2. Design a framework for the achieving the secure communication and 
addressing the security requirements in CRNs. 
3. Limiting the communication to only CUs, so that any user that has not 
registered and obtained access information will be banned from the 
communication with a CU due to the failure of the authentication. Therefore, 
the network resource will be protected and make it available to only 
registered CUs. 
4. Limiting and hiding both control information (FCL and SLDCH) and data 
exchange to only a pair of CUs after they have been verified and given a 
shared key. This works against making the SLDCH unavailable by 
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adversarial users, who can be internal or external and can manipulate or 
preoccupy the SLDCH, or generate jamming attacks, in which an attacker 
forces the CU to hop to a different channel to utilise by transmitting high 
signalling power to disturb the CUs. This resulting in launching a DoS 
attack that leads to deteriorating the network performance and throughput. 
Therefore, encrypting the control information and make it unrecognised for 
malicious users will reduce the chance of targeting the SLDCH by adversary 
users, who can make this channel unavailable or creating interference to the 
CUs (jamming attack).  
5. Each pair of CUs obtain a shared key after they have been authenticated 
which then can be used for limiting the data communication to only a pair of 
CUs and not among a group (more than two CUs) of the registered CUs. 
This will ensure the confidentiality of the transmitted data.  
The next chapter will focus only on the execution time of the associated security 
algorithms in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN and demonstrates the impact of the 
encryption algorithms in the sizes of the transmitted frames.  
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Chapter 4  APPLYING SECURITY MECHANISMS 
With the application of the BAN formal logic method in the analysis and 
validation of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols for achieving the 
authentication and secure communication requirements in the previous chapter, 
this chapter focuses on the simulation and the execution times of the considered 
security features of the proposed protocols using Java. Since the security 
execution time is required and will be added in the communication time of the 
proposed protocols in Chapter 6. This will investigate of the possible effect on the 
protocols’ performance due to different attacks that can be lunched such as 
modification on the transmitted messages, and the unauthorised access to the 
network resources. These security algorithms include the encryption and 
decryption procedures of the transmitted messages along with the keys’ 
generations using two standard algorithms known as RSA and AES. Also the 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is involved for checking the 
integrity and the authenticity of the transmitted messages along with the digital 
signature algorithm for generating and verifying the signed information for the 
authentication process. 
4.1. Applying digital signature  
A Digital Signature has two different main parts; message signature and message 
verification. This process requires a pair of public and private keys cryptographic 
method which also called Asymmetric-Key scheme for the operation (Harn & 
Ren, 2011) (G, et al., 2012). This pair of key usually associated together and is 
owned by a particular user or server for encryption and decryption procedures. 
Generally the public key is used to encrypt a message while the private key is kept 
secret and utilised for decrypting that message. However, in a digital signature 
procedure, the private key is used to sign (encrypt) messages while the public key 
is the key element to verify (decrypt) these encrypted messages (G, et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the digital signature technique is applied only in DSMCRN protocol 
and its implication provides the authentication security demand of CUs within the 
protocol. Therefore, both sender and receiver CUs are required to generate their 
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digital signatures and send them to the server for authentication within RTA frame 
(See the ITA and RTA frames discussed in section 3.3.4.2). However, this process 
requires a successful registration and gain authorised ID which is associated with 
the right public-key in the verification process. Thus the sender signs its ID using 
its private key and this process goes through a set of steps as follow: 
1- Each CU produces a hash value that represents the ID from the Message-Digest 
5 (MD5) algorithm.  
2- Encrypting the generated hash value using the sender’s private key (Signing 
Key) 
3- Append the ID to the encrypted hash value and this represents a signed ID 
(digital signature). 
The pseudo code of the first two steps that belong to generating the Hash value 
and then encrypts it with the sender private key is shown as follows: 
Digital signature generation pseudo code in DSMCRN  
 
                       =============== Sender Side ================ 
// ID= User’s ID an input that is going to be transmitted to another entity 
 
//Generating Hash value from User’s ID 
1. Uses ID as input for Message-Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm  
2. Make   plaintext = generated hash value 
 
//Generating signature  
3. uses user’s Private-Key to encrypt plaintext  
4. Make   Signature = encrypted plaintext  
5. Make   Digital-Signature = ID + Signature 
6. Uses server’s public-key to encrypt Digital-Signature 
7.  Make   User’s-Digital-Signature = Encrypted Digital Signature   
 
As soon as these steps have been completed, the sender uses the server’s public 
key to encrypt the digital signatures within the ITA frame which is then 
transmitted to the receiver CU. This encryption is significantly important because 
of hiding the ID from any users, including CUs who intended to manipulate with 
this information and leads to launch a DoS attack. Therefore, the chance of 
intercepting this encrypted information and decrypting it by unauthorised user is 
may be impossible since the RSA algorithm with the keys size equals to 1024 bits 
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is deliberately considered and preferable rather than the keys size equals to 512 
bits of the same algorithm in the proposed protocol for generating the pair of the 
public and private keys. This increases the efficiency of the protocol since the 
encryption discourages attackers to attack this particular information.  
Therefore, the receiver necessitates generating their digital signature through 
applying the same steps and then encrypts it using the server’s public key. After 
that, both encrypted digital signatures are sent to the server within RTA frames.  
After receiving and decrypting the RTA frame, the server verifies both signatures 
individually through the use of the attached ID for retrieving the public key of 
each CU. Then the verifications of each signature is applied through the use of 
public key to decrypt the encrypted hash value that will then be compared to the 
computed hash for each CU ID as shown in pseudo code follow while the entire 
process sequence of the digital signature verification is shown in Figure  4-1. 
Digital signature verification pseudo code in DSMCRN  
 
//Decryption 
1. Server uses its private-Key to decrypt (Cipher text) 
 
//Verifying Digital Signature  
2. Uses ID to retrieve the relevant public-key 
IF  the public-key is found  
     Then          Go To    3 
 Else  Go To 4 
Endif 
3. Uses user’s public-key to verify the Signature  
         IF  Signature verification = True 
   Then Go To 5 
           Else  Go To 4 
Endif 
4. Send FTA frame  
5. The user is valid 
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Figure ‎4-1: Verification process of the digital signature 
Table  4-1 gives the required execution times to sign two different IDs by the 
sender and receiver separately in ITA and RTA frames. Also, it shows the 
required time to verify these signatures by the server. Therefore, the execution 
time of signing each ID is 861.5µsec in ITA and RTA while the verification time 
of each signature is 55261.04µsec.  
 
Hash
 Function
Decryption 
Algorithm
Data
Hash1
Receiver
Signed Data
 
Encrypted
Hash value
Public Key
Hash2
=?
IF Hash1=Hash2
   Then the verification is True
Else 
The verification is False 
Table  4-1: Generating and verifying digital signatures in DSMCRN 
Frames 
Original 
Message 
Message Signature Message Verification  
Users’ Private Key 
Time To 
Sign 
Users’ Public 
Key 
Time To 
Verify 
ITA ID-X Private key-X 861.5 Public key-X 55261.04 
RTA ID-Y Private key-Y 861.5 Public key-Y 55261.04 
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4.2. Applying Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) 
The MAC scheme is a symmetric key cryptography based in which a shared key 
is involved to the MAC algorithm operation. The main principle and goal of this 
algorithm is to ensure both the integrity and authenticity of the transmitted data 
which they are concerned in the communication field. In other words, it detects 
any manipulation or modification has been occurred by a malicious user during 
the transmission process. Thus, the MAC algorithm confirms that the message is 
originated by the known sender who shares the same shared key with the receiver. 
If any modification has been occurred during the transmission, it results in failing 
the verification on the receiver side due to producing incorrect MAC key that 
indicates the received message is not authentic and should be discarded. 
Therefore, the MAC algorithm plays a significant role to ensure the integrity and 
authenticity of the transmitted message between two entities in both DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN protocols. The process of this algorithm implication is shown in 
Figure  4-2 which has two main steps called MAC Key generation and MAC Key 
and Message verification. 
Sender
Message
Shared Key 
1010101010
MAC Key
Message 
Authentication 
Code Algorithm
1010101010
MAC Key
+
Receiver
Shared Key 
Message 
Authentication 
Code Algorithm
1010101010
MAC Key
1010101010
MAC Key
=IF
Then    Integrity ensured
Otherwise     data is changed
Original message
Message
Message
  
Figure ‎4-2: MAC Key generation and verification 
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As soon as shared keys are exchanged securely among entities as explained in 
section 3.3.2, it plays a significant aspect of the MAC algorithm to generate and 
verify MAC keys in the sender and receiver sides in both DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN protocols. A certain message, which is going to be sent, and a shared 
key are the two main inputs to the MAC algorithm and resulting in generating a 
unique MAC-key for that particular message and that shared key. Thus, the 
generated MAC-key, then attaches to the original message for encryption before 
the transmission to the intended destination.  
Generally the transmitted messages can be verified after its decryption in the 
receiver side. The receiver uses the same procedure of generating a new MAC-key 
from the received message and then compares it with the received MAC-key. If 
these MAC-keys are matching, then this indicates the message is originated from 
the right sender and has not been modified during its transmitting. Otherwise the 
message is discarded as it is not authentic or a significant change to it has 
occurred. Thus, the following steps of the verification are applied to each message 
has been received on each frame that includes MAC-key in both DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN:  
1- Decrypt the received messages  
2- Recalculating new MAC-key from the received message which is taken as a 
first input and the shared key as a second input. 
3- Compare the received MAC-key with the new generated MAC key. 
The pseudo code of generating MAC-keys in the senders’ sides and verifying the 
MAC-key in the receivers’ sides of both DSMCRN and SSMCRN as follow:  
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MAC algorithm pseudo code in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
 
                        ======= Sender Side ======== 
// info= an input that is going to be transmitted to another entity 
//Generating MAC-Key 
1. Mac_Key = senderGenMAC from (Sharedkey, “Info”)  
2. Make   plaintext = mac_key+“Info” 
//Encryption 
3. Uses a Key to encrypt (plaintext) = Cipher text  
4. Sends Cipher text 
                     ======= Destination Side ======= 
//Decryption 
5. Receiver uses a Key to decrypt (Cipher text) 
//Verifying MAC-Key 
6. NewMac_key= receiverGenMAC(Sharedkey, “Info”); 
7. comparemacKey (NewMac_key, Mac_Key) 
IF  NewMac_key = Mac_Key 
Then accept‎“info”‎ 
Else  Go To 8 
Endif 
8. Send RES frame  
 
4.2.1. MAC-Key Generation and verification in the 
Registration Phase of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
There are only two frames out of four in the registration process of both 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols where the MAC algorithm is applied. 
Table  4-2 and Table  4-3 show the original messages of these frames; IOR and 
COR along with the utilised shared keys to participate in generating MAC-keys in 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN. Each frame of the both protocols has a different 
message while the shared keys that are used by both the CU and the server is X-S-
Shared-Key which was generated by the CU before transmitting IOR frame. The 
original message that is intended to be transmitted in the IOR frame of the 
DSMCRN is the CU’s Public-key, Shared-key and ID and requires 29.88µsec and 
54.33µsec for generating and verifying MAC-keys respectively. However, it is 
different in the same frame of the SSMCRN in which it includes the sender’s 
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Shared-key and ID and necessitates 27.88µsec and 46.33µsec for MAC-keys 
generation and verification respectively.  
However, the original message of the COR frame in the DSMCRN is only the 
CU’s ID which is generated by the server after the successful registration process 
while it is different in the same frame of SSMCRN since it is network’s shared-
key and CU’s ID. Therefore, it requires time equals to 21.36µsec and 44.37µsec 
for generating and verifying MAC-keys respectively in COR of the DSMCRN 
while it necessitates different time in the same frame of the SSMCRN which 
equals to 26.86µsec and 52.83µsec for MAC-keys generation and verification 
respectively. 
Table  4-2: Time to generate and verify MAC-keys in the registration phase of DSMCRN 
Frames Original Message Shared Key 
Time to generate 
MAC-key 
Time to verify 
MAC-key 
RTR N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CTR N/A N/A N/A N/A 
IOR 
User’ X ID, public 
key and shared key 
X shared key 29.88 54.33 
COR User’ X ID X shared key 21.36 44.37 
Table  4-3: Time to generate and verify MAC-keys in the registration phase of SSMCRN 
Frames Original Message Shared Key 
Time to generate 
MAC-key 
Time to verify 
MAC-key 
RTR N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CTR N/A N/A N/A N/A 
IOR 
User’ X ID and 
shared key 
X shared key 27.88 46.33 
COR 
X ID and network’s 
shared key 
X shared key 26.86 52.83 
 
4.2.2. MAC-key Generation and verification in Control 
Phase of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Generating and verifying MAC-keys process in the control phase of both 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN remain same. However, the main difference here is that 
which shared keys are used in each frame for generating and verifying the MAC-
keys? 
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To answer this question, Table  4-4 and Table  4-5 give the original messages as 
the first input and the applied shared key in each frame as a second input for the 
MAC algorithm in SSMCRN and DSMCRN respectively. 
The attached MAC-keys in ITA and RTA frames of SSMCRN only were 
generated with the use of the network’s shared-key (Group 1) and users’ IDs as 
the original messages. Thus, the sender’s MAC-key, which is sent in ITA, 
requires processing time equal to 27.17µsec for generation at sender side and 
40.15µsec for verification at the receiver side. This verification is necessary 
before requesting the server to authenticate the sender since the integrity of the 
sender’s ID is significantly important for the server to authenticate the user. 
Therefore, the receiver CU also requires 34.71µsec to generate their MAC-key 
based on the received ID and MAC-key along with his/her ID using the network 
shared key. In the server side, the verifications takes place and requires time to 
validate the integrity of the transmitted message equals to 44.98µsec.  
However, in DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols, one different MAC-keys are 
generated for both CUA1 and CUA2 frames instead of generating two different 
MAC-keys for both the sender and the receiver since it provides the same 
functionality and both users have been authenticated. This will save extra time for 
the server to process and generate another MAC-key if each frame has a different 
MAC-key. Therefore, the generated MAC-key which is attached to both frames is 
obtained by running the X-Y-Shared Key and new ID on the MAC algorithm and 
requires 21.43µsec for generating by the server. In contrast, each CU necessitates 
verifying the integrity of the received information in CUA1 and CUA2 
independently since these frames were transmitted to different CUs. Therefore, 
the required times for verifying these keys are 26.56µsec and 25.66µsec of the 
CUA1 and CUA2 respectively. 
In RTS and CTS frames of both protocols, the MAC-keys are generated with the 
use of X-Y-Shared Key as the first input while the second input is FCL in RTS and 
SLDCH in CTS frames to the MAC algorithm. Thus, the required time for 
generating these MAC-keys are 21.35µsec and 20.41µsec in RTS and CTS 
respectively, while they require times equal to 32µsec and 30.31µsec to verify 
these keys in both frames. 
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4.2.3. MAC Key Generation and verification in the Data 
Transmission Phase of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
For generating a MAC-key for an intended data for transmission in both 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN, only Group 3 shared key (X-Y-Shared Key) is applied 
for the data integrity assurance and the secure transmission. Therefore, Table  4-6 
demonstrates the size of the payload; 1500 bytes as a first input belongs to the 
original message and the X-Y-Shared Key belongs to Group 3, which is generated 
by the server after the successful authentication of both the sender and receiver, as 
the second input for the MAC algorithm. Therefore, the required time for 
generating a MAC-key is 43.47µsec and 59.16µsec is consumed at the receiver 
side to verify the integrity of the transmitted message in both DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN protocols. 
Table  4-6: Time to apply and verify MAC-keys in Data phase of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Frame Original Messages Shared Key 
Time to Generate 
MAC-key 
Time to Verify 
MAC-key 
Data 1500 bytes of text 
X-Y-Shared 
Key (Group3) 
43.47 59.16 
Table  4-4: Time to generate and verify MAC-key in the control phase of SSMCRN  
Frames Original Messages 
Shared Keys        Time to  
Generate 
MAC Key 
Time to 
Verify 
  MAC Key 
ITA MAC-Key+ID-A Network’s shared key (Group1) 27.17 40.15 
RTA MAC-Key+ID-B Network’s shared key (Group1) 34.71 44.98 
CUA1 G-ID+Shared Key X-S-Shared Key (Group2) 21.43 26.56 
CUA2 G-ID+Shared Key Y-S-Shared Key (Group2) 25.66 
RTS FCL X-Y-Shared Key (Group3) 21.35 32 
CTS SLDCH X-Y-Shared Key (Group3) 20.41 30.31 
Table  4-5: Time to generate and verify MAC-key in the control phase of DSMCRN 
Frames 
Original 
Messages 
Shared Keys Time to Generate 
MAC Key 
Time to Verify 
MAC Key 
ITA N/A N/A N/A N/A 
RTA N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CUA1 Gid+Shared Key X-S-Shared Key (Group2) 21.43 25.66 
CUA2 Gid+Shared Key Y-S-Shared Key (Group2) 25.03 
RTS FCL X-Y-Shared Key (Group3) 21.35 32 
CTS SLDCH X-Y-Shared Key (Group3) 20.41 30.31 
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4.3. Encryption and Decryption cryptography 
schemes 
Due to the desire cases of the security conditions, AES and RSA are two different 
cryptographic systems that are considered in the DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols for the purpose of encrypting and decrypting the required transmitted 
information. AES is used in all the phases of both protocols while the RSA is 
applied in the registration process of both protocols and only in the 
authentication/control phase of the DSMCRN. Table  4-7 highlights the use of 
both AES and RSA in the phases of each protocol. 
Table  4-7: AES and RSA implications in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Phases Frames from 
SSMCRN DSMCRN 
AES RSA AES RSA 
Registration 
Server to Node     
Node to Server     
Control 
Node to Node     
Node to Server     
Server to Node     
Data Node to Node     
 
4.3.1. Advanced Encryption Standard – AES implication 
As explained in section 1.4.2.3, the AES cryptography algorithm is based on a 
shared key cryptography, the determined key size is 128 bits for both encryption 
and decryption mechanisms in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols. 
Therefore, the use of this algorithm and its execution time in each phase of the 
proposed protocols are detailed as follows: 
4.3.1.1. AES algorithm in the registration Phase of DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN 
In the registration phase of both protocols, only COR frames are encrypted and 
decrypted using AES algorithm. However, the sizes of the included encrypted 
information are different in each protocol. This refers to the associated plaintext 
size, which has significant influence on the time is consumed for both encryption 
and decryption. Therefore, in the DSMCRN, the size of the plaintext (ID and 
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MAC-Key) of the COR frame is 27 bytes and it requires 84.82µsec for 
encryption. Meanwhile the size of the MAC-key and ID after applying the 
encryption process is expanded to 44 bytes. This increase has occurred since the 
encryption procedure has a direct influence on the size of the encrypted payload 
due to the total repetition iteration of the transformation rounds which converts 
plaintexts to cipher texts (Pavithra & Ramadevi, 2012). In terms of the decryption 
procedure, the time required to decrypt the COR frames in the same protocol is 
87.84µsec. 
In contrast, in the SSMCRN, the total size of the plain text (Network’s shared-
key, ID and MAC-Key) of the COR is 43 bytes and requires 148.21µsec for 
encryption. This size is not remained continuously after the encryption since it is 
expanded to 64 bytes as a cipher text and necessitates 149.11µsec for decrypting 
the cipher text of the same frame in SSMCRN protocol. Table  4-8 illustrates the 
execution times of the encryptions and decryptions of the COR frames in both 
protocols. 
 
 
 
4.3.1.2. AES algorithm in the control phase of DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN 
In the control phase of both protocols, the number of the transmitted frames that 
incorporate the AES encryption is different. In the SSMCRN protocol, six frames 
are encrypted and decrypted with the use of the AES algorithm while in 
DSMCRN only 4 frames out of six are encrypted and decrypted using the same 
algorithm and the remaining 2 frames have different encryption mechanism.  
Table  4-9 gives the characteristics of ITA and RTA frames in terms of their 
attached information before and after the encryption procedure with the AES in 
SSMCRN only. Thus, the plain text size of the ITA is 27 bytes which is combined 
of both the MAC-key and ID. This size is increased to 44 bytes after the 
Table  4-8: AES implication in Registration phase of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Protocol Frame Size after 
 Encryption 
Time to 
 Encrypt 
Time to 
 Decrypt 
DSMCRN COR 66 84.82 87.84 
SSMCRN COR 86 148.21 149.11 
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encryption and requires 84.82µsec and 87.84µsec for encryption and decryption 
respectively. On the other hand, the plain text size of the RTA is 54 bytes which 
include two IDs and two MAC-keys of both the sender and receiver CUs. Once 
the encryption is applied the cipher text size increases to 90 bytes and necessitates 
time for encryption and decryption equal to 131.14µsec and 133.65µsec 
respectively. 
Table  4-9: AES implication in control phase of the SSMCRN  
Frames Plain Text 
Plain Text 
size 
Cipher 
Text size  
Time to 
Encrypt 
Time to 
decrypt 
ITA MAC_key + A-ID 27 44 84.82 87.84 
RTA 
MAC_key+UidA+
MAC_key+UidA 
54 
90 131.14 133.65 
Table  4-10 provides the details of the common frames of the control phase in the 
SSMCRN and DSMCRN protocols in terms of the plaintexts and cipher texts that 
are associated to those frames and their sizes in bytes. Also, it gives the required 
times in microseconds for encrypting and decrypting these various sizes of plain 
texts. Thus, CUA1 and CUA2 have the same plaintexts (MAC-key, Shared Key 
and ID) and the same sizes which equal to 43 bytes of each frame. However, as 
soon as the encryption is applied the sizes of these frames are expanded to 64 
bytes as a cipher text of each frame. Moreover, each frame requires 149.11µsec 
for encryption using the recipient’s shared-key and 148.21µsec for decryption 
procedures using the same key.  
On the other hand, each of RTS and CTS has the same size of plain text which is 
equal to 25 bytes. This size includes FCL and the MAC-Key in RTS frame and 
SLDCH and MAC-key in the CTS frame of both protocols. However, the plain 
text size of each frame is affected after the encryption is applied and increased to 
44 as a cipher text. Therefore, the required time to encrypt each plain text on each 
frame is 136.16µsec and decrypt the cipher text is 130.40µsec of each frame.  
Note: 2 bytes are assigned for the SLDCH while only 4 bits are used to represent 
the SLDCH and the remaining bits are set to 0 for the future work to address the 
backup channels procedure. 
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Table  4-10: AES implication in the common frames of control phase SSMCRN and DSMCRN 
Frames Plain Text 
Plain 
Text size 
Cipher 
Text size 
Time to 
Encrypt 
Time to 
decrypt 
CUA1 userBid+sharkeybytes+mackey 43 64 149.11 148.21 
CUA2 userBid+sharkeybytes+mackey 43 64 149.11 148.21 
RTS FCL+mackey 25 44 136.16 130.40 
CTS SLDCH+mackey 25 44 136.16 130.40 
4.3.1.3. AES algorithm in the data transmission phase of 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
In the data transmission phase, both the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols have 
the same time for encryption and decryption over the data channel as they both 
utilise the AES algorithm and the same data size of the transmitted data. 
Although, 1500 bytes of plain text is considered and selected as sample of data in 
order to determine the required time of encrypting and decrypting, both protocols 
are applicable to any size of data for transmission as long as there is no fixed 
standard for packet size in the IEEE 802.22. Therefore, the encryption time of 
1500 bytes of data and the generated MAC-key before its transmission over a data 
channel is 858.18µsec and the size of the cipher text is 2100 bytes which requires 
510.43µsec to be decrypted. Table  4-11 shows the details of the data frame in both 
protocols in terms of applying the AES algorithm for encryption and decryption 
procedures.  
Table  4-11: AES implication in the data phase of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Frames Plain Text 
Plain Text 
size 
Cipher 
Text size 
Time to 
Encrypt 
Time to 
decrypt 
Data Data + MAC_key 1500 2100 858.18 510.43 
 
4.3.2. RSA implication in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
As discussed in section 1.4.2.2, RSA cryptography scheme is based on public and 
private keys, the determined key length is 1024 for both encryption and 
decryption mechanisms in both proposed protocols. Therefore, the RSA is used in 
the registration phase of both protocols to encrypt and decrypt the IOR frame 
while it is used only in the control phase of the DSMCRN protocol to encrypt and 
decrypt both the ITA and the RTA frames. The details of applying this algorithm 
in both protocols are provided as follows: 
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4.3.2.1. RSA algorithm in the registration phase of DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN 
In the registration phase of both DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols, only IOR 
frames are encrypted and decrypted using the RSA cryptographic scheme. 
However, their attached information sizes are different for each protocol and this 
effect on the time of the encryption and decryption. Thus, the plain text size of the 
IOR frame in SSMCRN is 43 bytes and requires 186.55µsec and 12136.18µsec 
for encryption and decryption respectively. On the other hand, the plain text of the 
IOR frame in DSMCRN protocol is 252 bytes and necessitates time equal to 
204.66µsec and 12817.39µsec for encryption and decryption respectively. 
Therefore, Table  4-12 shows the details of the applied RSA algorithm in the 
registration phase of both DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols while the pseudo 
code of the encryption and decryption of the IOR frame is shown as follow: 
Encrypting and decrypting IOR frame pseudo code in SSMCRN and 
DSMCRN 
 
// Plaintext= (MAC-Key +Shared-Key + Public –Key + ID) OR (MAC-Key+Shared-
Key+ID) 
//Encryption 
1. Uses server’s Public-Key to encrypt plaintext  
2. Make  Cipher text = encrypted plaintext  
3. Attaches Cipher text  within IOR frame   
4. Sends IOR frame 
//Decryption 
5. Server uses its Private-Key to decrypt the Cipher text  
6. Make   Plaintext = decrypted Cipher text  
 
Table  4-12: RSA implication in the registration phase of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN  
Protocol Frames Plain Text 
Plain 
Text size 
Cipher 
Text size 
Time to 
Encrypt 
Time to 
decrypt 
DSMCRN IOR 
mac_key+ Public-
key+ Sharedkey+X-id 
252 307 204.66 12817.39 
SSMCRN IOR 
mac_key+ 
Sharedkey+X-id 
43 64 186.55 12136.18 
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4.3.2.2. RSA algorithm in the control phase of DSMCRN 
However, in the control phase of the DSMCRN, there are only two frames out of 
six are encrypted and decrypted using the RSA algorithm. These frames are ITA 
and RTA in which they include digital signatures and users’ IDs of the CUs who 
transmitted these frames. Each CU uses the server’s public-key to encrypt their 
generated digital signature and ID while the server, which is the final destination, 
decrypts the received encrypted information of the RTA frame using its private 
key. Thus the time is taken to encrypt and decrypt the attached information in ITA 
frame is 545.15µsec and 1015.45µsec respectively, while it necessitates time 
equals to 546.36µsec and 1020.88µsec for the encryption and decryption 
respectively of the RTA frame of the same protocol. Table  4-13 shows the plain 
text information and its size before and after the encryption (cipher text) and both 
the time to encrypt and decrypt the information included within the ITA and RTA 
frames.  
4.4. Summary  
Different security algorithms such as digital signatures, Message Authentication 
Code and discrepant types of encryptions based on RSA and AES have been 
implemented in the current chapter. The execution time of each security algorithm 
has been determined in each proposed protocol and considered as the first part of 
implementing the secure MAC protocols to meet the intended task. Therefore, the 
following chapter will consider and apply the obtained execution times of the 
mentioned security algorithms to the MCRN protocol, which is discussed in 
chapter 3. This will provide secure MAC protocols for establishing secure 
communication process among CUs.  
Table  4-13: RSA implication in the control phase of the DSMCRN 
Frames Plain Text 
Plain 
Text size 
Cipher 
Text size  
Time to 
Encrypt 
Time to 
decrypt 
ITA signature + A-ID 52 64 545.15 1015.45 
RTA 
MAC_key+UidA+
MAC_key+UidA 
52 
64 546.36 1020.88 
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Chapter 5  MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) 
FOR DSMCRN AND SSMCRN 
Extending the work of the previous chapter, which mainly focused on the 
simulation of security features that are associated with the proposed protocols, 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN, this chapter discusses their simulation in terms of 
secure communication between CUs and a dedicated server. This requires 
modifications to the processing of MAC channel access frames, comparing to the 
frames in MCRN protocol, in reference to incorporating additional security 
frames and the bits associated with each frame, especially when a server node is 
involved in the communication process. This can affect the communication time 
required for CCC, and the data channel availability. Therefore, this chapter 
discusses the details of the secure communication of DSMCRN and SSMCRN in 
terms of MAC channel access.  
5.1. The common features of DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN 
Although, the proposed protocols are designed to achieve successful 
communication in CRNs, they have certain features common to their network 
operations. These features are associated with the number of transceivers 
equipped by each CU, as explained in section 3.2.2.1; in addition, the channel 
sensing approach and licensed data channel selection criteria were discussed in 
section 3.2.2.2. Moreover, all the proposed protocols are based on the same 
assumption; that of utilising a dedicated CCC, as explained in section 3.2.1.  
5.2. MAC access model and timing in DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN 
The MAC access for DSMCRN and SSMCRN is similar to that discussed in 
section 3.2.6 for the MAC of the MCRN. However, the main difference is the 
additional number of involved SIFS over time, due to the increase in the number 
of transmitted frames belonging to the security factor. A part of this, it is the same 
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mechanism as the DCF, which is based on CSMA/CA for channel access, and is 
considered in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols. Therefore, the application 
of MAC access modes and timing for both DSMCRN and SSMCRN is briefly 
discussed, as follows: 
5.2.1. MAC for the registration phase in DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN 
To support the registration process of both protocols, 4 frames are obligatory for 
transmitting data between a user and a dedicated server, over the CCC. According 
to the IEEE 802.11 standard, both DIFS and SIFS waiting times are necessary for 
channel access decisions and high-priority transmissions respectively. DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN apply these times, and NAV, in order to provide the same 
functionalities as the employed CSMA/CA in IEEE 802.11. Thus, Figure  5-1 
shows the associated interframe spacing (DIFS and SIFS) for coordinating CCC 
access for the registration process with the NAV factor in both protocols.  
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Figure ‎5-1: The time required for each user to register and join the network 
The following equation is used to calculate the overall time required for each CU 
to register the requisite information on the server and obtain authorised access to  
information to join the network in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN,  
𝑇𝑅𝑇𝑅+𝐶𝑇𝑅+𝐼𝑂𝑅+𝐶𝑂𝑅 + 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑆 + 3(𝑆𝐼𝐹𝑆) + 𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑒𝑦 + 𝑇𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑒𝑦 
+𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐 (𝑅𝑆𝐴) + 𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑅𝑆𝐴) +  𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝐴𝐸𝑆) +  𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝐴𝐸𝑆)
+  𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦 
Equation 1: The total time for each CU to register and gain the access information 
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5.2.2. MAC for control phase and data transmission 
The current phase exists in the MCRN protocol and involves only two frames, 
recognised as RTS and CTS, before switching to the selected data channel. It is 
considered in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN, with an additional 4 security frames 
launched over the same CCC, before both RTS and CTS transmissions. Three 
entities, which are; senders, receivers and the dedicated server, participate in the 
transmission process for these 6 frames. Thus, Figure  5-2 shows the sequence of 
these security and control frames over the CCC, with their NAVs settings, and 
both DIFS and SIFS in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN. The mechanism of access 
for CCC, and the waiting time after receiving each frame is known as SIFS (see 
section 3.2.6 for details of CCC access, which remain the same).  
The following Equation 2 is used to calculate the required time to exchange 
control frames between the sender and the receiver in both DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN. 
𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐴+𝑅𝑇𝐴+𝐶𝑈𝐴1+𝐶𝑈𝐴2+𝑅𝑇𝑆+𝐶𝑇𝑆 + 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑆 + 6(𝑆𝐼𝐹𝑆) + 𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑒𝑦 +
𝑇𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑒𝑦 + 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐 (𝑅𝑆𝐴) + 𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝑅𝑆𝐴) +  𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝐴𝐸𝑆) +  𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝐴𝐸𝑆) +
 𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦+ 𝑇𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎+𝐴𝐶𝐾 + 𝑆𝐼𝐹𝑆 + 𝑇𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑒𝑦 + 𝑇𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑒𝑦 +
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑐(𝐴𝐸𝑆) +  𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑐(𝐴𝐸𝑆)        
Equation 2: The total time to exchange the authentication and control frames over the CCC 
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Figure ‎5-2: The time required for CUs to exchange their control frames 
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5.3. Simulation and Performance evaluation of 
SSMCRN and DSMCRN  
Simulating the DSMCRN and SSMCRN are essential to identify the protocols’ 
performance and assist to visualise the evaluated network performance. MATLAB 
simulator is extensively used for wireless technology research is used as it is 
capable of simulating communication systems, analysing data, supports a high-
level language, and features an interactive environment (Uk.mathworks.com, 
2009) (Ahmad, et al., 2011). Therefore, despite CR technology research has 
recently emerged, the proposed protocols with and without security and the 
benchmark protocols are simulated and evaluated in MATLAB for comparison, 
evaluation and validation purposes and including aspects related to the network 
performance. As discussed in (Maziar, 2010), a large portions of the TV white 
space becomes available for CUs to utilise. Therefore, the TV portion; from 
471.25MHz to 607.25MHz, which are available most of the time, are considered 
for the CCC and 10 data channels to exchange both the control information and 
data respectively of the proposed and benchmark protocols. 
Thus, in order to simulate the proposed protocols, a set of wireless parameters are 
significantly identified to be configured for the simulation tasks. These parameters 
include the size of the frames, the number of CUs and LUs, the number of control 
and data channels, and the data channels availability that are associated with 
measuring the network performance. Therefore, in the simulation task, the 
parameters of the IEEE 802.11b has been considered for simulating both the 
proposed and the benchmark protocols since these parameters are used by most of 
the published MAC protocols for CRNs (Joe & Son, 2008) (Zhang & Su, 2011) 
(Jie, et al., 2013). In addition, the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) based 
on the CSMA/CA is considered for providing the CCC access mechanism by 
CUs. Thus, the proposed protocols are simulated with two different scenarios; five 
runs with different number of CUs, consisting of 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 users to 
exchange their control information and data while the second involves five runs 
with different number of CUs, consisting of 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 users with LU 
become ON to utilise the licensed data channel. These scenarios are considered to 
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measure the influence on the successful messages delivery rate and the time 
performance for each protocol. 
5.3.1. The network parameters  
Several parameters are considered in the DSMCRN and SSMCRN design and 
simulation to fulfil the entire communication process among 20 CUs. These 
involve a single control and 10 data channels used by CUs, considering the best 
data channel selection criteria which is based on the most available time as 
discussed in section 3.2.2.2 for enabling the success of data transmission. These 
channels have the same data rate of 11Mbps and the DSSS PHY layer 
characteristics are applied. 10 µsec is allocated for switching time after selecting 
and exchanging the most appropriate data channel between senders and receivers. 
Moreover, 1500 bytes of data as a payload size is considered in the proposed 
scenario to analyse its influence on the entire communication over the data 
channels. Table  5-1 highlights the parameters used with their values in the MCRN 
protocol. 
Thus, the frames and their sizes incorporated within DSMCRN and SSMCRN are 
given in Table  5-2, while their format details were discussed in the design stage in 
sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5. 
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Table ‎5-1: The network parameters  
Name of the 
parameter 
Value Description 
DIFS 50 µsec Distributed Interframe Space 
SIFS 10  µsec Short Interframe space 
CCC-TR 11 Mbps CCC Transmission rate 
DCH-TR 11 Mbps DCH Transmission rate 
TDCH Scan 5s Time of Data Channels Scan 
NTS 2 Number of Transceiver 
PHY layer 
Characteristics 
DSSS Direct-sequence spread spectrum  
Tswitch  10  µsec Time to switch from CCC to selected data channel 
CNTWindow 32 Contention Windows 
RTS 20 bytes Request-To-Send frame 
CTS 20 bytes Clear-To-Send frame 
Data 1520 bytes Data frame 
ACK 20 bytes Acknowledgement frame 
NCCC 1 Number of Common Control Channel 
NSLDCH 10 Number of Data Channels 
NCUs 20 Number of CUs where 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 CUs for 5 runs 
NS 1 Number of Sensor 
Table  5-2: DSMCRN and SSMCRN frames 
Name of the 
frames 
Frames’ sizes 
in DSMCRN 
Frames’ sizes in 
SSMCRN 
Description 
Registration phase 
RTR 22 22 Request-To-Register 
CTR 49 49 Clear to register 
IOR 329 86 Information for registration 
COR 66 86 Confirmation-OF-Registration 
Control phase 
ITA 86 66 Information-To-Authenticate 
RTA 150 110 Request-To-Authenticate 
CUA1 86 86 Confirmation of User’s Authentication 1 
CUA2 86 86 Confirmation of User’s Authentication 2 
RTS 66 66 Request-To-Send 
CTS 66 66 Clear-To-Send 
Data phase 
DT 2122 2122 Data transmission 
ACK 46 46 Acknowledgement 
Security Frames 
RES 22 22 Resend 
FTA 46 46 Failed-To-Authenticate 
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5.3.2.  Communication time of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Although, both DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols share many features, such as 
the number the transmitted frames and the control and data channels, they have 
different security features proceeding from the implications of having asymmetric 
and symmetric keys for authentication. This considerably affects the duration and 
performance of the protocols, since the applied security features require different 
lengths of time for execution (see section 4.3). Therefore, in order to calculate the 
total required time (T) taken to successfully exchange the control and data phases 
of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols between senders and receivers, the 
following Equation 3 is applied. 
T = {TDIFS + TITA + TRTA + TCUA1 + TCUA2 + TRTS + TCTS + TData + TACK + 7*TSIFS}  
Equation 3: Total time to exchange authentication, control information and data frames 
Thus, Figure  5-3 below shows the entire successful communication process and 
the time taken for a single pair of CUs to exchange data successfully. As shown, 
the time required to complete the communication process in DSMCRN is 
significantly higher than the time required in SSMCRN, by approximately 11 
times. This is because of the point introduced above, regarding security features, 
since the DSMCRN accommodates and applies the digital signature, which 
operates based on asymmetric key cryptography and relevant frame sizes. 
 
Figure ‎5-3: The communication time for a single pair of CUs in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
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However, Figure  5-4 demonstrates the communication time for 10 pairs of CUs, 
over both control and data channels in DSMCRN and SSMCRN. The data 
transmission initiates, only after the selected data channel has determined the CTS 
frame between both the sender and receiver. Thus, the first pair of CUs, who won 
in the channel contention process, accesses the control channel immediately, since 
it is dedicated and available, this requires time equal to 254784.74µsec in 
DSMCRN and 22540.8µsec in SSMCRN to successfully exchange the control and 
data frames in an encrypted format. However, the second pair of CUs necessitates 
total time equal to 506378.39µsec in DSMCRN and 41881µsec in SSMCRN, to 
exchange the same frames effectively. The time frame is different because of the 
waiting time, which is recognised as a NAV period, and is equal to 
251593.65µsec in DSMCRN and 19349.71µsec in SSMCRN for the control 
channel to be vacant, since it is occupied by the first group seeking to exchange 
control frames. As soon as the first group successfully exchanged the CTS frame 
and switched to the determined data channel, the control channel became 
available and ready for the second group to access based on the channel’s 
contention. Therefore, the second group necessitates a time equal to 
254784.74µsec to exchange the control and data frames successfully. 
However, in terms of the third group, the sender needs a waiting time equal to 
503187.3µsec in DSMCRN and 38689.9µsec in SSMCRN to be able to access the 
control channel, and entails 254784.74µsec and 22540.8µsec in DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN respectively to exchange the control and data frames successfully. 
Thus, this process remains continuous for the remaining 7 groups of CUs, while 
considering the waiting time for the control channel to be vacated and made 
available to the next pair of CUs, to avoid any collisions. 
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Figure ‎5-4: The communication time for 10 pairs of CUs in DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
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Therefore, in order to evaluate the total time for the performance of 20 CUs in 
conjunction with the LUs activities (which affects the protocols’ run time), 
Figure  5-5 demonstrates the communication time in microseconds for five runs 
(on 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs, with and without LUs activities), when using both 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols. It is apparent that there is a significant 
difference in the communication time of each protocol, since they have different 
security features, authentication mechanisms, and encryption procedures. 
Generally, the time for both protocols increases when the number of incorporated 
CUs involved in the communication process increases, as only one CCC is used 
by the incorporated CUs to exchange and control information. The total 
communication time for the 20 CUs increases significantly and is higher in 
DSMCRN compared to the SSMCRN protocol. This is because there are two 
different main factors responsible for generating and verifying digital signatures, 
as well as an RSA algorithm that is used to encrypt and decrypt some of the 
control frames (see section 4.3) for 20 CUs. This leads to the SSMCRN protocol 
performing much faster (about 11 times faster) in each run, compared to the 
DSMCRN. 
However, if a LU becomes ON, to utilise a data channel, the time pattern is not 
affected. Since the CUs’ data’s transceiver is still ON for observing the LUs’ 
activities over the data channel and time is passing. Therefore, CUs are not 
allowed to transmit data during the period the data channel is occupied by the 
LU’s activities. However, there is another case, in which the time taken for the 
CU to communicate can be affected due to the data channel’s occupancy by LUs’ 
activities, in which a backup data channel is involved in the communication. This 
leads to the CUs being switched to the selected backup data channel for 
retransmitting data, and requires additional time for both successful switching to 
the backup data channel and data transmission. However, due to the limitations 
affecting the current research, in which the backup channel is considered as part 
of future work, the process of data channel retransmission over a backup data 
channel is not considered.  
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Figure ‎5-5: Time performance of DSMCRN and SSMCRN with and without LUs’ activities 
To summarise the communication time performance of both DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN, the execution of the security algorithms require additional time over 
the CCC and have led to slow switching to the SLDCHs. Consequently, the 
overall communication time significantly increases between a pair of CUs. 
However, the difference in the communication time of both protocols is based on 
different associated security algorithms, asymmetric and symmetric keys 
cryptography, which have different effects on the reservation time of the CCC for 
a pair of CUs. Thus, SSMCRN performed fast switching to the SLDCHs to 
initiate and complete 1500 bytes due to two discrepant factors; the first is the less 
time required to authenticate CUs using the shared key (symmetric key) compared 
to the CUs’ validations approach that is based on the digital signatures, which rely 
on asymmetric key, in DSMCRN. The second relates to the number of the 
security fames that are encrypted using asymmetric keys in DSMCRN is higher 
than those in SSMCRN. Consequently, these two aspects led to an increase in the 
communication time in the DSMCRN compared to that in SSMCRN.  
5.3.3. DSMCRN and SSMCRN throughput analysis 
Throughput is a contributing factor used to analyse the performance of the MCRN 
protocol. Various parameters during the information transmission among entities 
within the control and data phases have a direct influence on the throughput. 
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These parameters are associated with and related to each other in terms of 
increasing and decreasing the network throughput value as explained in Table  5-3.  
Table ‎5-3: Throughput parameters 
Parameters Notations Relations to the throughput 
Number of 
Transceivers 
Tx and Rx 
Two different transceivers (Tx and Rx) are assigned for CCC 
to observe the activities and selected Data Channels. This 
resulted in an increase in the network throughput. 
Number of 
Licensed Data 
Channel(s) 
(LDCH) 
LDCH 
It significantly influences the time of successful data 
transmission. The required time to transmit date decreases 
when the multiple LDCH increase. This resulted in an 
increase in the network throughput. 
Payload of Data 
(PD) 
PD 
It indicates the actual data transferred over the SLDCH and 
This resulted in an increase in the network throughput. 
Data Rate (DR) DR 
Data rate (DR) for both the CCC and LDCH channels is set to 
11Mbps. When higher DR is determined the larger size of 
data is transmitted and this resulted in an increase in the 
network throughput. More data can be transmitted when 
higher data rate is determined and this resulted in an increase 
in the network throughput. 
Probability of 
Successful Access 
of Common 
Control Channel 
(PSCCC) 
PSCCC 
Higher probability of successful CCC access (PSCCC) for the 
authentication and control frames exchange over the CCC will 
reduce the communication time through the fast switching to 
the SLDCH. This resulted in an increase in the network 
throughput.  
Time of 
Communication 
(T) 
T 
Higher Time of the Communication (T) over both the CCC 
and Selected Licensed Data Channels decreases the network 
throughput and vice versa.  
 
Therefore, the throughput value is influenced by different parameters in which it 
is directly proportional to * * * *SCCC X XP PD DR T R SDCHs  and inversely 
proportional to T. Thus, it can be calculated from Equation 4:        
* * * *X XSCCCP PD DR T R SDCHs
T
  
Equation 4: Throughput value  
Thus, two different scenarios, with and without LUs activities as part of network 
operations, are considered to evaluate the throughput performance and activities 
of the LUs’ effect in each protocol. 
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5.3.3.1. Throughput‎analysis‎without‎LUs’‎activities‎ 
Figure  5-6 illustrates the throughput factor for both the DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols for 20 CUs, based on five runs involving 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs. It is 
obvious that in both protocols, the number of the CUs, who participated in the 
communication process, has a direct influence on the throughput rate, leading to 
an increase in the rate of the message delivery, which affects the situation as the 
number of CUs increases. However, the throughput rate of the SSMCRN protocol 
increases significantly, and is higher compared to throughput in DSMCRN. The 
difference is then related to the smaller security execution time over the control 
channel, which leads to a fast switch to the selected data channel to initiate data 
transmission. In other words, the longer communication affects the control 
channel, and other aspects, which affect and delay the message transmissions, and 
result in lower throughput. This occurred in DSMCRN, which saw a slight 
increase in the throughput in each run, compared to SSMCRN.  
 
Figure ‎5-6: Throughput in DSMCRN and SSMCRN without involving LUs 
5.3.3.2. Throughput‎analysis‎with‎LUs’‎activities‎ 
Figure  5-7 illustrates the throughput factor for both the DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
protocols, based on five runs, involving 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs, and LU activities 
in the communication process. As discussed previously, in Figure  5-6, the 
throughput rate is associated with the time taken to exchange and determine the 
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SLDCH in the control channel, in which it increases in cases where the time over 
the control channel decreases and vice versa. Additionally, it increases if the 
number of incorporated CUs intended to exchange messages over SLDCHs 
increases. However, the network throughput rate is also affected by the LUs, 
which have the priority for utilising the SLDCH, resulting in the vacancy of the 
SLDCH by the CUs, requiring an end to the transmitted message. This causes a 
low throughput rate, due to the unsuccessful message transmission over the 
SLDCH. This case occurred in the second run of both protocols, as shown in 
Figure  5-7, where 8 CUs are involved in the communication and a single SLDCH 
is utilised by the LUs. Although, the throughput values of both protocols increase 
in the second run, they are still lower than the throughput rate for the same run in 
the same protocols without LUs activities, as shown above in Figure  5-6.  
Therefore, successful messages delivery increases significantly in SSMCRN, and 
reaches the same value in the scenario showing no LUs’ activities involvement in 
the third run, where 12 CUs are involved. This is because the SLDCHs’ 
availability for data transmissions belongs to 6 pairs of CUs. However, along the 
same run of 12 CUs, there is a slight increase in the throughput rate of the 
DSMCRN compared to the SSMCRN, which reaches the same value for the same 
run in the scenario, without the involvement of LUs activities. The difference in 
the increased results of the third run of both protocols relates to the time required 
for each protocol to access the control channel, which influences the throughput 
rate, as discussed in Figure  5-6. 
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Figure ‎5-7: Throughput in DSMCRN and SSMCRN with LUs activities 
To summarise the throughput in DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols, in SSMCRN 
the throughput was significantly higher than that what was achieved by DSMCRN 
due to the less time required over the CCC. This time subsequently led to fast 
switching to the SLDCHs by CUs to initiate the data communication. Thus the 
relation between the time and throughput are associated together, and the more 
time required over the CCC will leads to low throughput rate and vice versa. 
Moreover, the appearance of LUs to utilise the SLDCH also affected the 
network’s throughput since they have the priority to utilise the licensed channel. 
As a result, CUs were prevented from transmitting data over the SLDCH and led 
to decrease the network’ throughput.   
5.4. Impact of malicious users on DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN  
The communication process for the entire network can be affected by associated 
malicious behaviours, since malicious activities affect the time required by both 
the control and data channels, resulting in a lower performance of the network.  
Modification and unauthorised access are the two types of attacks considered in 
this thesis, and these are analysed to investigate the extent of the impact on time 
and the throughput of both DSMCRN and SSMCRN. 
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5.4.2. Impact of modification attacks on the time taken to 
perform DSMCRN and SSMCRN  
When applying the MAC algorithm in DSMCRN and SSMCRN, CUs can 
authenticate received messages by checking the integrity assurance of messages 
transmitted. Thus, the detection of any invalid message leads to retransmission of 
the frame, causing more time to elapse when delivering the transmitted frame, 
whether over the control or data channels. This is considered as a delay of 
successful message delivery between the intended CUs. Therefore, the scenario 
when applying modification attacks on COR, CTS and Data frames are applied in 
each proposed DSMCRN and SSMCRN. 
5.4.2.1. Modification attack in DSMCRN 
Figure  5-8 demonstrates the differences in the communication time for a single 
pair of CUs in DSMCRN and DSMCRN with modification attacks applied. 
Evidently there is a significant delay, since the intended receiver detects the 
invalid received messages belonging to the COR, CTS and data frames. This 
increase the time by 2604.5µsecs over both the control and data channels, as the 
validation process for these retransmitted frames is repeated, to insure the 
integrity of received messages. 
 
Figure  5-8: Communication time of a single pair of CUs in DSMCRN and DSMCRN with 
modification attack 
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However, Figure  5-9 shows the communication time in microseconds for five 
runs, involving 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs, without LUs activities in both DSMCRN 
and DSMCRN with modification attacks applied. Aside from what was discussed 
in Figure  5-3 for the time increase due to the applied security features, there is a 
slight difference in the communication times for both protocols, with modification 
attacks compared to the same protocols without attacks. As discussed in the 
Figure  5-8, this increase results from the retransmission of CUR, CTS and data 
frames, which requires more time in DSMCRN with a modification attack 
protocol. However, a slight difference is difficult to perceive clearly from the 
graph, since the delay time is still very small, compared to the actual security 
time.  
 
Figure  5-9: Communication time of 20 CUs in DSMCRN and DSMCRN with modification attack 
5.4.2.2. Modification attack in SSMCRN 
Figure  5-10 illustrates the variation in the communication time for a single pair of 
CUs in SSMCRN and SSMCRN with modification attacks applied. The time 
required for successful message delivery in SSMCRN, with a modification attack 
is higher than the time taken for the message transmission in SSMCRN. This 
difference relates to the retransmitting of the COR, CTS and Data frames in 
SSMCRN, with modifications to attacks, for the validation of the integrity process 
applied to the messages received. Thus, the total delay time is equal to 
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2661.42µsecs, over both the control and data channels in SSMCRN with the 
attack.   
 
Figure  5-10: Communication time of a single pair of CUs in SSMCRN and SSMCRN with 
modification attack 
However, Figure  5-11 describes the communication time in microseconds for five 
runs, involving 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs in both SSMCRN and SSMCRN, with 
modification attacks. As discussed previously in section 5.3.2, the time is 
associated with the number of CUs incorporated in the communication process, 
and it increases with each run, due to the increase in the participating CUs, in both 
SSMCRN and SSMCRN with a modification attack. However, it is notable that 
the SSMCRN with modification attacks time is higher than the time for SSMCRN 
in each run. This increase is considered to represent a delay, which has occurred 
over both control and data channels, because of the mandatory retransmitting of 
three modified frames recognised as CUR, CTS and Data frames. Moreover, the 
difference in the time for the 5
th
 run is 10 times that of the 1
st
 run, due to the 
increase in the number of modified frames belonging to 10 pairs of senders and 
receivers. Thus, the increase in communication time depends on relationship 
between the time and number of modified and retransmitted frames.  
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Figure  5-11: Communication time of a 20 pair of CUs in SSMCRN and SSMCRN with 
modification attack 
5.4.3. Impact of modification attacks on the throughput of 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Since the time for the proposed protocols performance is affected by the 
modification attack, the throughput aspect might also be influenced as it is related 
to performing the fast switch to the SLDCHs. Therefore, the message delivery rate 
in both the DSMCRN with modification attack and the SSMCRN with 
modification attack were analysed as follows: 
5.4.3.1. Throughput in DSMCRN with modification attacks 
Figure  5-12 illustrates the successful messages delivery rate in both DSMCRN 
and DSMCRN with the attack for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs. It 
was discussed previously in Figure  5-6 that throughput rate increases if the 
number of message transmissions increases over the multiple available SLDCHs. 
Thus, it is evident that both trends increase significantly in each run, due to the 
number of data packets exchanged over the SLDCHs. The increase pattern 
remains the same in each run, due to the availability of the selected channels and 
the LUs activities, which are OFF during each run. However, as soon as the 
throughput rate is effected by the time over the control and data channel, the 
modification attack for the transmitted messages in COR, CTS and Data frames 
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increases the time resulting from the frames’ retransmissions and the associated 
security algorithms for both the decryption and the messages for integrity 
assurance. Therefore, the throughput rate for DSMCRN with modification attack 
is slightly lower than the throughput for the same protocol without the attack. This 
slight difference is difficult to perceive clearly from the graph, since the time is 
still very small, compared to the actual security time. 
 
Figure ‎5-12: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in DSMCRN and DSMCRN with modification attack 
5.4.3.2. Throughput in SSMCRN with modification attack 
However, Figure  5-13 shows the same throughput factor as SSMCRN and 
SSMCRN with the attack for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs. The 
same discussion for Figure  5-12 above is applied here in terms of the relationship 
between the throughput rate and the number of contributing CUs, who admit to 
transmitting and receiving messages. Therefore, it can be observed that in both 
trends, the message delivery rate increases as soon as the number of participating 
CUs transmitting and receiving messages is increased. However, the main 
difference is that the successful messages delivery rate, in SSMCRN with 
modification attack, is lower than the throughput in SSMCRN, due to the 
modified messages in COR, CTS and Data frames, leading to extra time being 
required for retransmitting the messages over the control and data channels. Based 
on this, the difference in the throughput varies in each run for both trends, this is 
due to the increase in the modified messages in SSMCRN with modification of 
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the attack in each run; there are 6 modified messages in the 1
st
 run, 12 modified 
messages in the 2
nd
 run, 18 modified message in the 3
rd
 run, 24 modified messages 
in the 4
th
 run and 30 modified messages in the final run. 
 
Figure ‎5-13: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in SSMCRN and SSMCRN with modification attack 
To conclude the impact of modification attacks on the throughput of DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN, the message delivery rate is associated with the time taken over 
both control and data channels. Thus, the correlation can be explained as the 
throughput is inversely proportional with the required communication time and 
the decrease in throughput depends on relationship between the time and number 
of modified and retransmitted frames in both protocols. 
5.4.4.  Impact of unauthorised access on the time 
performance of DSMCRN 
Unauthorised access by malicious users, who have not registered and obtained 
authorised access information, can affect the network performance, resulting in a 
delay in the overall communication process for the other CUs. This delay resulted 
from the failure of successful authentication by the dedicated server, which makes 
the CCC busy for others waiting for the contention process to launch ITA frames. 
Therefore, both throughput rate and total successful communication time include 
authentication, and exchanging both control information and data, that is affected 
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by malicious users, since they contribute to the communication process with other 
valid CUs. In the unauthorised access scenario, it has been assumed that malicious 
user usually communicates with a valid CU, and we do not consider the situation 
of 2 malicious users communicating with one another. Two different cases, which 
have different numbers of invalid users involved in the communication over the 
CCC by transmitting ITA frames for initiating communication with other CUs, are 
considered to investigate their influence on the network’s performance. Therefore, 
the first case includes only 1 invalid user in the communication process, while 6 
malicious users are considered in the second case. 
5.4.4.1. Communication time in DSMCRN with unauthorised 
access 
Figure  5-14 shows the successful communication time for 20 users over both 
control and data channels in five different runs, consisting of 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 
users, in which the case of 1 malicious user on the 4
th
 run is considered. 
Generally, the increase in each run occurs due to the increase in participating CUs 
in the communication process, which arises when exchanging both the control and 
data frames phases. However, it is evident that the increase in the communication 
time affected the 4
th
 run, in which 7 out of 8 pairs of CUs successfully completed 
their communication processes over both the CCC and data channel, the 
difference is obvious compared to the same run in case showing no malicious 
users involvement in the communication of the DSMCRN, as shown previously in 
Figure  5-5. This is because of the detection mechanism of unauthorised access by 
a malicious user who transmits the ITA and fails to be authenticated by the server 
after receiving the RTA. Therefore, the receiver is updated by the status of the 
sender to halt the process of communication with that particular user. This process 
requires time over the control channel, and affects other legitimate users from 
using the CCC channel and transmitting their ITA frames. 
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Figure ‎5-14: Communication time for 20 pairs of users, including 1 malicious user in DSMCRN  
Figure  5-15 shows the communication time for 20 users over both the control and 
data channels in five different runs, consisting of 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 users; in 
which the cases of 1, 2 and 3 malicious users in the 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 runs are 
considered respectively. Although, the communication time increases in each run, 
due to the increase in the number of CUs participating in the communication 
process, it experienced a different increase pattern in the 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 runs, 
where the malicious users participated in the communication process. This creates 
a delay resulting from unsuccessful authentication processes, leading to 
termination of the communication before the control information can be 
exchanged with the malicious users. For example, the first run indicate 4 CUs 
successfully communicating with each other and requiring time equal to 0.5*10
6
 
µsecs, while the second run involves 8 CUs that are successfully authenticated 
and exchange their data in 1*10
6
µsecs.  
In contrast, in the third run, only 10 valid users out of 12 successfully completed 
their communication over both the control and data channels, since 1 malicious 
attempt to make unauthorised access was detected by the server, resulting in 
stopping the communication process. Thus, the total time for the run requires 
1.4*10
6
µsecs, including the detection process. Therefore, 139003.61µsecs refers 
to the detection time over the control channel for the 6
th
 pair of users, which 
includes 1 malicious and 1 valid CU user. 
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However, the 4
th
 run, which involves 16 users in the communication, only 12 
valid CUs communicated and exchanged their data successfully, since 2 malicious 
users were detected and banned from continuous communication with other valid 
users. Therefore, the total communication time, including the detection process, 
was 1.75*10
6
µsecs. Regarding the last run, in which 20 users were 
communicating, only 14 CUs successfully exchanged data and three invalid users 
(senders) were banned from the communication process as soon as the recipients 
CUs were updated because of failed authentication. Thus, 2.15*10
6
µsecs is the 
time required to successfully complete the communication time for the last run. 
 
Figure ‎5-15: Communication time for 20 pair of users include 4 malicious users in DSMCRN  
 
5.4.4.2. Throughput in DSMCRN with unauthorised access 
Figure  5-16 shows the throughput rate for 20 users in five different runs, 
consisting of 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 users, in which the case of 1 malicious users 
being present in the 4
th
 run is considered. Despite the successful messages 
delivery rate increasing significantly for the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 runs, due to the 
number of successful data exchanges among the intended destinations, there was a 
slight increase noted in the throughput rate of the 4
th
 run, because only 14 out of 
16 users successfully exchanged their data over the selected data channels. This 
decreased the message delivery rate, especially when the detection time over the 
control channel involved and has direct influence on the throughput compared to 
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the same run in case showing no malicious users involvement in the 
communication of DSMCRN in Figure  5-12.  
 
Figure ‎5-16: Throughput for 20 pair of users include 1 malicious user in DSMCRN  
However, Figure  5-17 shows the throughput rate for 20 users in five different 
runs, consisting of 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 users, in which the cases of 1, 2 and 3 
malicious users in the 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 runs respectively are considered. The figure 
shows a significant increase in the throughput rate for both the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 runs, 
due to the quantity of successful data exchanged over the SLDCHs in each run. 
However, the increasing pattern did not remain same in the others runs, which all 
have less successful message delivery rate compared to the same runs in the 
situation showing no malicious user’s involvement in the DSMCRN. This is 
because of the malicious users’ detection, which results in terminating the 
communication process before the control and data exchanged. Subsequently the 
throughput rate decreased since there was no data exchange with unauthorised 
users. Thus, only 5 pairs out of 6 in the 3
rd
 run, 6 pairs out of 8 in the 4
th
 run and 7 
pairs out of 10 in the final run which the CUs complete the data exchange 
successfully. 
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Figure ‎5-17: Throughput for 20 pair of users include 4 malicious users in DSMCRN 
To summarise the impact of unauthorised access by malicious users, both 
communication time and throughput can be affected by unauthorised access. 
Although, the detection process requires a time to proceed, which affects the 
entire network by increasing communication time, there is no data exchanged with 
the detected malicious users and resulting in a decrease of the message delivery 
rate. 
5.5. Discussion of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
The network performance for the proposed DSMCRN and SSMCRN was affected 
by two main factors, which have a strong relationship to the throughput rate and 
the communication time. The first factor is related to the applied security features, 
which differ to some extent in each protocol, while the second belongs to the 
frames’ sizes for each protocol. These security features involved encryption and 
authentication procedures, operating according to different approaches in the 
proposed protocols. For instance, some of the encryption processes in DSMCRN 
were based on applying the RSA algorithm, which operates based on a large key 
size equal to 1024, required for encrypting and decrypting a message. This 
necessitates a significant time for performing the task, and results in increasing 
the communication time for the proposed protocols. Thus, there were three 
implementations of RSA in DSMCRN, in IOR, ITA and RTA, but only the IOR 
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frame in SSMCRN. Moreover, the authentication process in DSMCRN is based 
on the digital signature implementation, which requires a multi process generation 
and verification of each signature belonging to each CU, while it is based on only 
the decryption of the received RTA frame in SSMCRN. Thus, the time required to 
perform the authentication in DSMCRN was significantly higher than the 
authentication time in SSMCRN, since it requires an average time equals to 
870.045μsecs and 55260.54μsecs, for generating and verifying each digital 
signature respectively in DSMCRN, and 219.98μsecs for authenticating both the 
sender and receiver in SSMCRN.  
The need to apply the RSA and AES for the authentication process in DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN also affected the transmitted frames size. For instance, the sizes of 
the ITA and RTA frames in DSMCRN were 86 and 150 bytes respectively, while 
they were less in SSMCRN, and equal to 66 and 110 in the same ITA and RTA 
frames respectively. Therefore, both the security and frames sizes applied 
considerably affected the messages transmission time over the control channel, 
and resulted in faster communication in SSMCRN compared to the DSMCRN.  
On the other hand, the network throughput rate was affected by the associated 
security and communication time taking over the control and data channels. Since, 
more time is taken over the control channel, this leads to a lower throughput rate, 
especially once a large number of CUs are involved in the communication 
process. This is because the control channel becomes busy when exchanging both 
the security frames that belong to the authentication process, and the other two 
frames belonging to the FCL and SLDCH for each pair of CUs. Although, the 
security time and data frames sizes in the data phase are the same in both 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN, SSMCRN achieves a better throughput rate compared 
to DSMCRN, since the overall communication time over CCC is less. Thus, 
Table  5-4 shows the time over both the control and data channels, and the 
differences in throughput rate in both DSMCRN and SSMCRN for each run, 
which include 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs. 
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Table  5-4: The differences in the time and throughput of DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
Number of CUs 
in each run 
DSMCRN SSMCRN 
Time (ms) Throughput Time (ms) Throughput 
4 CUs 506.38 1.3262*106 41.89 1.6035*10
7
 
8 CUs 1009.55 2.9182*10
6
 80.59 3.6566*10
7 
12 CUs 1512.75 4.3212*10
6
 119.29 5.4812*10
7 
16 CUs 2015.94 5.557*10
6
 157.99 7.0926*10
7 
20 CUs 2519.13 6.6456*10
6
 196.69 8.5137*10
7 
Since both protocols have different mechanisms to authenticate CUs, they 
contribute in addressing the security threats in CRNs. Therefore, Table  5-5 below 
describes and compares the methods of addressing the security threats and 
providing defence against most of the related MAC layer’s attacks in DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN. 
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Table  5-5: Contributions regarding the security threats and countermeasures in DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN 
Security 
requirements 
and threats 
DSMCRN SSMCRN 
Authentication 
Authenticate CUs through the 
applied digital signature  
Authenticate CUs through the applied 
network’s shared key, which is 
obtained in the registration process 
Secure 
communication 
Different symmetric keys are generated for securing the registration, 
authentication and control information exchange and data transmission 
processes. Asymmetric key also is applied to secure the messages’ 
transmissions to the dedicated server.  
Data Integrity  
Message Authentication Code algorithm is applied in the protocol phases 
to ensure the authenticity and data integrity of the transmitted messages   
DoS Attack 
Encrypting and making the FCL 
and SLDCH unreadable to a 
malicious user, who attempts to 
make the SLDCH busy, 
increases the chance of data 
transmission over the SLDCH. 
 Encrypting and making the FCL and 
SLDCH unreadable to a malicious 
user, who attempts to make the 
SLDCH busy, increases the chance of 
data transmission over the SLDCH. 
 Reducing the Request-To-
Authenticate frame which intended to 
be transmitted to the server through 
applying a Prior authentication of the 
sender in the receiver side. 
Non-
repudiation 
Authenticating both senders and 
receivers through verifying their 
digital signatures will ensure 
non-repudiation. 
After authenticating both the sender 
and receiver and generating a shared 
key for only this pair of CUs in order to 
applying and generating a MAC-key 
based on both the user’s ID and the 
message, which they will be encrypted, 
non-repudiation would not be violated.  
Compromised-
Key Attack 
The control information and data transmission are encrypted with different 
shared keys to increase the level of the security and each pair of CUs uses 
a shared key once for exchanging both control information and data 
Spectrum 
sensing data 
manipulation/ 
falsification 
Attack 
Encrypting both the FCL and the associated MAC-key ensure the 
authenticity of the transmitted message and detecting any manipulation has 
been occurred on the received message. 
Forgery Attack 
Authenticating both the sender 
and receiver through the applied 
digital signature provides 
defence against forged 
messages. 
Authenticating both the sender and 
receiver through the applied network 
shared key provides defence against 
forged messages. 
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Table  5-6: Contributions regarding the security threats and countermeasures in DSMCRN and 
SSMCRN (cont.) 
Modification 
Attack 
Generating and encrypting a MAC-key for each transmitted message leads 
to validate the received data at the receiver side by checking the 
authenticity and integrity of the received message. 
MAC address 
Spoofing Attack 
Both protocols provide the authentication mechanisms of both senders and 
receivers in which the user’s identity along with the MAC-key is 
associated with the transmitted messages in encrypted format for the 
message validity and integrity.  
Unauthorised 
Access Attack 
Authenticating both senders and receivers through verifying their digital 
signatures limits the networks access to only authorised users.  
Jamming 
Attacks  
 
Reducing the possible interference that can be created by malicious users 
and leads to DoS through encrypting and hiding both the FCL and 
SLDCH. 
Eavesdropping 
Attack 
The applied authentication mechanisms and encryption of the transmitted 
messages strongly assist and work against intercepting the communication 
process by an attacker for gaining access to data. The encryption 
mechanism makes these encrypted messages useless for the attacker. 
Data Tamper 
Attack 
Apart of the authentication, avoiding the wrong decision made by the 
spectrum management through encrypting and ensuring the integrity of the 
transmitted FCL and SLDCH. 
 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter has described evaluation of the DSMCRN and SSMCRN proposed 
protocols in reference to two main factors associated with the network 
performance. These factors were the communication time over both the control 
and data channels and the successful message delivery rate. In addition, two 
alternative scenarios, with and without LUs activities over the data channel were 
considered for the proposed protocols, to analyse the LUs impact on the 
communication time and throughput. The comparison of both protocols with and 
without the potential modification attack occurrence and its impact on the network 
performance were analysed. The current chapter also examined unauthorised 
access in DSMCRN, in which has a significant influence is placed on the 
communication time and decreasing the throughput rate. The chapter was 
concluded by highlighting the main differences between DSMCRN and SSMCRN 
operations in terms of the security execution time, when obtaining throughput for 
multiple runs including different participatory CUs.  
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In this chapter, several contributions of this research were achieved when the 
proposed security protocols provided defence against different types of threats 
related to the MAC layer that aimed to launch DoS attacks to deteriorate the 
network performance. These can be summarised as follows: 
1- Both DSMCRN and SSMCRN performed successful secure 
communication among only valid CUs through the associated security 
features, and selected the best data channel according to the criteria of the 
highest channel availability that led to increasing the network throughput.   
2- DSMCRN performed defence against unauthorised access by malicious 
users and successfully detected the invalid users who were prohibited from 
continuing the communication with valid CUs. This lead to protecting the 
network resources. 
3- Both protocols protected the sensing results from any modification that 
can be occurred during their transmission. Since the detection mechanism 
on the modification of the FCL prevented incorrect decision making of the 
licensed data channel based on the defined selection criteria, while the 
detection on SLDCH protected the network from DoS attacks. This 
protection was achieved by ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the 
transmitted control messages among CUs. 
4- Protecting and hiding the channel sensing results, which is considered one 
of the network components and resources, from adversary users (internal 
and external) by limiting the recognition of the FCL and SLDCH to only 
the sender and receiver CUs, so that protect the availability of the SLDCH 
to this pair of CUs and reduces the chance of making the SLDCH 
unavailable or launching interference (jamming attacks) to the CUs.  This 
led to increasing the network throughput. 
5- Reducing the communication time of malicious users over the control 
channel in SSMCRN. This was done by applying fast detection (pre-
authentication) at the receiver side to protect the server from receiving 
fake control frames from the CUs, since these frames can lead to increase 
the overload of the network and server. Thus, detection is performed in the 
earliest stage once the malicious user transmit ITA frame for requesting 
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and setting the communication with a CU. It significantly ensured the 
credibility of the robust security features that are integrated with the 
protocol. However, there was no need to launch an attack based on 
unauthorised access while the receiver has the accountability to pre-
authenticate the sender by using the‎network’s‎ shared‎key to decrypt the 
received content of the ITA frame. If the decryption has proceeded 
successfully then the RTA frame is sent to the dedicated server for the 
final authentication and obtaining the security key assigned for those pair 
of CUs. Therefore, the early stage of detecting malicious users, who 
attempt to obtain the advantages of the network components and its 
resources will:  
- Reduce the communication over the CCC and make it available 
for others instead of transmitting RTA to the server for 
validating the sender.  
- Protect the server from receiving unauthentic frames, which 
leads to increase the server’s overload. 
The next chapter will deliver a comparative analysis of the proposed and two 
benchmarks protocols, with and without incorporating the security features. Thus, 
the MCRN, which was discussed in chapter 3, will be compared with two 
benchmark protocols. In addition, two versions of the security features have been 
added to both the proposed MCRN and resulting in introducing two versions of 
security protocols recognise as Digital-signature based Secure MAC protocol for 
CRNs (DSMCRN) and Shared-key based secure MAC protocol for CRNs 
(SSMCRN) that were discussed in the current chapter will be compared with the 
two benchmarks after adding the security algorithms. 
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Chapter 6  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
PROPOSED AND BENCHMARK PROTOCOLS 
Since the proposed MCRN was designed and detailed in section 3.2, its 
simulation part and performance analysis are introduced in this chapter. The 
chapter also presents two different comparative approaches, to highlight the 
differences between the proposed and the benchmark protocols, with and without 
security features included. The details of the benchmark protocols operations 
before and after incorporating two versions of the security features will be 
provided. In addition, the chapter includes an evaluation of the throughput 
analysis and time performance, which are both considered significant factors in 
research aiming to evaluate proposed protocols for comparison with benchmark 
protocols. The comparisons consider two different scenarios; over the selected 
data channels: with and without LUs activities. 
6.1. Simulation and performance evaluation of the 
MCRN 
The same discussion of both the simulation part and network parameters that were 
introduced in sections 5.3 and 5.3.1 are applied here for the MCRN and 
benchmark protocols without security. Thus, Table  6-1 gives the frames and their 
sizes that are used in the MCRN protocol. 
 
The pseudo code of the proposed MCRN protocol is shown as follows: 
  
Table ‎6-1: MCRN frames 
Name of the 
parameter 
Value Description 
RTS 20 bytes Request-To-Send frame 
CTS 20 bytes Clear-To-Send frame 
Data 1520 bytes Data frame 
ACK 20 bytes Acknowledgement frame 
Comparative analysis of the proposed and benchmark protocols 
170 
 
MCRN protocol pseudo code 
================================================= 
1. Wait for Random time 
2. IF    RTS found 
Then    Go To 4 
Else    Send RTS 
Endif 
3. Check IF    CTS received 
Then Go To 7 
Else    Go To 1 
Endif 
4. IF    the RTS for him/her self 
Then     Send CTS  
Else    wait for NAV time, then Go To 1 
Endif 
5. Switch to SLDCH 
6. IF    LU is ON 
Then     wait for expiring time, then Go To 1 
Else    Go To 7 
Endif 
7. Transmit/Receiving Data  
Go To 1 
================================================= 
6.1.1. Channel sensing results 
Figure  6-1 demonstrates the white spaces and the LUs’ activities over the licensed 
data channels. The spectrum sensing results of these channels are determined by 
CUs, who are contributing in the communication process to observe the LUs’ 
activities over these channels. In each channel, the X-axis represents the duration 
of the LUs’ activities in microseconds while the Y-axis shows the amplitude of 
the LUs’ activities (the signal strength is represented by the American Standard 
Code for Information Interchange, ASCII, format (Injosoft, 2015) since the LUs 
activities pattern falls out of the scope of this thesis). Therefore, each CU senses 
the 10 channels and records the channels’ status that is whether the LUs are ON or 
OFF. The green area indicates the LUs activities over each channel and signals 
that the channel is ON whereas the white area refers to the availability of the 
channel with the LUs being OFF. Thus, the channels’ holes are easily determined 
and enable the launch of data transmission based on previous channel prediction. 
For instance, in channel 1 most of the channel status is not efficiently utilised and 
an LU appears to be ON at the time of 1.9*10
4
µsecs; however channel 10 has less 
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availability because the LU is ON during most of the recorded period. In this case 
CUs consider channel 1 as the highest priority and the most reliable channel for 
data channel selection criteria due to its higher availability than others and the 
possibility of successful data transmission between a pair of CUs increase. In 
contrast, channel 10 is recorded as the lowest priority due to its low availability 
because the LU is ON for most of the duration. This decreases the chance of 
successful data transmission between a pair of CUs.  
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Figure ‎6-1: Recording LUs activities over licensed data channels 
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6.1.2. Control channel activities  
The effect of the control channel activity is based on the number of CUs attempt 
to content and reserve the channel to exchange the control information. It is 
obvious that each pair reserves the control channel for a specific time duration as 
they are required to send only the RTS and CTS frames. Thus, the channel is 
simultaneously occupied by different pairs of CUs as soon as it becomes idle. The 
control channel availability depends on the number of associated CUs who need 
to initiate communication. Therefore, each pair of CUs requires 109.91µsecs, 
while 10 pairs require 1099.1µsecs in all to exchange their control frames. 
In order to calculate the required time to successfully exchange control 
information over the CCC (TCCC) between the sender and receiver, the following 
Equation 5 is applied in MCRN protocol.   
    2*CCC DIFS RTS CTS SIFST T T T T     
Equation 5: Time to successfully exchange control frames in MCRN 
6.1.3. Probability of successful access of common control 
channel 
The most significant part of the CRNs is the exchange of the control information 
belonging to FCLs among CUs in order to determine the criteria of selecting the 
appropriate data channel to initiating the data transmission. This FCL is referred 
to as control information and is exchanged over a CCC. The CCC access 
mechanism in the proposed MCRN is based on the IEEE 802.11 wireless standard 
(Dappuri & Venkatesh, 2014). However, a large number of CUs, which attempt to 
access the CCC, decrease the Probability of Successful Access due to possible 
collisions. Therefore, the transmission process is initiated solely when the idle 
time of the CCC is equivalent to the DIFS time. However, when there is a 
collision, CUs necessitate the selection of a random back off time from the range 
[0, CNTWindow -1] where CNTWindow indicates the size of the Contention Window 
(CNTWindow) which is set to 32 in the MCRN. The following Equation 6 is derived 
from (Vu & Sakurai, 2006) and belongs to the collision probability (PCCC) of the 
contention process to access the CCC by CUs.  
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11
1( ) CUsCCC
N
P
CNTWindow

   
 Equation 6: The collision probability of the contention process to access the CCC 
In order to avoid collision of CUs for CCC access, the Equation 7, which is 
derived from (Vu & Sakurai, 2006), is used to contribute to the Probability of 
Successful Access of Common Control Channel (PSCCC). Where NCUs signifies 
the number of CUs trying access CCC.  
11
1 1( ) CUsSCCC
N
P
CNTWindow

        
Equation 7: The probability of successful access of CCC 
6.1.4. Communication time over control and data 
channels 
Figure  6-2 shows the communication time over the control and data channels for 
each pair of CUs. Each pair exchanges 1500 bytes of payload after the data 
channel is determined. Therefore, the total time to successfully exchange the 
control information within the RTS and CTS and 1500 bytes of data for the first 
pair of CUs (CU1 and CU2), who first won in the channel contention process, is 
1242.82µsecs. 
However, the second pair of CUs (CU9 and CU10), who the second winner in the 
control channel contention, requires a waiting time equal to 109.91µsecs to access 
the CCC as it is reserved for the first pair of CUs and the channel is vacated after 
this period of time. Then both the sender (CU9) and receiver (CU10) necessitate 
1242.82µsecs to successfully complete the data communication.  
The waiting time to launch the RTS frame belonging to Group 3 of CUs (CU11 
and CU12) is doubled to 2*109.91µsecs since the control channel is busy 
exchanging four control frames belonging to Groups 1 and 2. In addition to this 
time, the third pair of CUs also requires 1242.82µsecs to complete their entire 
communication over both channels. This process is repeated for the remaining 7 
groups of CUs including the waiting time for the control channel to be vacated 
and available for the next pair of CUs in order to avoid any collisions. 
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In order to calculate the total required time to exchange the control and data 
phases of the MCRN protocol (TTMCRN) between senders and receivers 
successfully the following Equation 8 is applied. 
     3*MCRN DIFS RTS CTS Data ACK SIFST T T T T T T       
Equation 8: Total time to successfully exchange control and data frames in MCRN
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Figure ‎6-2: Total communication times for 10 pairs of CUs over control and data channels  
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However, Figure  6-3 demonstrates a scenario in which the communication 
activities of 10 pairs of CUs, and the prediction activities of LUs take place over 
10 data channels. In each data channel, the x-axis explains which LUs are busy 
and which have free time; the green areas show the busy signals for the LUs and 
the remainder are available to the CU. Therefore, the red areas represent the CUs 
activities in the white space in each channel. However, the y-axis shows the 
amplitude of the LUs’ and CUs’ activities (the signal strength is represented by 
the ASCII format).  
As discussed in (Hussein, et al., 2013) CUs are allowed to share the spectrum with 
LUs with some restrictions such as the transmitted power’s limitation. Thus 20 
CUs are involved in the communication and initially two users, who won in the 
channel contention process perform the successful exchange of the control 
information over the CCC and select a data channel based on the highest available 
time as shown in channel 1 while the rest of CUs wait until the first group moved 
from the control to the data channels. Then, again contention process starts and 
only one CU wins the contention, which then leads to exchange the control 
information between the next pair of CUs and so on. Generally, channel 1, which 
is occupied by the first group of CUs; CU1 and CU2, has the maximum time of 
availability since LUs utilise the current channel after a period of time equal to 
1.9*10
4
µses. This makes this channel is the most reliable data channel for the first 
pair of CUs to transmit the data. In contrast, channel 10, which is occupied by the 
last pair of users, CU11 and CU12, has the lowest time availability in which the 
LU is predicted to appear in approximately 0.2*10
4
µses and this results in channel 
10 having the lowest priority in terms of data channel selection criteria. Although 
the time of the CU activities over these channels is equal, since they have the 
same size of data to exchange, their communication process is initiated at 
different times based on the waiting time of the control channel’s availability. For 
instance, the first pair of CUs utilises the CCC immediately after the successful 
contention process for the channel utilisation while the last pair of CUs (CU11 
and CU12) had to wait 9*109.91µsecs to content the CCC and  initiate their 
communication over CCC and SLDCH respectively. The time required over the 
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control channel would influence the data channel availability since the LUs have 
priority to utilise the licensed data channel at any time. 
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Figure ‎6-3: 1500 bytes of Data activities over the SLDCHs (Red colour represents CUs activities and green colour represents the LUs activities) 
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However, Figure  6-4 shows the overall time in microseconds which is required for 
20 CUs to successfully complete the communication process in the MCRN 
protocol. This time refers to both the period over the CCC for control frames 
exchange and the period over the SLDCHs for data transmission for 10 pairs of 
CUs. Both the number and the sizes of the control frames significantly affect the 
time of the frames exchange between two CUs. Moreover, the overall time 
increases with the number of participating CUs. This is common sense where each 
sender wins contention for accessing the CCC to launch their RTS and CTS 
frames for channel selection and this requires 109.91µsecs where each pair needs 
1132.91µsecs to exchange their data and ACK frames over the SLDCH.  
 
Figure ‎6-4: Total communication time of 20 pair of CUs in MCRN  
6.1.5. Throughput analysis of the MCRN 
The parameters of the throughput analysis, as discussed in section 5.3.3 for the 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols, remained the same when analysing the 
throughput factors in MCRN protocol.  
Therefore, Figure  6-5 demonstrates the throughput factor in MCRN for five runs 
including 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs without LU activities. It is obvious that the 
message of a successful delivery increases in each run due to the increase in the 
number of the CUs who participated in the communication and exchange of 1500 
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bytes of data. Although each pair of CUs requires a time equal to 109.91µsecs 
over the CCC, the increase of the throughput rate remains significant in each run 
where the CUs increase. This is due to the availability of the determined data 
channels that aim to perform the successful switch by the participating CUs and 
results in each SLDCH being occupied by a single pair of CUs for data 
transmission. This clearly indicates the main advantages of the CR technology in 
terms of improving the use of channels since 10 data channels are available and 
utilised by those CUs.  
However, the throughput rate can also be affected by the LUs activities. For 
example, in the second run where 2 pairs of CUs exchanged their data (see 
Figure  6-6), the throughput rate decreased to 1*109 compared with the same run 
in Figure  6-5. This decrease resulted from the occupation of a single data channel 
by an LU who has priority in the use of the licensed data channels. Apart of this, 
the throughout rate remained the same as in other runs where the data channels are 
available due to the status of the LUs being OFF. 
 
Figure ‎6-5: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in MCRN without LUs activities 
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Figure ‎6-6: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in MCRN with LUs activities 
6.2. Benchmarks CREAM and RACRN protocols 
Both Cognitive Radio-EnAbled Multi-channel MAC (CREAM-MAC) (Zhang & 
Su, 2011) and Cognitive-radio-based carrier sense medium access with collision 
avoidance (CR-CSMA/CA) (Qian, et al., 2013) for CRNs are two different 
benchmarks protocols. These protocols were discussed in Chapter 2, section 
2.1.1.2. Thus, they are selected among the available MAC protocols, since they 
are well known for decentralised CRNs, and are the closest to the proposed 
MCRN in the two networks features. These features include the use of a dedicated 
control channel to exchange control information among participating CUs in the 
communication, and multiple Licensed Data Channels (LDCHs), which are 
involved for data transmission. However, due to the long names of these 
protocols, they are renamed and abbreviated only in this thesis, to CREAM and 
RACRN instead of CREAM-MAC and CR-CSMA/CA respectively. Thus, from 
this point, these two abbreviations will be used and appear all the time when they 
are used.  
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6.3. Handshaking frames over the control channel 
and data channels in MCRN, CREAM and 
RACRN 
Table  6-2 below demonstrates the number of control and data phases’ frames, and 
their sizes in MCRN and the benchmarks protocols. Despite all the protocols 
considering two different frames, known as data and ACK in the data phase, the 
number of control frames does not remain the same, since only 2 frames are used 
in MCRN, while 4 and 3 frames are exchanged in CREAM and RACRN 
respectively. This is considered as a clear contribution point of this research, since 
MCRN performs the negotiation with less hand shaking frames, leading to a 
reduction of the communication time over the control channel and resulting in 
accomplishing fast switching to the SLDCH. Moreover, both CREAM and 
MCRN protocols use 20 bytes of common control and data frames; whereas, 
RACRN uses different sizes and equals 14 bytes in PTS and CTS, while the RTS 
size remains the same, and equal to 20 bytes. 
It is not possible to deny that, the smaller sizes of frame exchange lead to 
reservations in the channels for a shorter time; however, the extra handshaking 
frames increase the time over the control channel, since both the size of the 
transmitted control frames and SIFS are two contributory factors leading to 
reserving the channel for extra time. This case is applied to both the benchmark 
protocols, since MCRN reduces the number of the handshaking frames over the 
CCC. 
Table  6-2: Control and data frames in MCRN, CREAM and RACRN 
Protocols 
Control 
frames 
Control frames’ sizes in byte 
Data 
frames 
Data and ACK frames’ 
sizes in byte 
MCRN 2 RTS= 20  and CTS= 20 2 Data= 1520 and ACK= 20 
CREAM 4 
RTS= 20, CTS= 20, CST= 20 
and CSR= 20 
2 Data= 1520 and ACK= 20 
RACRN 3 PTS= 14, RTS= 20 and CTS= 14 2 Data= 1514 and ACK= 14 
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6.4. Comparative analysis of the proposed and 
benchmarks protocols without security 
Both the communication time and successful messages delivery are the two 
network performance factors aiming for a comparison’s analysis of both MCRN 
against the benchmark protocols, CREAM and RACRN, when not incorporating 
security.  
6.4.1. Time performance analysis of MCRN, CREAM 
and RACRN  
Although, the proposed MCRN protocol has been discussed and analysed in 
section 3.2, it is also introduced in this section as a constituent of the comparisons 
against the benchmark protocols. These protocols do not incorporate security 
features and their analysis is required to compare their performance in terms of 
communication time and throughput rate. Moreover, the LUs activities are taken 
into the consideration to analyse their potential impacts on channel availability 
and network performance in general. Therefore, both the time taken for the 
communication process, and the message delivery rate with and without LUs 
activities in the network in the proposed and benchmark protocols are discussed 
next.  
Figure  6-7 illustrates the time spent on the communication process in 
microseconds for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs in the proposed and 
benchmark protocols, without considering the security features. This time refers to 
both the period consumed over the control channel to exchange the control 
frames, and the period over the SLDCH to transmit 1500 bytes of data. Both the 
number and sizes of the handshaking control frames considerably affects the 
communication time for the frames’ exchanges between senders and receivers. 
Consequently, it is clear that CREAM requires more time to exchange messages 
successfully than RACRN and the proposed MCRN protocols in each run. This is 
because there are 4 handshaking frames belonging to each pair of CUs, which are 
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transmitted over the control channel in CREAM, while 3 and 2 frames for 
RACRN and MCRN respectively are launched over the same channel. 
Moreover, the overall times in the benchmarks and the proposed MCRN protocols 
increase as soon as the participating number of CUs is increased in each run. This 
is logical when each sender necessitates contention access the control channel to 
launch his or her RTS frames for data channel selection. However, a large and 
notable performance is achieved by MCRN compared to the benchmarks protocol, 
especially once the number of contributing CUs is increased due to the fewer 
handshaking frames that have been transmitted over the control channel, which 
lead to fast switching of the SLDCH for data transmission. Although, the RACRN 
operates based on 3 handshaking frames over the control channel, it is closer to 
the proposed MCRN than CREAM protocols in each run, due to the smaller sizes 
of the control frames transmitted, compared to those in the MCRN.  
Thus, in the first run, where 2 pairs of CUs communicate, the total time required 
to successfully complete the communication process is 1439.27µsecs in CREAM, 
1361.09µsecs in RACRN and 1352.73µsecs in MCRN. However, in the second 
run, where 4 pairs of CUs are communicating, the total time for completing the 
data transmissions over the different SLDCHs increases by 306.09µsecs in 
CREAM, 239.82µsecs in RACRN and 219.82µsecs in MCRN. These increases 
resulted from exchanging the control frames, belonging to the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 
participating pairs of CUs. Therefore, requirements are: 1745.36µsecs in 
CREAM, 1600.91µsecs in RACRN and 1572.55µsecs in MCRN. This process 
remains the same for the third, fourth and final runs, where 6, 8 and 10 pairs of 
CUs contributed to the communication in the same order.  
It is notable that, the differences in the time are significantly distinct in cases 
where a large number of CUs are participating in the network. For instance, in the 
last run, CREAM necessitates the highest time, equalling 2664.71µsecs, to 
successfully exchange the data among the intended CUs, while the proposed 
MCRN requires the lowest time and is equal to 2232.01µsecs when exchanging 
the same data. Thus, achieving the lowest time for successfully completed the 
communication among CUs by MCRN is considered as one of the contribution 
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point of this research since the communication time is critical for CUs needing to 
switch to the SLDCH and perform data transmission. 
 
Figure ‎6-7: Communication time of 20 pair of CUs in MCRN, CREAM and RACRN with and 
without LUs activities 
6.4.2. Throughput performance analysis of MCRN, 
CREAM and RACRN  
Figure  6-8 shows the message delivery rate in both the MCRN and benchmark 
protocols for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs without LUs activities. 
The discussion of the throughput increase in the protocols for each run is 
associated with the number for the contributing CUs; since each sender transmits 
a message over a different SLDCH. Therefore, is apparent that the throughput 
increases dramatically in each run, since the SLDCHs are available to the CUs to 
initiate the data transmissions. However, although, the throughput rate in the 
MCRN is higher than the message delivery rate in the benchmarks for each run, 
the difference is significant between MCRN and CREAM. This is because the 
higher communication time is required among the contributing CUs to exchange 
the control frames over the control channel in the CREAM. Moreover, in each run 
of the MCRN and other benchmarks, the difference in throughput continuously 
increased, due to the increase in the number of successful data exchange among 
the participated CUs over the SLDCHs.  
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Figure ‎6-8: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in MCRN, CREAM and RACRN without LUs 
activities 
However, Figure  6-9 shows the message delivery rate in both the MCRN and 
benchmark protocols for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20 CUs with LUs 
activities. The same discussion of the throughput increases, and its comparison in 
the MCRN and benchmarks protocols for the previous figure is applied here. 
However, the LUs activities play a major role in utilising the LDCH with higher 
priority; therefore, it can be observed that the increase in the throughput in the 
second run is slight compared to that in the others runs, as the LU turned ON in 
the current run, for utilising a single LDCH, and this led to the channel being 
vacated by the CUs. As a result, the CUs are unable to transmit data over this busy 
channel causing a decrease in throughput, compared to the situation in which the 
channel is available and utilised by the CUs. However, the status of the 
throughput increases in the remaining runs is dramatic compared to those in the 
second run, since the LUs remain OFF during the communication process. 
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Figure ‎6-9: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in MCRN, CREAM and RACRN with LUs activities 
A clear contribution point of this research is accomplished in this section by 
obtaining a higher throughput that is achieved by the MCRN compared to the 
benchmark protocols. This is due to the less communication time, which is 
inversely proportional with the throughput, is performed by the MCRN for a pair 
of CUs over CCC and subsequent switching to the SLDCH and initiate data 
transmission.   
6.5. Comparative analysis of the proposed and 
benchmark protocols with security  
This section considers the same analytical approaches to throughput and 
communication time for the same proposed and benchmark protocols after adding 
two different security features belonging to the digital signatures and shared key 
for the authentication procedure. Therefore, these protocols are recognised as 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN, as discussed before in Chapter 4, and compared against 
the same benchmark protocols after adding the same security features. Therefore, 
for the digital signature MAC protocols group, the DSMCRN will be compared 
with both Digital Signature based Cognitive Radio-EnAbled Multi-channel MAC 
(DSCREAM) and Digital Signature based cognitive Radio medium Access for 
Cognitive Radio Network (DSRACRN), while for the shared key MAC protocols, 
the SSMCRN will be compared with both Shared-key based Secure Cognitive 
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Radio-EnAbled Multi-channel MAC (SSCREAM) and Shared-key based Secure 
cognitive Radio medium Access for Cognitive Radio Network (SSRACRN).  
6.5.1. Time performance analysis of DSMCRN, 
DSCREAM and DSRACRN  
Figure  6-10 shows the difference in the time taken for a single pair of CUs to 
communicate with each other in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and DSRACRN 
protocols. It is evident that the difference is very small due to the security time, 
which is significantly large, due to both the RSA encryption and decryption, as 
well as applying the digital signature for authenticating CUs. Thus, there are only 
1.27µsecs different between DSMCRN and DSRACRN and 46.12µsecs between 
DSMCRN and DSCREAM. This is a clear contribution point of this research 
where the DSMCRN showing less time required for successful secure data 
exchange among valid CUs compared to the benchmark protocols (DSRACRN 
and DSCREAM) due to the less handshaking of frames.    
 
Figure ‎6-10: Communication time of a single pair of CUs in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and 
DSRACRN 
However, Figure  6-11 demonstrates the communication time required to 
successfully exchange the control and data frames for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 
16, and 20 CUs in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and DSRACRN. As discussed 
previously, the time to access and exchange the control frames over the control 
channel increases, as soon as the number of joined CUs increases, since each 
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sender necessitates launching of the ITA frame. Thus, the communication time for 
these control frames doubles in each run, compared to the previous run. However, 
it is difficult to observe the time differences in the current figure for both the 
DSMCRN and benchmarks protocols, as they have same lengthy security time, 
while the communication time is very short, as discussed in the previous figure. 
This makes these trends very closely aligned, requiring maximisation for each 
run.  
 
Figure ‎6-11: Communication time of 20 pair of CUs in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and DSRACRN 
without LUs activities 
6.5.2. Throughput performance analysis of DSMCRN, 
DSCREAM and DSRACRN  
Figure  6-12 shows the throughput rate for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 
CUs without LUs activities in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and DSRACRN. Since the 
SLDCH are available for the CUs’ message transmissions, and the LUs are OFF 
during the communication process, the messages are successfully delivered to the 
intended destinations. The number of transmitted messages increased in each run, 
due to the number of participating CUs, and the availability of the LDCHs 
function; the successful message delivery resulted in an increased throughput rate. 
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Figure ‎6-12: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and DSRACRN without 
LUs activities 
However, Figure  6-13 demonstrates the successful message delivery rate for five 
runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 CUs, with LUs activities in DSMCRN, 
DSCREAM and DSRACRN. A component of what has been discussed in the 
previous figure without the LUs activities, the throughput rate in the second run of 
the proposed DSMCRN and the benchmarks is different compared to the scenario 
without the LUs activities, due to channel occupancy by the LUs. This affects the 
throughput rate, since the number of the data channels decreases, while the 
number of contributing CUs remains the same. Thus, there is a slight increase 
compared to the scenario without LUs in the rate of the message delivery, since 
the LU, who has the priority to utilise it, occupies a single data channel. However, 
the throughput rates for other runs remain the same, since the LUs are OFF and 
this results in making the SLDCHs available to the CUs. 
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Figure ‎6-13: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in DSMCRN, DSCREAM and DSRACRN with LUs 
activities 
6.5.3. Time performance analysis of SSMCRN, 
SSCREAM and SSRACRN  
Figure  6-14 demonstrates the communication and security time frame for a single 
pair of CUs in the SSMCRN, SSCREAM and SSRACRN protocols. It is clear 
that the proposed SSMCRN protocol perform better and faster than the 
benchmark protocols, since 1.27µsecs and 46.18µsecs are the additional times 
taken in SSRACRN and SSCREAM respectively, compared to the 
communication time in SSMCRN. Therefore, this is considered as another 
contribution point of this research since the secure communication time in 
SSMCRN is less compared to that in the benchmark protocols (SSRACRN and 
SSCREAM).   
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Figure ‎6-14: Communication time of a single pair of CUs in SSMCRN, SSCREAM and 
SSRACRN without LUs activities 
Figure  6-15 demonstrates the communication time required to successfully 
exchange the control and data frames for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 
CUs in SSMCRN, SSCREAM and SSRACRN. It can be seen that the throughput 
rate in SSMCRN and the benchmarks increases dramatically in each run, because 
of the increase in the number of CUs participating in the communication process. 
Therefore, the status of the time increase is constant in each run, due to the 
availability of the SLDCHs for those CUs; and there are no activities belonging to 
the LUs over these SLDCHs. However, the communication times for these 
protocols are close, since the same applied security features are considered, and 
the difference is apparent in the communication time, relative to the associated 
frames in the benchmark protocols, as shown in the previous figure. This makes 
these trends very closely aligned, requiring maximisation for each run. 
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Figure ‎6-15: Communication time of 20 pairs of CUs in SSMCRN, SSCREAM and SSRACRN 
without LUs activities 
6.5.4. Throughput performance analysis of SSMCRN, 
SSCREAM and SSRACRN  
Figure  6-16 demonstrates the successful message delivery rate for five runs, 
including 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 CUs without LUs activities in SSMCRN, 
SSCREAM and SSRACRN. Generally, the throughput rate increases in each run 
because of the number of messages transmitted by the participating CUs. 
However, the security time affects throughput rate, and it can be seen that the 
difference in the message delivery rate for the proposed protocol and the 
benchmarks is not significant. This is because the large time relates to the same 
applied security features in each protocol compared to the time for the same 
protocols in the scenario not involving security features (see Figure  6-8). The 
throughput increase for each protocol remains continuous in each run, because the 
SLDCHs by CUs are available and not utilised by the LUs, which are OFF during 
message transmissions; this leads to increased throughput of data 
communications.  
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Figure ‎6-16: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in SSMCRN, SSCREAM and SSRACRN without 
LUs activities 
Figure  6-17 demonstrates the throughput rate for five runs, including 4, 8, 12, 16, 
and 20 CUs with LUs activities in SSMCRN, SSCREAM and SSRACRN. 
Although, the message delivery rate for the proposed and benchmark protocols 
increased in each run, due to the increase in the senders, the LUs activities had a 
considerable impact on throughput rates. This influence resulted from LUs 
occupying a licensed data channel, making it unavailable for CUs willing to 
transmit data. An obvious example is shown in the second run, where 8 CUs 
participate in the communication process in the figure. Therefore, the throughput 
pattern is different compared to the scenario in which the LUs are OFF during the 
communication (see Figure  6-16). Thus, there is a slight increase in the 
throughput rate in the second run of the SSMCRN and benchmark protocols; 
however, the throughput increases dramatically to the point that it should be in the 
third run due to the increase in both the number of transmitted message and the 
channels available for the contributing CUs. Therefore, the increase in the status 
of the throughput remains the same in the 4
th
 and final run compared to the 
scenario where the LUs are OFF. 
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Figure ‎6-17: Throughput for 20 pair of CUs in SSMCRN, SSCREAM and SSRACRN with LUs 
activities 
Therefore, based on the comparison results of the proposed and benchmarks 
protocols with and without security and with and without the LUs appearance 
scenarios, it is clear that the number of the transmitted control frames significantly 
affects the communication time over the CCC in general. This effect plays a major 
role on the switching time to the SLDCH for each pair of CUs. Thus, there is no 
doubt about the fact that throughput results are different from protocol to another 
since the communication time differs on each protocol with and without 
incorporating the security features. As the correlation between the throughput and 
communication time is significantly inversely linked to each other in which the 
increase in the communication time leads to the decrease of the throughput and 
vice versa as explained in section 5.3.3. 
6.6. Summary 
The current chapter mainly presented the simulation of a novel MAC protocol for 
decentralised CRNs (MCRN). The protocol promotes efficient use of unused 
licensed channels and enables Cognitive Users (CUs) to transmit their data 
successfully over licensed channels without any hindrance to Licensed Users 
(LUs). The status of the LUs over the licensed channels is determined before data 
transmission takes place. The protocol uses a dedicated Common Control Channel 
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(CCC) for only control information exchange among CUs and multiple Licensed 
Data Channels (LDCHs) are involved in the data transmission.  
In addition, the chapter introduced two different phases of the comparative 
analysis, focusing on the communication time and throughput rate. The first 
involved a comparison of network performance for the proposed MCRN, and the 
benchmarks CREAM and RACRN protocols. It also included two different 
scenarios, i.e. with the LUs ON or OFF, to investigate the LUs impacts on the 
performance of the entire network. Thus, the proposed MCRN achieved better 
performance compared to the others, since it was based on fewer handshaking 
frames, which aimed to perform faster when switching to SLDCH to initiate the 
data transmission.  
However, the second phase incorporates two different versions of the applied 
security features; a digital signature, and a shared key, for authentication 
procedures in the proposed and benchmark protocols. Therefore, although the 
differences in network performance are considerably obvious in the comparison 
task for the proposed and benchmarks protocols without incorporating security, 
this is not significant, since the security features are applied in them. The reason 
for this relates to the length of time for the applied security frames and the 
execution time for the security algorithms. Thus, it results in a small difference in 
obtained communication times and the throughput rate results for the proposed 
and benchmarks protocols, based on the digital signature and the shared key 
security versions.   
Therefore, the highlighted contributions of this research that has been addressed in 
this chapter can be summarised as the follows:   
1- Reserving the CCC for less communication time to make it available for 
the next pair of CUs in the MCRN, DSMCRN and SSMCRN as compared 
to the other benchmark protocols with and without security. This is 
achieved as the proposed protocols have less handshaking frames 
compared to the benchmark protocols. 
2- Higher successful message delivery rate is accomplished by the MCRN, 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN as compared to those in the benchmarks 
protocols with and without security. This is obtained when the lower 
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latency of the complete control information exchange between a pair of 
CUs and subsequently led to less time being needed to switch to the 
SLDCH for initiating data transmission. 
The next chapter will conclude the thesis. It includes three main parts: a summary 
of the research, a summary of the research contributions achieved, and future 
work. 
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Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes this thesis by first explaining what has been achieved by 
this research thus far, to meet the primary aim of deploying secure MAC protocols 
for the CRNs, then summarising the research contributions, and followed by 
proposing related future work. 
7.1. Summary of the current research   
Since CRNs have their own characteristics and functions to enable unlicensed 
users to communicate over a licensed band, it is crucial that LUs meet the 
condition of non-interference. This approach is considered highly advantageous 
for several reasons, such as; 
1- The ability to improve the spectrum utilisations, 
3- Increase wireless devices to establish communication,  
4- Overcome issues with limited and under-utilised spectrums.  
Thus, CR technology has become a successful research topic, aiming to address 
communication within the CRNs environment. Since spectrum sharing is 
considered one of the main functions CRNs must provide, the communication 
process among CUs is based on three classifications, which are variously 
recognised as Network architecture, Access technology and Allocation behaviour. 
These determine the methodology for successful communication and message 
transmission between the intended users. 
Therefore, an effective improvement of the successful communication between 
CUs in decentralised CRNs was achieved by the proposed MAC protocol for 
Cognitive Radio Networks (MCRN). Since the related existing approaches in the 
literature require additional frames to be exchanged between the senders and 
receivers, the proposed protocols offered efficient functionality for the objective 
of gaining better communication among CUs through reducing the number of 
handshaking frames over the CCC. This has led to performing fast switching from 
the CCC to the selected data channel and offering the CCC availability to the next 
pair of CUs. Thus, the proposed MCRN protocol was designed (in sections 3.2), 
then simulated, successfully tested, and evaluated by performing comparison 
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against two different related approaches (in section 6.4), in terms of time 
performance and throughput. 
However, security is fundamental to maintaining a successful communication 
process among intended recipients, since an entire network performance can 
easily deteriorate as a consequence of malicious behaviours and attacks, such as 
the modification and forgery of transmitted messages, unauthorised access, DoS, 
masquerading, replay, and non-repudiation. Therefore, this research has 
successfully addressed the aim and objectives stated in section 1.7 for providing 
required security in CRNs to ensure the maintenance of effective secure 
communication among legitimate CUs, and providing protection and detection 
mechanisms against threats targeting spectrum sharing and spectrum management 
that lead to DoS attacks. This is accomplished by investigating the existing secure 
MAC protocols in CRNs and identifying different types of attacks that are 
possible in CRNs (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). This has led to the proposal and 
design of two different versions of hybrid secure MAC protocols based on digital 
signature and shared key (see section 3.3) to investigate and analyse the 
authentication mechanisms and how these different security algorithms can affect 
the network performance and throughput. Although, each attack employs a unique 
method and technique when launched, when combined, a variety of security 
features can provide effective defence against each malicious approach. 
Specifically, cryptographic algorithms provide great functionality to protect CRNs 
from the potential behaviours mentioned. Message Authentication Code, 
Symmetric and Asymmetric Keys, and digital signature algorithms are 
incorporated within the proposed MCRN protocol. In addition, the security 
analysis of the proposed protocol using the BAN formal logic is performed as an 
initial stage (3.3.6) to validate the protocols in terms of meeting the secure 
communication and the security requirements. A simulation was performed as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 to analyse the performance of the proposed hybrid 
secure MAC protocols. The performance evaluation of the proposed hybrid secure 
MAC protocols against other secure protocols was completed in section 6.5. As a 
result, the proposed security protocols achieved better performance in perspective 
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of fast communication time and higher throughput compared to the two other 
benchmark protocols. 
The following section summarises the main contributions and points leading to 
achieving the aim of this research. 
7.2. Contributions Revisited  
The primary contributions of this thesis are based upon three proposed CRNs’ 
MAC protocols that were classified into two categories: Networking and Security 
protocols and discussed as follows:   
7.2.1. The proposed MCRN network protocol 
The following points are the summary of the achieved contributions by the 
proposed MCRN protocol:  
 Reducing the number of handshaking frames over the CCC effectively 
improved the network efficiency. The comparison results showed that 
the proposed MCRN achieved better performance related to less 
communication time and higher throughput compared to the benchmarks, 
since it aimed to reserve the CCC for a shorter time, due to exchanging 
fewer handshaking frames. The enhanced communication time among 
CUs led to speeding up the switch to SLDCH for initiating data 
transmissions, which in turn led to achieve higher throughput compared to 
the existing related protocols (as discussed in section 6.4.2).  
 The proposed protocol offers the network availability to a large 
number of CUs compared to the existing related approaches. 
Therefore, each pair of CUs requires less communication time over the 
control channel. This led to performing speeding up the switch to SLDCH 
and resulting in vacating the current channel to the other CUs within the 
network. 
7.2.2. Security protocols 
A robust protection and detection security mechanisms are offered by both 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN proposed protocols for controlling the network and 
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guarding its resources. The proposed security protocols overcome the limitations 
in the existing techniques in literature by improving the network performance and 
delivering a complete and efficient security approach that was experimentally 
validated and tested for ensuring successful secure communication. The proposed 
protocols incorporate appropriate security algorithms that remarkably ensure the 
objectives of maintaining the network operation and accomplish the CUs demand 
of performing successful secure communication with aim of improved network 
performance. These are achieved by utilising effective mitigation and defence 
procedures against the potential threats that commonly target the network 
communication and resources.  
Thus, the following points are the contributions that are obtained by the proposed 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols: 
 Protecting the channel sensing results and selected licensed data 
channels: The proposed DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols ensure the 
spectrum management performs the right decision and successfully defend 
against Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification attacks, which in turn cause a 
DoS. This is successfully accomplished by confirming the authenticity and 
integrity of the transmitted both sensing results and SLDCHs. Without 
insuring the control information authenticity and integrity, the network 
operation can be easily compromised by malicious users due its significant 
vulnerability to manipulation and malicious activities. 
 Reducing the possible interference over the selected data channels: 
The proposed security protocols reduce the possible interference (jamming 
attacks) that can occur by malicious users over the selected licensed data 
channel. Thus, the proposed protocols consider the encryption procedure 
of the transmitted available channels between senders and receivers for the 
objective of making the exchanged channels unrecognised and hidden to 
the adversary users, who aim to disturb the communication.  
 Ensuring both authentication and authorisation procedures: The 
propose security protocols limit the network access to only authorised CUs 
and address the mutual authentication factor by considering two different 
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approaches related to digital signature and shared key. Hence, CUs are 
validated at the initial sage before performing spectrum sensing and 
spectrum sharing for determining and exchanging available channels. This 
safeguards the credibility of the network resources from any potential 
security threats that can lead to increasing the chance of DoS attacks. 
 Improving the network efficiency and connectivity: The proposed 
security protocols grant a better and effective approach for secure 
communication between CUs. They successfully adopt a symmetric key 
approach and avoid the use of asymmetric key method, which is 
considered in the existing related techniques in literature, for secure 
communication between senders and receivers. This adoption is essential 
since the security execution time of the symmetric key approach is faster 
than asymmetric key algorithm. Consequently, the overall secure 
communication time over both the control and data channels is 
significantly reduced and led to both improving the network performance 
and the licensed channels availability. 
 Reducing the number of handshaking frames: Form the network 
performance side, the proposed security protocols have led to ensure the 
successful communication among CUs with improved network 
performance related to the communication time and throughput compared 
to the existing approaches in literature. The proposed protocols reduced 
the number of handshaking frames that efficiently decreased the 
communication time and improved throughput. This is significantly 
constructive and important in situations where a large number of CUs exist 
to utilise the CCC. Therefore, the proposed security protocols contributed 
in decreasing the probability of the CCC saturation. Hence, CUs are 
successfully offered with security and higher throughput by the DSMCRN 
and SSMCRN compared to the benchmarks protocols. 
 Protecting the network availability: The SSMCRN performed fast 
detection process of the invalid transmitted messages over the control 
channel. This detection indicates the robust security features associated 
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with the proposed protocol for the aim of decreasing the network and 
server’s overhead. 
7.3. Future work 
Several aspects can be addressed in future to enhance this work, specifically to 
improve the communication among the CUs and to provide defence against 
attacks not considered in this research. These are as follows: 
7.3.1. Incorporating a backup data channel to improve 
network performance 
Since the current research mainly focused on the security of spectrum sharing in 
CRNs and enabling secure communication among authorised CUs, the use of a 
backup data channel remains an effective approach to improving the 
communication process for exchange data. During the data transmission phase, 
both the sender and the receiver can switch to the backup data channel to resume 
the data exchange process, only if the LU is ON (LU’s activities were detected), 
to utilise the licensed data channel. This will be beneficial to the network itself 
and for security reasons.  
For example, on the network side, in the current work, if the LU’s activities are 
detected over the SLDCHs then both senders and receivers are required to vacate 
the data channel (SLDCH) and restart the entire process to determine a different 
SLDCH for data exchange. This leads to an increase in the communication time 
between a pair of CUs over the CCC, resulting in decreasing the network 
throughput and increasing performance time. Moreover, restarting the 
communication process will affect the CCC’s availability and lead to channel 
saturation, due to the increase of the contention for accessing the CCC by a 
number of CUs.  
However, from a security perspective, the use of a backup data channel might 
increase the chance of data exchange between a pair of CUs if an attacker has 
attempted to misbehave by intercepting a communication or by busying the 
SLDCH. In this case, CUs can switch to the determined backup data channel to 
resume communications. For instance, if the sender has transmitted data and is 
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waiting to receive the ACK frame, which is necessary to indicate successful 
message delivery, and an attacker has failed to deliver the ACK frame, then the 
sender can switch to the backup channel for frames exchange. 
Conversely, the deployment of the backup data channel is a challenging task, 
since several factors need to be investigated. For example, the number of 
equipped transceivers and backup channel announcements required to keep the 
channel available to a particular pair of CUs. In cases of associated multiple 
transceivers, an additional transceiver approach is important here if the backup 
data channel is to observe any switching or receive information. Despite the fact 
that the additional transceiver leads to greater energy consumption it will increase 
the chance of successful data exchange between a pair of CUs. However, backup 
channel announcement is an issue that will arise since the encryption mechanism 
assists in hiding both the SLDCH and backup data channel from adversarial users 
who can manipulate or busy these channels. Therefore, it is recommended to 
encrypt the backup data channel and associate it with the SLDCH within the CTS 
frame in DSMCRN and SSMCRN so only a pair of CUs knows the backup 
exchange channel. 
7.3.2. Detection of selfish activities 
Another area requiring future work is the detection of selfish activities that 
adversely affect overall network performance by sending a fake channel list (FCL) 
to disturb the communication process and maximise throughput. However, work 
to date (Huayi & Baohua, 2011) and (Zou & Yoo, 2015) involves puzzle 
banishment and cooperative attack detection scheme (CADC) technique 
respectively to detect selfish users as discussed and detailed in section 2.3.2.1, 
which can be applied to MCRN, DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols to detect 
CUs attempting to misbehave to maximise throughput. 
7.3.3. Detection of Licensed/Primary User Emulation 
(PUE) Attacks  
Since the PUE attack is out of the scope of this thesis as it belongs to the physical 
layer, it is significant to decrease the network’s efficiency by resembling the LU 
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signal, in order to mislead and deceive CUs. Therefore, the fake signals transmitted 
by attackers on the SLDCH lead to the launch of DoS attacks, which require the 
CUs to vacate the SLDCHs. 
Therefore, the use of the public and private key encryption scheme can 
significantly assist to detect fake signals in DSMCRN and SSMCRN and deliver a 
certain advantage to the CUs, enabling legitimate users to differentiate between 
LUs’ and CUs’ signals during data transmission. Therefore, any malicious user 
aiming to deceive the CUs by launching a PUE attack over a licensed data channel 
will be detected. This can be done if a pair of public and private key is used by 
both LUs and CUs in which any transmitted signal by LUs should include a 
specific part that is used by only CUs and needs to be encrypted using the public 
key.  
Therefore, before vacating the SLDCH both CUs who suing the SLDCH perform 
the decryption procedure of the received signals and if they are able to decrypt 
then this indicates the appearance of the LU over the SLDCH. Consequently, both 
CUs require vacating the current data channel. However, if the encrypted signals 
cannot be decrypted due to the applied wrong  public key then both CUs can 
confirm that the launched signals over the SLDCH is fake and generated by a 
malicious user. Thus, this process of the detection is substantially beneficial since 
it does not require any additional hardware or any changes in the network or 
system structure.  
7.3.4. Threshold cryptography against DoS Attack 
A DoS attack can easily be launched against a dedicated server, although this is 
outside the scope of this research since the issue has been arisen and existing in 
the traditional wireless network and not specific to the CRN, it is therefore 
considered as a future work. Since the dedicated server is involved as one of the 
network components and acted as trusted entity for only performing the 
authentication and providing security keys, it is prone to DoS attacks, which is not 
specific to only CRN environments. Therefore, protecting the dedicated server in 
DSMCRN and SSMCRN protocols from a DoS attack is strongly needed to 
maintain successful commination among CUs. One solution is through a 
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technique called threshold cryptography (Tarmizi, et al., 2009) in which the secret 
information is divided into parts and distributed to a number of cooperating 
servers that shared a private key for performing the required sensitive 
functionalities, such as decryption and validation (Ertaul & Chavan, 2005). 
Therefore, the required process works with multiple servers instead of only a 
single one for providing defence against DoS.  
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